
SOCIAL ASPECT OF HUMAN BEING

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Anthropological Sense of History

Purpose. The paper's main purpose is to establish the nature of the historical past's reality and its presence in being. **Theoretical basis.** The author considers historical time as a factor in the identities of individuals and society. The past has a dual ontological status: it is absent as a presence in the literal sense, yet it is embedded in the structure of modernity and influences the future. To substantiate and elucidate the impact of this position on historical cognition, the author employs the methodologies of R. Descartes, E. Husserl, M. Heidegger, F. Ankersmit, and other thinkers. **Originality.** The author has developed a fluid-discrete model of historical time, linking it with the experiences gained by both individuals and society. This historical experience serves as the anthropological foundation of the subject's identity and a guide for reconstructing the past. **Conclusions.** As a historical category, time is only partially connected with time as a subject of discussion in physics and philosophy. All three of these disciplines regard cause-and-effect relationships as fundamental characteristics of time; however, physics and philosophy study them in general terms, while historical science is concerned with their specific implementations. But history also encompasses experience – both that of the participants in the historical process and that of historians or readers of historical texts. This experience becomes one of the reasons behind their actions, as well as the lens through which past events are interpreted. Experience, in both senses, can be false and distorted, raising questions of interpretation; yet, even in such cases, it impacts future actions and thus serves as their cause. Even more importantly, historical experience provides a means of identity. An individual's own experience allows for self-awareness (I am I), while historical experience facilitates identification with society. Although there is no direct connection to the past, it has not disappeared; it cannot inherently vanish. It does not exist because it has evaporated, nor because it lingers in some unreachable dimension, but due to its transformation into modernity. These transformations can be either fluid or discrete, making historical time fluid-discrete at both individual and social levels. Essentially, the terms "past", "present", and "future" merely serve as distinctions between "now", "not yet", and "too late". In both individual and collective histories, even a minor event can trigger significant resonance, leading to fundamental changes in the future ("butterfly effect"). While it is certainly impossible to ascertain which past events shaped the present, this does not preclude us from constructing a "hierarchy of butterflies" for historical investigation. Thus, reconstructing the historical past becomes a means of self-knowledge, forming its primary anthropological significance.

Keywords: man; "I"; history; past; experience; historical time; subjectivity

Introduction

One of the earliest and most original attempts to understand the nature of time is rightly regarded as the Eleventh Book of the Confessions of Saint Augustine. His answer is well known: "It is in you, my mind, that I measure times" (Augustine, 2019, p. 220, Conf. 11.27.36). However, it is important to recognize that the Bishop of Hippo approaches the issue of time not in a philosophical sense, but in a theological one; he seeks to understand the relationship between the eternal God and the fluid world. He accomplished this task brilliantly.

For theologians, Augustine's elegant answer can still serve as a guide, but a modern scientist cannot view time merely as a function of the mind. For example, in the general theory of relativity, time is one of the coordinates of the space-time continuum. In quantum physics, various

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models of time are considered – including the effect of "negative time", retrocausality, discreteness of space-time, and other counterintuitive ideas. Therefore, "the problem of time in quantum physics is not exclusively related to quantum gravity but is more general than that. These widely discussed controversial issues are intimately connected with time measurements" (Altaie et al., 2022, p. 3).

Among philosophers, there are also discussions about time, partly related to traditional philosophical topics, partly to the understanding of the achievements of modern physics (for a review, see, for example: (Power, 2021)). In particular, philosophers are interested in the correspondence of human ideas about time (past, present, and future) to objective reality. And here, three main positions are presented: *presentism* (only the present exists), *pastism* (the present and the past exist, the future does not exist), and *eternalism* (there are all three modes of time – present, past, and future). The overwhelming majority of researchers prefer presentism, and it is this position that most corresponds to common sense, which is confirmed by a survey among non-philosophers (Graziani et al., 2023).

So, among physicists and philosophers, various models of time are considered – from the most obvious and consistent with common sense to the most exotic and paradoxical. This is not surprising; what is surprising is that a discipline directly related to time – I mean history – shows little interest in time itself.

