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Cognitive Experience in Positivism and Pragmatism

Purpose. The main purpose of the article is to compare the anthropological context of the concept of cognitive experience in pragmatism, which is based on an empirical basis and is determined by the result of the interaction of a person as a biosocial being with the surrounding natural and social environment through experimentation and choosing the most optimal way of acting in a given situation in accordance with individual and social values, on the one hand, and the exclusively epistemological significance of cognitive experience in positivism, aimed at observation and verification empirical data, on the other hand. **Theoretical basis.** The anthropological approach is important for this study, since its defining theoretical idea is the focus on the inseparability of theoretical and practical approaches to the integrity of human activity, proposed by pragmatism. Unlike positivism, which absolutizes theoretical knowledge of reality, supported by empirical experience, pragmatism understands this knowledge as an element of the practical adaptive activity of a person as a biosocial being who constructs the natural and social environment necessary for his/her life, transforming uncertainty into certainty. Thus, from the position of radical empiricism of W. James, a person's cognitive experience includes not only knowledge of what is before a person's eyes "here and now", but also values, interests, moral feelings that determine the purpose, prospects and motives of his/her activity. **Originality.** Thanks to an anthropological approach, pragmatism achieves a more complete understanding of cognitive experience than positivism. If in positivism cognitive experience is valuable in itself, then in pragmatism it, through feedback, performs the function of reflective practical experimentation, which should ensure the effectiveness of practical actions of a person as a biosocial being. Cognitive experience is an important component of habit, which for pragmatism is, on the one hand, the accumulated experience of a person's long-term practical adaptation to the natural and social environment, and on the other – a person's ability to find innovative ways of survival in the event of a change in the determining circumstances of life support. Thus, in extreme existential conditions of human existence (ecological and social disasters, wars), human-centred and socio-centred values, including identity values, together with strategically verified pragmatic optimality of actions, provided by cognitive experience, are important for the survival and development of man and society. **Conclusions.** Using an anthropological approach, pragmatism considers cognitive experience in a human-dimensional aspect. From the entire spectrum of cognitive experience, which enables a person to navigate in the natural and social environment, there is a part that allows a person to apply the acquired knowledge in productive practical activities based on universal values. From the point of view of pragmatism, cognitive experience based on experimentation with reflective feedback is important for ensuring the effectiveness of human practical actions. In the conditions of epoch-making social transformations currently taking place in the world, the survival and development of a civilization based on universal human values largely depends on the effectiveness of the actualized cognitive experience of a person, his or her intellectual and moral resources.

Keywords: cognitive experience; anthropological approach; biosocial nature of man; pragmatism; human life experience; human practical experience; universal human values

Introduction

Modern researchers of pragmatism analyse the cognitive and practical experience of a person in the context of life activities of society as a whole. Thus, N. Rescher (2020) believes that the main thing in knowing the extremely complex world is that our cognitive models must be brought into line with real things (p. 75). A. Guilan (2020) believes that knowledge should be guided by a certain ontology, on the basis of which cognitive models and algorithms of practical activity are developed, with the help of which a specific problem is solved (p. 86). According to

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L. Hickman (2019), habits are an important foundation of human experience as naturally determined forms, algorithms and methods of human activity, in this regard, pragmatism pays attention primarily to the production of habits by a person (p. 254). C. Legg and J. Reynolds (2022) note that the concept of habit combines cognitive understanding and human bodily skills (p. 14). Pragmatism considers the cognitive and practical aspects of the problem of moral values in the context of economic activity. C. Greene and M. Steuer (2020) believe that real economic activity goes beyond economics and theory and should be considered in an empirical aspect and social context (p. 124). According to A. Cenci (2020), economic activity should take into account basic human values – life, health, well-being, identity (p. 231). From the point of view of Pragmatism, as A. Honnacker (2020) believes, this is possible by taking into account the issues of democratic self-governance and the ecological orientation of the activity itself (p. 12), and according to M. Santarelli (2021) a democratic process of agreeing moral values must be established in society (p. 12). As S. Marchetti (2021) believed, for the normal life of a person in experience, it is necessary to separate moral reflection and the real moral existence of a person and society (p. 7). From U. Schulenberg's (2021) point of view, the humanistic solution of moral issues from the perspective of Pragmatism should not be based on metaphysical postulates (p. 2). B. Ibanez (2021) believes that through reflection an experimental approach should be used (p. 10). An experimental approach to the analysis of moral issues was also noted by M. Klenk (2021, pp. 11-12), more fully taking into account human experience, which is not exclusively cognitive in the narrow sense, as Positivism claims. Such cognitive experience involves practical experience of activity, which also includes correction of activity by means of experimentation based on feedback.