As is known, history studies the past and seeks its truth. However, the past as a scientific object may not seem entirely convenient in an epistemological sense. If we agree with the "common sense" that only the present exists, then it turns out that history studies what does not exist. How can something that does not exist have truth? And how can we work with what is absent?

This article is dedicated to exploring the essence of the past in general and the historical past in particular.

Purpose

The purpose of the paper is to establish the nature of the reality of the historical past and the way of its presence in being.

Statement of basic materials

The Greek, known as the "father of history", aimed "to prevent the traces of human events from being erased by time" (Herodotus, 2008, p. 3). This can be understood roughly as follows: every event occurs in the present. As the present transitions into the past, it disappears from presence, leading to the erasure of past events by time. However, events leave *traces* that can be preserved by writing them down and retelling them to future generations. In other words, the past is maintained in collective memory thanks to historians. This perception of the past aligns closely with Augustine's view: the past exists in memories, or rather, in records of memories.

Everything would be fine if the future did not try to change the past. For example, the Romans sincerely believed that their city was founded by the brothers Romulus and Remus, and Roman historians wrote about this as an indisputable fact (although they could have differing opinions about the identity of the founders, particularly regarding the circumstances of Remus's death or Romulus' divinity). However, in the 19th century, researchers criticized the veracity of individual elements in the biography of the first Roman king and questioned the very fact of his existence. Thus, Theodor Mommsen (2009) called the entire story of the foundation of Rome a fable, which belongs to the category of not very witty fictions (p. 48); this German's approach

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became decisive for subsequent generations of historians, most of whom began to consider Romulus a mythological character.

It turns out that Roman historians recorded a certain fragment of the past in the collective memory (although none of them were witnesses to it), and a historian from another era and culture *rewrote* this memory. This does not surprise anyone, because rewriting history is one of the favorite pastimes of historians. Therefore, the historian is not just a keeper of memory but also its editor, who can change not only the accents but also the past itself. For example, by stating that Romulus is not a person but an archetypal "Mr. Rome" (Beard, 2015, chap. 2).

But obviously, we are discussing more than just memory, even historical memory. When historians analyze past events, they attempt to *recreate* the real past as accurately as possible. The ideal of positivist historians (and to one degree or another, most historians belong to the positivist camp) is to adhere to the principle proclaimed by Leopold von Ranke of reconstructing the past "as things actually were". Even when one argues that the past does not actually exist, everyone perceives the difference between "not existing because it *no longer* exists" and "not existing because it *never existed*". In other words, although both are absent in the present, this equality does not negate the distinction between "once it was" and "never it was". Although the past has passed, it seems that its truth has somehow escaped disappearance; otherwise, the boundary between the past as *no longer-being* (accomplished history), the conditional past *as if-being* (counterfactual history), and the fictional past as *fiction-being* would dissolve into nothingness, leaving no possibility of separating the first (as something real) from the second and third.

It is clear that the historian is only interested in what was, and even games with counterfactual history, when we are not discussing purely artistic fiction, possess scientific value only in terms of better understanding and assessing what *really happened*. The historian believes that s/he can reconstruct this *reality*, although it cannot be presented as existing to confirm or refute theoretical constructs. Historical sources are available, and from them, the historian begins the research, attempting to reconstruct the world that *was* real. In this respect, historical sources function as *signs* of the past, rather than its *fragments* (at least, in the direct sense). Consequently, while the past may not be a reality in the sense of an *existing* entity, it still holds a relation to reality. What is this relation, and *where* does the past hide?

History can be rewritten, but it cannot be replayed. You can change your attitude towards the past and place different accents, but it remains closed to editing. In collective memory, history is never stored as a duplicate; it always represents an interpretation and is not immune to change. Thus, rewriting pertains to the past as an interpretation rather than the past in its true *essence*.

It turns out that the past is attributed to existence when we discuss its truth, essence, or the reconstruction of what actually happened. However, the past is not accessible; we have missed it, and no force can organize our meeting. Nevertheless, the historian believes that the past is a reality that can be objectively investigated, although it cannot be changed. So, does the past have any relation to reality?