Purpose

The main purpose of the article is to compare the anthropological context of the concept of cognitive experience in pragmatism, which is based on an empirical basis and is determined by the result of the interaction of a person as a biosocial being with the surrounding natural and social environment through experimentation and choosing the most optimal way of acting in a given situation in accordance with individual and social values, on the one hand, and the exclusively epistemological significance of cognitive experience in positivism, aimed at observation and verification empirical data, on the other hand.

Statement of basic materials

Thanks to the anthropological approach to a person's cognitive experience, it becomes clear that in the structure of his or her experience, cognitive experience occupies an important place, providing a person with the opportunity to both plan and adjust actions in the course of his or her own life. Cognitive experience, which as well-established mental mechanisms ensures processing, storage and application of information about the surrounding world, occupies an important place in the general structure of human experience and creates the opportunity to both plan and adjust actions in the process of a person's own life. The rapid development of science in the second half of the 19th and in the 20th centuries turned it and knowledge itself into an important branch of society, which led to the emergence of logical positivism in the first third of the 20th century, the methodology of which was, in particular, very convenient for generalizing protocol observations of subatomic physics. Along with this, the technologies developed on the basis of the acquired knowledge should be improved during their use due to feedback in such a way as to be more effective in the daily life of people and society. A more convenient method for this is the method of

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Pragmatism, the basic idea of which is the adaptation and survival of a person in the natural and social world as a biosocial being through experimentation, choosing the most effective course of action in a particular situation, including innovative scientific and technological experimentation. If for the positivist approach cognitive experience is dominant and self-valued, then for Pragmatism cognitive experience is woven into practical activity from the very beginning, which must be accompanied by constant experimental adjustment based on feedback to achieve greater efficiency. Accordingly, scientific knowledge has value in the case when it can be used in the development of the most effective technologies that contribute to the survival and development of man and society. In this regard, it is important to compare and determine the place of positivist and pragmatist methodological approaches in modern scientific research.

The 2017 issue of the Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook examines the history of the mutual influence of Pragmatism and Positivism in the process of formation of logical positivism in the Vienna Circle. A significant role in this, as noted by F. Stadler (2017), was played by E. Mach's "Popular Science Lectures" in 1895 (p. 3). W. James writes about the interest in Pragmatism in Europe and draws attention to E. Mach. According to E. Mach, the main thing that logic is useful for science is the theory of economy, in particular, "economy of thinking" (Stadler, 2017, p. 9). For E. Mach, no hypothesis compared to other hypotheses is truer in the sense of a literal copy of reality. For him, as well as for other modern physicists, the concept of "matter", "mass", "atom", "ether", "inertia", "force" is not a duplicate of properties hidden in nature, but a mental tool with which you can use the properties of nature (Stadler, 2017, p. 11).

For W. James, consciousness is not an entity, but combines various data of experience, he notes:

Consciousness connotes a kind of external relation, and does not denote a special stuff or way of being. *The peculiarity of our experiences, that they not only are, but are known, which their "conscious" quality is invoked to explain, is better explained by their relations – these relations themselves being experiences – to one another.* (James, 1912, p. 25)

For W. James, the main thing is not the relationship of certain elements of experience to consciousness, but the relationship of the elements of experience themselves among themselves, in this sense, he as a radical empiricist overcomes the dualism of epistemology. And the interpretation of what is subjective and what is objective in our experience is a matter of context. W. James (1912) notes: "The difference between objective and subjective extension is one of relation to a context solely" (p. 30).

Focusing on the experience itself and W. James' rejection of the distinction between its subjective and objective dimensions is analogous to Husserl's phenomenological reduction.

According to M. Ferrari, one of the founders of Pragmatism, W. James, had an important influence on the representatives of the "First Vienna Circle", in particular on H. Hahn, regarding the falsity of the metaphysical idea of the correspondence theory of truth as the correspondence between reason and reality. For H. Hahn, truth in this context is a relative subjective human truth, and theoretical truth needs verification and falsification, just as Newton's theory of gravity was falsified by A. Einstein's General Theory of Relativity (Ferrari, 2017, p. 16). According to

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M. Ferrari (2017), O. Neurath with his anti-fundamentalism and fallibilism was also close to Pragmatism (p. 17). In this sense, W. James was significantly ahead of his time.

However, it is necessary to indicate how the understanding of experience in Pragmatism and Positivism differed. Therefore, if for E. Mach the interpretation of experience was limited to the theory of "elements" consisting of colours and tactile sensations, then for the radical empiricism of W. James, experience covers a wide range of evaluations, interests and feelings (Ferrari, 2017, p. 21). If the "new way of thinking" of W. James came to the possibility of rehabilitating God as a useful entity in human life, providing a place for faith and spiritualism, then E. Mach considered this a philosophical weakness, while at the same time recognizing the significant achievements of the "Principles of Psychology" of W. James, which were, according to E. Mach, an outstanding work filled with a large amount of empirical data. Therefore, E. Mach considered W. James a good psychologist, but, unfortunately, a very bad philosopher (Ferrari, 2017, p. 22). For W. James, the truth was revealed not only in epistemological and logical, but also in rational and emotional aspects as satisfaction from the truth, which was unacceptable for Positivism. It appeared as a discrepancy of American technology to the strict German mind. In addition, W. James, according to M. Ferrari (2017), did not deny the existence of a priori forms, since they are formed by nature itself, and our mental forms of categories develop not only in the process of adaptation, but also with the help of spontaneous acts of the human intellect (p. 27). For Pragmatism, experience is everything that is in front of our eyes, but what we can say about reality depends on the perspective that we project from it, and our impression is organized by the anticipation of the impression that can be in the case of perceiving this reality. Therefore, no hypothesis is more true than any other, and it is possible to compare these hypotheses only from the point of view of one or another of their possible applications (Ferrari, 2017, p. 28). N. Rescher (2020) also noted the important role of cognitive hypotheses in Pragmatism (p. 75). In order to propose hypotheses for the development of effective solutions, it is necessary, according to A. Guilan (2020) to make appropriate predictions (p. 82). Disposition to hypothetical prediction of the result of practical actions is a characteristic feature of Pragmatism.

Knowing the truth for Pragmatism is a certain innovative modification of the already existing experience of human adaptation to nature and society and is a certain process of modification that occurs between the old and new activity paradigms. New truths are the result of complementing old truths, which are mutually combined and modified as a result of cognitive research and experiments. For W. James, the variety of logical, geometric, physical, chemical and other scientific hypotheses is an indicator that scientific truths are tools, and scientific laws are conceptual abbreviations for the mind, which prefers symbols to reproduction of reality, approximation to precision, plasticity, not rigor. Truth is only the collective name of verification processes (Ferrari, 2017, p. 29). Pragmatism adheres to the principle of fallibilism, the possibility that our knowledge can be wrong, because there can be many hypotheses and many theories about the same data. Facts are not neutral data, because they are the result of choosing from an indefinite number of hypotheses, and what we can say about reality is the result of our expectation that we impose on it (Ferrari, 2017, p. 33). After all, the main function of cognition is to move from a previous paradigm of activity to a more perfect one.

M. Ferrari notes that some representatives of Positivism, in particular M. Schlick, believed that the principle of truth verification proposed by W. James does not mean that the truth can be understood with its help. The argument here is that all true propositions can be verified, but veri-

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fiable propositions need not necessarily be true. The pragmatist conception of truth is allegedly false and unscientific because it confuses the essence of truth with both the criterion of its verification and its practical consequences (Ferrari, 2017, p. 34), and therefore it is necessary to distinguish between the criterion of truth and its logical nature. For logical empiricism, the most important condition of truth was protocol fixations of the results of observations expressed in language (Ferrari, 2017, p. 35). However, protocol provisions, as noted by M. Ferrari, are not *tabula rasa*, obtaining these results requires a preliminary project. In addition, from the point of view of Pragmatism, no language is more true than another, and each subsequent new truth is the result of a new experiment and an old truth, so M. Schlick's main mistake is to think that the truth of a proposition is the result of its comparison with reality (Ferrari, 2017, p. 36). For Pragmatism, truth is primarily a tool, as well as a certain result of human activity, and therefore is not determined exclusively by experimental data.