In everyday usage, "reality" means the sphere of presence, characterized by empirical clarity. In this sense, a history tied to the past cannot claim to be an everyday understandable "reality", but reducing reality to the visibility and facticity of here and now presence destroys the very idea of reality, because this visibility and this presence also have their own history (Heidegger, 1996, p. 382).

When people look at the starry sky, they are actually gazing into the past. If they use modern, powerful telescopes, they can observe events that took place long before the Earth was formed.

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This is the only way to visually perceive the past. If we are not interested in the history of the Universe, but rather in the history of humanity (historical science, by default, studies it), we are deprived of this opportunity. Of course, the advent of recording technologies such as photography and videography has significantly changed this aspect, but here too, it is not the past itself that is revealed, but only what photographers and cinematographers chose or were able to show. It turns out that the historian is left with only more or less authentic signs of the past and various methods for its reconstruction. But where has the past itself disappeared?

The present is an open action field, serving as an arena for life, struggle, and self-affirmation among different I, providing them with *close contact* with being. The issue of the reality of the past lies in the lack of *such* contact, in the safeguarding of the past from external invasion, and thus in its *immunity* from actions. The ability to carry out the latter distinguishes "now" from "not yet" and "too late".

However, this situation can be viewed from another perspective. At any given moment, there are numerous potential possibilities; only some of them come to fruition, and not always the most likely ones. Right now, something is happening, but we do not know how the existing trends will evolve. The past has *already* unfolded, and in this sense, potential possibilities have become realities that can be explored, and rest assured, *we are not in a hurry*. Of course, one can fantasize about "what would have happened if...", but history does not know the subjunctive mood, simply because by imaginatively altering one or several parameters of the past, one cannot accurately determine how other parameters would have behaved, or what possibilities might have been realized.

That is, the future does not yet exist, and it is unknown what it will be like; only more or less probable predictions can be made here. The present exists, but it is still ongoing; it has not ended, and therefore it is impossible to fully assess the significance of the processes that are taking place right now and their further trajectory. The past has much greater certainty; it will not *change anymore*, and in *this respect*, it is more real than the present and, even more so, the future.

Of course, the reality of the past is of a special kind; it is real, but at the same time not visually and empirically so. It is considered in connection with the present, but is not placed in the objective world as something *neighboring* it. Even in the "traces of the past", there is not the past itself, but rather some kind of signification that helps the historian recognize and reconstruct it. Being a certain and accomplished reality in itself, from the outside (and the approach to the past is possible only from the outside), it eludes grasping.

Thus, the past seems to be somewhere nearby yet incredibly far away. However, without understanding the essence of the past as the condition and substance of history, the results of a specific historical exploration are ontologically vulnerable and epistemologically uncertain. As Franklin Ankersmit (2024) noted, "in all kinds of inquiry, whether scientific or philosophical, one should clearly distinguish between one's premises, assumptions, or axioms, on the one hand, and the conclusions one hopes to derive from them through valid argument, on the other" (p. 218). And precisely here it is appropriate to recall René Descartes.

Everyone who has reproduced a Cartesian thought experiment in their mind has the right to assert: "*I think; therefore I am*" (Descartes, 2020, p. 47). The content of this assertion does not depend on the individual, meaning that I act as a *transcendental subject*. However, the I becomes transcendental only as a *result* of the *cogito* procedure, and at the very beginning of the thought experiment, the I can only be empirical, given one's personal, this-is-I.

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Let a person named Mykola, following Descartes (2020), begin to discourse about the possibility of the fabrication of the world by a cunning and powerful demon (p. 108). But what remains is what Mykola is sure of even before he begins thinking, and what he will not question even if he doubts everything else – namely, that he is Mykola, not Peter or Mary. To say: "I think...", "I doubt...", etc., the subject must have an idea of what the I is for him/her. In the formula "I am I", there is a connection of consciousness (which is here and now) with his own existential flow, consisting of a multitude of moments that shape the uniqueness of the one who thinks. In other words, in the act of self-identification, the personality establishes an identity between him/herself, as s/he exists at the moment of thinking, and those states that they perceive as *their* biography.

Thus, the Cartesian cogito procedure does not begin with methodical doubt but with the *process of establishing self-identity*; that is, the identity of the thinking I with a specific personality that engages in thought. This first step does not necessarily occur in the direct form of "I am I", since it has already been implicitly undergone in the history of the formation of this personality. However, *logically*, it remains the first and necessary step. When reflecting on the essence of being and exposing this being to doubt, consciousness already operates under the assumption that I am *my* I, distinguished both topologically and chronologically. When the thinker begins to doubt and seeks support in being, they are already assured that the I, which is now doubted, belongs to a specific (her/his) personality. Thus, even before carrying out the cogito procedure, the thinker must have an experience of the I that gives them confidence that the word "I" carries meaning, and this meaning is defined by their awareness of themselves as a specific and *unique* I.

What is unique about this thinking I? It is immediate, always here and now, and the rest of the world is centered around this present I: this thing is close, and that is far away, this event is happening now, that has already happened, etc. One I differs from another I not so much in the place of presence and duration but in the uniqueness of personality. The latter is inseparable from the upbringing, feelings, experiences, etc. that have shaped them; a personality is unthinkable outside her/his history, only part of which is realized (through memory) as such. Therefore, a necessary prerequisite for carrying out the cogito procedure is the presence of a personal *history*, without which a person would not rise to the level of self-awareness.

It can be argued that, in some cases, the procedure for establishing self-identity can be problematic. For example, with amnesia or Alzheimer's disease, a person may not remember individual fragments of his or her biography, or may not be aware of themselves at all. Mykola may be told that he is Peter, and he will believe in "his" biography invented by someone else. However, even with a false idea of oneself, a person still understands their difference from others on a subjective level, and on an objective level, biography, so to speak, continues its action regardless of awareness. The fact that Mykola, who considers himself Peter, is found in this place and among these people is explained by the biography of Mykola, not the fictional Peter. The same applies to those mental illnesses in which a person considers himself the emperor of the Universe or a guinea pig. No person is without his or her own history, even if it is a medical one.

It is worth noting that the cogito procedure does not explicitly require or assume the presence of its historical basis, as it relates not to the empirical, but to the transcendental I. However, as mentioned above, the transcendentalization of the I occurs in the finale, when the procedure is executed, the thought is completed and formalized, and there is a ready-made result that each I can apply to itself. At the beginning of reflection, the subject operates as an empirical self, since they have not yet substantiated the possibility of the existence of something external to them-

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selves. What is given to them with obviousness is themselves, presented to themselves in direct internal (historical) experience, in which there is still no place for anything transcendental.

So, every I that is aware of her/himself already has the experience of history as the history of *this* I. But the complete loss of memory is the loss of one's own "I". History exists, but awareness of it does not. Thus, memory turns out to be a condition for the possibility of being aware of one's own experience (one's own history), and in this sense – a condition of consciousness.

As is known, Descartes considered a person to be a combination of a mechanical body and an immaterial thinking soul; he was interested in the problem of finding an interface that allows these two distinct substances to interact. The psychophysical problem he posed is still being discussed today, although the emphasis has shifted somewhat (Kalmykova et al., 2025). Typically, it pertains to the interaction of physiological processes in the human brain and its cognitive functions. Perhaps today, Descartes would employ different analogies, comparing a person to a computer, where "hard" refers to the body (and the brain, in particular), and "soft" denotes the soul. At least, such analogies are sometimes used in discussions surrounding the psychophysical problem; they have also permeated popular culture. If we continue this analogy, we can hypothetically assume the possibility of scanning consciousness, digitizing it, and transferring it to another medium (for example, a computer or the "formatted" brain of another person), while the issue of artificial immortality would be fundamentally resolved (Halapsis, 2019).

The implementation of this project faces significant challenges, not just technical difficulties. Let us imagine that somehow it was possible to read information from one person's brain and write it into the pre-formatted brain of another (or into a completely non-human "brain"). Furthermore, let us envision that, as a result of this procedure, the personality of the double would be completely identical to the personality of the original. However, for the latter, nothing would change; he would not develop *two* personalities, would not see the world with four eyes, and would not be in two places at once, etc. Even if a thousand "copies" of this personality were made, it would not become "a thousand times more alive", but would remain one, tied to *one's* body and vital functions, on which I depend in one way or another.