We emphasize that the interaction of Positivism and Pragmatism at the beginning of the 20th century took place in opposite directions – not only did Pragmatism influence Positivism, but vice versa, Positivism influenced Pragmatism. As T. Uebel (2017) notes, E. Mach's concept of the "economy of thought" had a significant impact on Pragmatism after W. James's visit to the latter (p. 95). From the point of view of positivism, all propositions and formulas of mathematics are a consolidation and generalization of previous empirical experience, which was consistent with the idea of W. James about the anti-aprioristic character of our experience (Uebel, 2017, p. 91). W. James was based on the idea that when analysing the process of cognition, it is necessary to take into account the biological and economic functions of scientific concepts, since scientific knowledge has value for the economic activity of a person. Scientific knowledge has an economic dimension, since the results of scientific research should have a design convenient for practical implementation, and complex ideas should be expressed in simple and concise, as possible, formulas and results (Uebel, 2017, p. 94). As T. Uebel points out, from the point of view of E. Mach, it is never possible to reproduce the facts in full, but only on the basis of what is important for us, directly or indirectly taking into account practical interest. Scientific thinking develops from our ordinary everyday thinking and economy of thought has an evolutionary context. In our scientific laboratories, the experience of all previous generations was accumulated, including the economic nature of searches, among which scientific ones (Uebel, 2017, p. 95). Science in the modern world is important for the survival and development of man, but it is a continuation of his/her natural adaptive activity, including in the field of economic relations.

Pragmatism and logical positivism of the first Vienna circle actively interacted and mutually complemented each other, and at the same time retained their own differences, as they were aimed at different aspects of human cognition and activity. Logical positivism was intended primarily for the fixation and generalization of experimental data of complex scientific research of the 20th century, in particular subatomic physics. The methodology of Pragmatism focused on the technologies of human adaptation to natural and social reality, including those based on the latest achievements of scientific research, for the procedural implementation of their results in practical activities. The scientific experiment here was used not only to obtain knowledge, but also to evaluate the effectiveness and further development of this knowledge and to improve the technologies of using this knowledge in practice.

For Pragmatism, the entire complex of natural sciences is important, including those that study man (biology, physiology, experimental psychology), as well as social sciences aimed at the development of man and society.

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Important for Pragmatism is the interpretation of the metaphysical or non-metaphysical nature of the problem of determinism, which is connected with the understanding of both the nature of the laws of natural science and human free will. Pragmatism considers science to be not so much a matter of theory as of practice, and in this sense it adheres to a dynamic concept of science. Moreover, modern quantum mechanics, according to D. Romizi (2017), can be considered an indeterministic theory that corresponds to the tradition of classical Pragmatism (p. 63). In addition, deterministic and/or indeterministic paradigms provide an ontological basis for cognitive experience. However, for Pragmatism, a practical approach to cognitive experience is as important as an ontological approach.

One of the central ideas of Pragmatism is the idea of the instrumental character of knowledge developed by J. Dewey. As G. Rubeis points out, J. Dewey took an anti-realist position, because he believed that the most important thing for a person is social experience, and for him a scientific object is a tool of comprehensive control for the use of things of everyday experience. J. Dewey interpreted theoretical questions as practical problems and says nothing about the nature and structure of the object (Rubeis, 2017, p. 69). The instrumental here is the knowledge acquired in previous experience, as well as innovative one.

For J. Dewey, cognitive experience is oriented towards life values and is a component of practical experience, he notes:

My theme is that a judgment of value is simply a case of a practical judgment, a judgment about the doing of something... To *find* a thing good is, I repeat, to attribute or impute nothing to it. It is just to do something to it. But to consider *whether* it is good and how good it is, is to ask how it, *as if acted upon*, will operate in promoting a course of action.

(Dewey, 1998, p. 243)

According to G. Rubeis, J. Dewey avoided metaphysical concepts such as realism and idealism, but he was most interested in human experience and the instrumental character of knowledge. For J. Dewey, it is important how logical concepts function in the process of experimental fixations of future consequences, and in the psychological aspect this is manifested in the fact that a person in the process of cognition achieves deeper beliefs in the expediency of his/her own practical actions (Rubeis, 2017, p. 70). J. Dewey, according to G. Rubeis, takes the position of naturalistic empiricism. A person's cognitive actions are an important component of adaptive activity, and knowledge as such is a tool for his/her adaptation to natural and social reality. A person as a biosocial being can react to the external world directly – with emotions and desires, and indirectly – through the mediation of the intellect and the knowledge obtained with its help. Knowledge and practice are inseparable in human activity as a whole. However, when a situation of uncertainty arises in the process of activity, it stimulates the process of cognition, which transforms uncertainty into knowledge, which consists of two layers: first, knowledge as the perception of data and, second, knowledge as the contextual integrity of experience (Rubeis, 2017, p. 71). The first of them is the knowledge of purposeful research,

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which must be recorded in a logical form, the second is a certain perception, which can be interpreted as knowledge that is the result of research for the realization of a certain practical goal, which works as practical intelligence and is a natural process. Knowledge as a natural process does not separate the mind from the world of objects, moreover, knowledge is not separated from action and as such is a type of action (Rubeis, 2017, p. 72). Knowledge does not change the object, but changes the meaning of concepts, that is, the object of knowledge is modified, and not the object itself as such, as a result of which the "belief" changes, which is a kind of motive for activity and the strengthening of confidence that replaces previous doubt, which is actually the result of cognition (Rubeis, 2017, p. 73). The obtained data is determined by the relevance and content of the problem that needs to be solved, and data is not given, but taken (Rubeis, 2017, p. 73). For the practical activity of a person, it is more important to determine the properties of objects, materials, processes, etc., than to contrast the concepts of truth and error (Rubeis, 2017, p. 73). Modern and postmodern science is becoming more and more constructivist, since the practical activity of a person does not require a description and reflection of the world, but the construction and improvement of tools based on certain data, which were found selectively for a certain pre-formulated production task. In this sense, science is a productive enterprise, and the task of the scientific model is to conceptualize reality (Rubeis, 2017, p. 74). Practical and socio-organizational knowledge are just as important and instrumental as theoretical knowledge, which create immediate prerequisites for the implementation of theoretical knowledge.

G. Rubeis points out that for J. Dewey, the organism and the environment, and accordingly, knowledge and the external object are parts of the natural continuum, and knowledge is a procedural act that transforms a situation of uncertainty into a stable situation in which productive practical action is possible. The organism interacts with the environment, purposefully selecting data on the basis of which it adapts to the environment and adjusts its own behaviour. There is an element of teleology in this purposeful behaviour. In this regard, knowledge, as understood by classical epistemology, is instrumental and useful for Pragmatism and is not aimed at forming a picture of reality, but rather fills the gap between experience and scientific explanation. Therefore, in practice, for Pragmatism it is not so important whether an object is "existential" or "operational", because when it is used in an operation, it is existential (Rubeis, 2017, p. 76). The concept of situation, according to G. Rubeis (2017), means that there is an organism and an environment, when the structure of their interaction determines not only the experience of the organism, but also its behaviour and thinking (p. 78). The main thing that a person needs is to construct reality, not just to know. By changing the environment, a person transforms a problematic situation into a stable one, and at the same time transforms him-/herself, therefore there is no eternal, final truth, but a process of constant active transformation. Truth, from the point of view of Pragmatism, is not correspondent, but coherent (Rubeis, 2017, p. 79). The main function of knowledge for Pragmatism is survival, and the problem situation stimulates and motivates cognition, which results in the modification of values, beliefs and social practices. Objective truth turns out to be a free creation of nature, which becomes more secure, diverse and reliable (Rubeis, 2017, p. 80). After all, J. Dewey as a representative of Pragmatism does not deny the existence of reality, but he claims that it is permanently changed by man through the transformation of uncertainty into certainty (Rubeis, 2017, p. 81). For J. Dewey, a person is a biosocial being and his/her knowledge, ideas, desires are a continuation of natural processes, as well as the process of innovative cognitive overcoming of uncertainty that may arise in the course of activi-

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ty. Thus, from J. Dewey's point of view, knowledge for a person as a biosocial being that must adapt to the natural and social world acquires not only a practical but also an anthropological context.