This can be illustrated by the 2025 film directed by Bong Joon-ho, "Mickey 17". The main character of this fantastic picture agrees to participate in an experiment in which his body and consciousness are scanned during various risky research ventures. As a result of this research, the hero dies repeatedly, but his body is printed using a 3D printer, into which his own consciousness is loaded. The hero feels like "the same Mickey" and retains memories of previous experiments. It seems that this personality's life continues, and that periodic deaths are merely unpleasant inconveniences. When Mickey 17 is declared dead, the next clone is created – Mickey 18. However, the previous Mickey survives and meets his successor. It turns out that they are different personalities, and later, the girlfriend of the main character notes that the previous versions of Mickey also exhibited slightly different characters. This film received many positive reviews, with Jacob Oller (2025) calling it a "sci-fi critique of our dehumanizing present". Although this film does not claim to be scientifically accurate, the worldview issues it raises extend far beyond social satire. The emphasis on the differences in the character of clones of one person strengthens the filmmakers' idea. However, even without this assumption, it is quite obvious to me that copies do not add life to the original.

In my opinion, the above is sufficient to recognize that: 1) the human self is always unique and singular, and the clone will be a different self; 2) a "hologram" of a person is not a person, and even if it is installed in another body, the identity of the person will not be preserved, be-

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cause identity is being *the very same*, not in *the same league*. Therefore, there is not an accidental but a substantial connection between the body and consciousness.

Therefore, it makes sense to discuss the real existence of I in the *unity* of body and consciousness, which proves to be substantial. This is why it is appropriate, given the cognitive situation and the convention of such a nomination, to refer to such I as *substantial*. Substantial, of course, does not refer to the body (thus, we are not talking about the "physical I"), but to the fundamental *unity* of the body and consciousness (soul) – namely, *this* body and *this* consciousness.

The empirical I is given directly, explicating through the act of self-consciousness. The transcendental I arises from the process of reflecting on oneself, the results of which extend to the other I. The substantial I serves as an indispensable condition for the existence of the first and second. The authenticity of each of these aspects of the I has a different nature and can be established during the cogito procedure, but at different stages.

At the first stage, the authenticity of the empirical "I" is established when the subject, having passed the test of methodological doubt, recognizes that s/he undoubtedly exists. At the second stage, the existence of the surrounding world is substantiated, wherein the subject identifies a specific object around which the "world" is centered and which serves as a refuge for her/him – this is his body, which, at least in this layer of being, is the condition for the existence of the thinking I. Edmund Husserl noted:

Among the bodies belonging to ... "Nature" and included in my peculiar
ownness, I then find my *animate organism as uniquely* singled out name-
ly as the only one of them that is not just a body but precisely an animate
organism: the sole Object within my abstract world-stratum to which, fol-
lowing experience, I ascribe *fields of sensation* ..., the only Object "in"
which I "*rule and govern*" immediately... (Husserl, 1999, p. 97)

At the third stage, the subject encounters in experience other subjects who are real, since the entire surrounding world is real; but unlike other objects of the world that express themselves through extension, they contain within themselves the universe of their own *cogitations* (in Husserl's words). The suspicion of the identity of different universes of cogitations centered around different I brings the subject to a transcendental level, where s/he no longer poses the question of the essence of her/his own, this I, but of the I-as-such, of humanity in general.

For the empirical I, the past is a fundamental factor without which this I loses itself. For the substantial I, the past is no longer a memory, but a *trace*; representing the ontological unity of body and consciousness, the substantial I bears within itself the imprint of past events, entrusting the empirical I with remembering and reflecting on them. The latter, using the information transmitted from the substantial I and employing its "physical resources", appears as the *actuality of consciousness*. Thus, the personal human I (and in this capacity, the empirical I and the substantial I act) is so tightly tied to the past that without the latter, it cannot even be thought. This past is "packaged" in experience, which, in fact, forms the personalities themselves.

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Thus, the past of the individual has not disappeared, dissolving into non-existence, but continues to influence in a *recorded* form. As such, it is real here and now. However, although individual historical experience itself is inevitable, interpreting history is always problematic for an individual. This applies not only to reconstructions of the past that one could not have witnessed but also to the past that has entered one's personal historical experience.

Moreover, personal experience is not something stable and unambiguously fixed. For example, a participant in historical events can retrospectively rethink the content of their experience, change the emphasis, and rebuild the hierarchy of its components. This "correction of the past", even when taken as supposedly neutral historical experience, is more the rule than the exception. Here, we can also mention paramnesia (false memory), when an *individual* has false memories, and the "*Mandela effect*", when memories that contradict real facts are formed in the *mass* consciousness. One can have a mystical experience, feeling the presence of higher powers, or even communicating with them. It is customary to be skeptical about this in our time, but sometimes such personal experiences affect large groups of people. I am not sure that the archangel Michael really addressed Joan of Arc, but her belief in this certainly influenced both her personal fate and the course of the Hundred Years' War.

Thus, the experience of the past – whether distorted or false – is fundamental to the individual's existence, although the assessment and interpretation of its individual fragments change over time. However, personal historical experience is limited by the framework of life. Does this imply that the past is fundamentally outlined by fragments that are accessible to the memory of the living?

Since I cannot fully explain its historical content based solely on personal existence, I must acknowledge the real existence of other spiritual entities (other I's) and the socio-cultural environment they create. Therefore, self-knowledge for the I cannot be confined to an understanding of the empirical and substantial components; it requires an expansion of the cognitive horizon and the inclusion of the cultural world revealed through history.

Moreover, the perception and evaluation of other I also require historicity. Bennett Gilbert rightly noted:

Valuing and disvaluing others requires historicity – memory or history and sociality – as its critical conditions because our relations with others, both privately considered or publicly developed, vary according to our normative concepts formed from the retained and communicated experience of events involving others that we evaluatively express as our history. The evaluative force in human behavior establishes historicity because evaluation, including moral judgment, is a poly-logue that ties us up with other, even if we reject them, since they are part of our life-world. (Gilbert, 2024, p. 1382)

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Eventually, a *habit* of viewing the world from a historical perspective is formed, and communication with others leads to the *surprise* that not everyone shares this habit. It is strange to me that many people use concepts like "democracy", "republic", "liberalism", "human rights", "rule of law", and "equality" without even trying to inquire how these phenomena arose, what evolution they underwent, how these concepts migrated from one culture to another, and why they can represent different and sometimes completely incompatible phenomena for different peoples. In this regard, I align with the position of historicism as described by Ankersmit (2005): "The identity of a nation, of a people, or of an institution lies in the past of this nation, people, or institution, and if we wish to get hold of their identity, we should above all write their histories" (p. 318). When we write such histories, we will be less surprised by the fact that spreading freedom and democracy is very difficult among those who have only experienced slavery and despotism.

Thus, the individual expands his world in space (considering other selves) and in time (considering the historical prerequisites of what is happening now). However, such a story remains solely in the individual's consciousness and has not yet reached the level of objective reality. The Egyptian stonemason who participated in the construction of the Cheops pyramid cannot respond to those who attribute his work to aliens, as the Egyptian architect did not patent his engineering solutions. Of course, no one prevents anyone from believing in anything, even in the world-historical mission of the proletariat. But where, after all, should one look for the *real* past?

In 1963, Edward Lorenz published a paper on calculating weather forecasting models, in which he showed that non-periodic solutions are usually unstable under small modifications. As a result, slightly different initial states can evolve into significantly different states (Lorenz, 1963). The patterns he discovered are now commonly known as the "butterfly effect", and even earlier, in 1952, a similar idea (with a butterfly) was described in Ray Bradbury's novel "A Sound of Thunder". Although the importance of cause-and-effect relationships has been understood since at least the time of Democritus, the "butterfly effect" demonstrated at least two important things: 1) even a small event can have a significant resonance and lead to fundamental changes in the future, and 2) given the countless events that have occurred in the past, it is impossible to know for sure where the *same butterfly is*. Ultimately, cause and effect relationships lead to the Big Bang, and at each stage, there were many "butterflies" whose actions made possible the world we consider "ours".