Rejecting transcendental metaphysics, Pragmatism, like Positivism, considers it necessary to rely on scientific ontology. Thus, H. Koskinen proposes to establish rational, and together with them, pragmatic limitations imposed on the application of ontological theorizing. Establishing rational pragmatic constraints begins with trust in sense experience and scientific experimentation, and highly theoretical ontological categories are operative at the level of everyday experience within which we talk about various objects, properties, and relations between objects. Ontology here can have its origins in the most mundane and everyday conceptual environment (Koskinen, 2017, p. 109). In other words, the ontology of Pragmatism creates the conditions for considering not only being as such, but also the everyday activity of a person.

Modern versions of Pragmatism in the form of neo-pragmatism emphasize not the empirical confirmation of knowledge, but the logical form of knowledge, which assumes the inevitability of pluralism of interpretations. S. Pihlström (2017) notes that Pragmatism is characterized by conceptual pluralism (p. 144), moreover, in our activity we choose the most practically acceptable naturalistically grounded transcendental arguments (p. 151). A special place in Pragmatism is given by S. Pihlström (2017) to ethics, which in his view is an empirical and, at the same time, a real normative management structure, which is a bridge that fills the gap between morality and linguistic description of the situation (p. 159). Human activity in the modern world is impossible without an ethical aspect, since this activity is carried out only in interaction with other persons.

Thus, the concept of cognitive experience for Positivism and Pragmatism in the period of their formation and development at the beginning of the 20th century had both common features and differences. What they had in common was the empirical focus of cognitive experience. At the same time, if cognitive experience in the sense of Positivism was focused on observing the conditions of recording protocol observations of scientific experimental data, then for Pragmatism, the concept of cognitive experience extended to the main types of human adaptive activity, including both experimental data of science and experimental data regarding the effectiveness of practical activities, which also includes social, moral and other factors. Pragmatism is characterized by reflexive practical experimentation based on feedback, which should ensure the effectiveness of practical action in the life support strategy. The hypothesis chosen for this or that practical action is only a basis for adjusting activities and proposing future hypotheses regarding the nature of the situation, since circumstances may change. Knowledge, ideas, beliefs as current elements of cognitive experience can change, while cognitive experience itself is the basic mental structure of biological survival of man and society. Cognitive experience consists in a willingness to experimentally test the subject's knowledge, ideas and beliefs based on feedback as a necessary part of the self-organizing processes of nature and society. W. James shared the empirical approach of Positivism, but did not agree with the denial of consciousness by radical positivism, since "external" and "internal" experience for him is only a matter of context. J. Dewey paid attention to the practical activity of a person in accordance with natural and social values and emphasized the instrumental nature of knowledge. Reflective moral regulation of a person's practical activity contributes to his/her consolidated productive interaction with other persons and makes this activity more effective. For Pragmatism, among other things, the anthropological aspect of the interpretation of cognitive experience is important, since this experience is a tool for human survival as a biosocial being in the natural and social environment.

Originality

Thanks to an anthropological approach, pragmatism achieves a more complete understanding of cognitive experience than positivism. If in Positivism cognitive experience is intrinsically valuable, then in Pragmatism it performs the function of reflective practical experimentation with the help of feedback, which should ensure the effectiveness of practical actions. Cognitive experience is an important component of habit, which for pragmatism is, on the one hand, the accumulated experience of long-term practical adaptation of a person to the natural and social environment, and on the other hand, as his/her ability to find innovative ways of survival in the event of a change in the determining circumstances of life support. Unlike Postmodernism, which is busy with endless deconstructions and re-descriptions of reality, Pragmatism, like Positivism, based on the data of natural sciences, realizes its own anti-metaphysicality and empirical orientation through experimentation in practical human activity. Thus, in extreme existential conditions of human existence (ecological and social disasters, wars), human-centric and socio-centric values, including identity values, along with strategically verified pragmatic optimality of actions, provided by effective cognitive experience, are important for human survival and development and society.