Therefore, the past did not disappear; it simply has nowhere to go, just as the present cannot appear from nowhere. The past "is" right now, not only as a memory but also as a *reality of the present*, because the overwhelming part of the conditions of my existence and the features of my Self were formed independently of me, before me, and are inaccessible to me in the experience of remembering. At the same time, the past is not homogeneous for me, and although I certainly do not know the "hierarchy of butterflies" concerning myself, the events of human history seem closer to my Self than the events of the history of life on Earth, and the events of the latter closer than the history of the evolution of the Universe. Therefore, it is highly likely that the Battle of Cannes had a much greater impact on my life than the explosion of the supernova SN 1885A in the Andromeda galaxy.

Here, one could assume that the past simply flows into the present or the future; as water or mercury change shape and location, remaining themselves (without changing their essence). But this assumption is contradicted by at least two circumstances: *birth* and *death*. One can assert as much as one wants that the life of parents continues in children; however, this is a qualitatively

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different life that begins "from" and continues "until". Additionally, the life of children does not always *fulfill* what the parents did not have time to or could not do; Commodus, for example, was not the best continuation of Marcus Aurelius. Furthermore, not everyone has children, and it is hardly possible to claim that the life of the same Newton was in vain. In the latter case, we will discuss ideas that outlived their author and changed the world. This will be fair, but ideas (and here, obviously, we are not talking about Plato's *eidos*), regardless of the ontology used to prove their independent existence, cannot be characterized as "life", at least in the direct sense.

Human time is fluid within the limits of life: yesterday flows into today, today into tomorrow. However, life has rigid chronological boundaries: a beginning (birth) and an end (death). Religious or mystical doctrines can potentially expand these boundaries to infinity (some doctrines allow for the pre-existence of the soul, and even more doctrines allow for posthumous existence either in a purely spiritual (soul) form or as a rebirth into another body), but this, in any case, goes beyond what was referred to as the substantial self above. In other words, one can imagine conditions under which human consciousness exists outside the body, but this experience will certainly differ from bodily experience. Thus, time as an anthropological category is *fluid-discrete*.

As fluid-discrete time can also be considered in a cultural-historical sense: within the life of a particular society, time is fluid, and outside it, it has either not *yet* begun or has *already* ended. However, this is true only in general cases and with many assumptions. If human life is a natural process, with clear and distinct biological boundaries, then social existence is a different kind of process, and we call it "life" solely by analogy. In most cases, the "birth" of a society is difficult to correlate with any specific event, and it is not always possible to determine the time of its death.

However, this blurring of boundaries does not deny the discreteness of world history, as demonstrated by Arnold J. Toynbee (1988), reflecting on the fields of historical research, notes that events within local civilizations have a much greater degree of kinship with each other than those occurring beyond their borders (pp. 39-42). The boundaries of the "life" of societies are not as clear as those of human life, and their establishment usually involves accepting a set of non-obvious tolerances. Much, so to speak, depends on the observer.

It is evident that the observer only affects the interpretation of the past, not the past itself. Conversely, this interpretation, in turn, influences the observer (interpreter), and through such observers, their contemporary society, and consequently, the future. After all, since culture is an intersubjective reality (Harari, 2015), it is highly sensitive to such interpretations. Therefore, by studying the "butterflies" of the past, the historian transforms into a "butterfly" with quite powerful wings.

Originality

The author developed a fluid-discrete model of historical time, linking it to the experiences of both individuals and society. This historical experience serves as the anthropological foundation of the subject's identity and as a guide for reconstructing the past.