Conclusions

Using an anthropological approach, pragmatism considers cognitive experience in a human-dimensional aspect. From the entire spectrum of cognitive experience, which enables a person to navigate in the natural and social environment, there is a part of it that allows a person to apply the acquired knowledge in productive practical activities based on universal values. From the point of view of pragmatism, cognitive experience based on experimentation with reflective feedback is essential to ensure the effectiveness of practical actions. Cognitive experience is focused on human life values and is a component of practical experience related to practical intelligence. A component of cognitive experience is also ethical regulators of practical activity, which ensure consolidated productive interaction with other individuals to achieve common goals and values. The strategy of social development, based on the basic pragmatic values of survival and development and the corresponding accumulated cognitive experience, is a support for overcoming unfounded populism. In the conditions of epoch-making social transformations currently taking place in the world, the survival and development of a civilization based on universal human values largely depends on the effectiveness of the actualized cognitive experience of a person, his or her intellectual and moral resources.

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Когнітивний досвід у позитивізмі і прагматизмі

Мета. Основна мета статті полягає в порівнянні антропологічного контексту поняття когнітивний досвід у прагматизмі, що базується на емпіричній основі й визначається результатом взаємодії людини як біосоціальної істоти з навколишнім природним і соціальним середовищем шляхом експериментування та вибору найбільш оптимального способу дії у тій чи іншій ситуації відповідно до індивідуальних і суспільних цінно-

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стей, – з одного боку, та виключно епістемологічного значення когнітивного досвіду у позитивізмі, спрямованого на спостереження та перевірку емпіричних даних, – з іншого. **Теоретичний базис.** Антропологічний підхід є важливим для цього дослідження, позаяк його визначальною теоретичною ідеєю є орієнтація на нерозривність теоретичного й практичного підходів до цілісності діяльності людини, запропонованої прагматизмом. На відміну від позитивізму, який абсолютизує теоретичне пізнання реальності, підкріплене емпіричним досвідом, прагматизм розуміє це пізнання як елемент практичної адаптивної діяльності людини як біосоціальної істоти, що конструює необхідне для її життя природне й соціальне середовище, перетворюючи невизначеність у впевненість. Так, із позиції радикального емпіризму В. Джеймса, когнітивний досвід людини охоплює не лише знання того, що є перед очима людини "тут і тепер", але й цінності, інтереси, моральні почуття, які визначають мету, перспективи й мотиви її діяльності. **Наукова новизна.** Завдячуючи антропологічному підходу, прагматизм досягає більш повного розуміння когнітивного досвіду, ніж позитивізм. Якщо в позитивізмі когнітивний досвід є самоцінним, то в прагматизмі він за допомогою зворотного зв'язку виконує функцію рефлексивного практичного експериментування, яке має забезпечити ефективність практичних дій людини як біосоціальної істоти. Когнітивний досвід – це важливий компонент звички, яка для прагматизму є, з одного боку, накопиченим досвідом тривалого практичного пристосування людини до природного та соціального середовища, а з іншого – як її здатності віднаходити інноваційні способи виживання в разі зміни визначальних обставин життєзабезпечення. Так, в екстремальних екзистенційних умовах існування людини (екологічні й соціальні катастрофи, війни) людино- й соціоцентричні цінності, включаючи й цінності ідентичності, разом із стратегічно вивіреною прагматичною оптимальністю дій, забезпечувані когнітивним досвідом, є важливими для виживання й розвитку людини та суспільства. **Висновки.** Використовуючи антропологічний підхід, прагматизм розглядає когнітивний досвід у людиновимірному аспекті. З усього спектра когнітивного досвіду, що уможливорює орієнтування людини в природному й соціальному середовищі, є та його частина, що дозволяє людині застосовувати здобуті знання в продуктивній практичній діяльності на основі загальнолюдських цінностей. Із погляду прагматизму, когнітивний досвід, заснований на експериментуванні з рефлексивним зворотнім зв'язком, є важливим для забезпечення ефективності практичних дій людини. В умовах епохальних соціальних трансформацій, що наразі відбуваються у світі, виживання й розвиток цивілізації на основі загальнолюдських цінностей значною мірою залежить від ефективності реалізації актуалізованого когнітивного досвіду людини, її інтелектуальних і моральних ресурсів.

Ключові слова: когнітивний досвід; антропологічний підхід; біосоціальна природа людини; прагматизм; життєвий досвід людини; практичний досвід людини; загальнолюдські цінності

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