Conclusions

Thus, time as a historical category is only partially connected to time as a subject of discussion in physics and philosophy. All three sciences consider cause-and-effect relationships fundamental characteristics of time; however, physics and philosophy study them in theory, while

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historical science examines them in concrete implementation. History is not only about how cause X leads to consequence Y; it also encompasses experience – both the experience of participants in the historical process and the experience that historians or readers of historical texts gain about events in which they did not participate. Experience, in both senses, can be false and distorted, but it still influences subsequent actions and thus becomes their cause. Even more importantly, historical experience serves as a means of identity. An individual's own experience allows him to recognize himself (I am I), while historical experience enables him to identify with society.

Direct contact with the past is absent, yet the past has not vanished; it cannot disappear in principle. It does not exist because it has vanished, nor because it continues to exist in some unreachable dimension, but because it has transformed into the present. These transformations can be fluid or discrete, making historical time fluid-discrete at both the individual and social levels.

In fact, the words "past", "present", and "future" merely serve to distinguish "now" from "not yet" and "too late". In both individual history and the history of humanity, even an insignificant event can create significant resonance and lead to fundamental changes in the future ("butterfly effect"). While it is impossible to know which past events shaped the character of the present, this does not impede us from building a "hierarchy of butterflies" for the study of history. Thus, the reconstruction of the historical past becomes a means of self-knowledge, which is its main anthropological meaning.

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Антропологічний сенс історії

Мета. Основною метою роботи є встановлення характеру реальності історичного минулого та способу його присутності в бутті. **Теоретичний базис.** Автор розглядає історичний час як фактор ідентичності людини та суспільства. Минуле при цьому має подвійний онтологічний статус: воно відсутнє як наявність у прямому сенсі, але вбудоване в структуру сучасності та має вплив на майбутнє. Для обґрунтування та розкриття впливу цього положення на історичне пізнання автор використовує методологію Р. Декарта, Е. Гуссерля, М. Гайдеггера, Ф. Анкерсмита та інших мислителів. **Наукова новизна.** Автор розробив плінно-дискретну модель історичного часу, пов'язавши її з досвідом, який отримує як окрема людина, так і суспільство. Цей історичний досвід є антропологічним фундаментом ідентичності суб'єкта та дороговказом для реконструкції минулого. **Висновки.** Час як історична категорія лише почасти пов'язаний із часом як предметом обговорення фізики та філософії. Всі ці три науки розглядають причинно-наслідкові зв'язки як фундаментальні характеристики часу, просто фізика та філософія досліджує їх у загальному варіанті, а для історичної науки важливим є їхнє дослідження в конкретній реалізації. Але історія – це і про досвід, причому

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досвід самих учасників історичного процесу, і тут він стає однією з причин їхніх дій; а також про той досвід, який отримують історики чи читачі історичного тексту про події, у яких вони участі не брали. Досвід як у першому, так і в другому смислах може бути хибним та перекрученим, і тут вже постає питання інтерпретації, але навіть у такому випадку він все одно впливає на подальші дії, отже, стає їхньою причиною. Але ще важливішим є те, що історичний досвід стає засобом ідентичності. Власний досвід особистості дозволяє їй усвідомлювати себе (Я є Я), а історичний досвід – ідентифікувати себе із суспільством. Безпосередній контакт із минулим відсутній, але минуле нікуди не зникло, воно в принципі не може зникнути. Його немає не тому, що воно зникло, і не тому, що воно продовжує існувати в якомусь недосяжному вимірі, а тому, що воно трансформувалося в сучасність. Ці трансформації можуть бути плинними або дискретними, а тому історичний час є плинно-дискретним як на індивідуальному, так і на соціальному рівні. По суті, слова "минуле", "теперішнє", "майбутнє" – лише слова для виділення "тепер" з-поміж "ще ні" та "надто пізно". І як в історії окремої особистості, так і в історії людства навіть незначна подія може викликати значний резонанс та призвести до фундаментальних змін у майбутньому ("ефект метелика"). Напевно не можна знати, які події минулого визначили характер сучасності, але це не заважає будувати "ієрархію метеликів" для дослідження історії. Відтак реконструкція історичного минулого стає засобом самопізнання, і в цьому – її основний антропологічний сенс.

Ключові слова: людина; "Я"; історія; минуле; досвід; історичний час; суб'єктивність

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