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V. V. LIAKH[1*]

[1*]H. Skovoroda Institute of Philosophy, the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine (Kyiv, Ukraine), e-mail vvlvv2012@ukr.net, ORCID 0000-0003-4683-0838

Topic of Apriorism in Modern Discussions of the Evolution of Consciousness

Purpose. The article aims to: 1) to determine the place and role of a priori topoi of knowledge in the overall process of evolution of human consciousness, to clarify the relationship between innate and acquired human abilities; 2) to determine the creative potential of a priori and acquired human abilities on the basis of the evolutionary approach; 3) to clarify the basic intentions of a person which allowed him or her to reach a new level of adaptive behaviour. **Theoretical basis.** The article investigates the genesis and significance of the idea of a priori in the traditional theory of knowledge and its modern implications in the evolutionary theory of consciousness. The evolutionary approach allows us to rethink a fairly wide range of things that fall under the definition of a priori: from analytics, normativity, various attitudes of consciousness to human behavioural reactions. In the course of analysing Kant's apriorism, which he used to justify the possibility of theoretical sciences, an attempt is made to determine the nature of a priori in the context of the evolutionary theory of consciousness. Although the idea of a priori was criticised by both Kant's opponents (based on historical experience) and his followers (who opposed the formalism of a priori knowledge), the evolutionary theory of consciousness played a special role in this criticism and further development of this topic, contributing to a more detailed consideration of the genesis of the so-called a priori forms. Ultimately, through a combination of different forms of learning and a set of socio-cultural forms of mastering the world, man has managed to gain access to "potential intelligence" and a new "space for creation". **Originality.** The article substantiates the thesis that the evolutionary theory of consciousness allows explaining both the genesis of the a priori sphere and determining the mechanism of action of artificial formations or the achievements of human civilisation. Since people have gained the ability to generate and test hypotheses about reality instead of directly dealing with specific threats, the likelihood of wrong decisions and false preferences has arisen and is constantly growing. Therefore, in general, we have an urgent need for a double reflection – both on the limits of the application of a priori forms of knowledge and on the intentional attitudes of the human habitus. Drawing on the achievements of the evolutionary theory of consciousness, the author points to the possibility of a much broader approach to the problem of the a priori, which distinguishes not only different forms of knowledge, but also attitudes, biases, and intentions. In other words, the epistemological a priori is only a subdivision of the general sphere of innate and acquired human abilities. Hence, it can be argued that basic intentionality is also a kind of a priori, but it is widespread both in the field of ethics and in human behaviour. **Conclusions.** Based on Darwin's ideas of natural selection, research in ethology, anthropology, neuroscience data, modern ideas about consciousness, etc., representatives of the evolutionary theory of consciousness proposed a more detailed approach to the study of the a priori. On the one hand, the belief in the apodictic reliability of a priori forms was undermined, and on the other hand, the complex nature of those forms of knowledge that Kant considered a priori was revealed. Ultimately, the idea of a priori leads us to questions about people's ability to learn, to formulate tasks, hypotheses, theories, etc. In particular, the evolutionary theory of consciousness allows us to look at human cognitive abilities from the perspective of *adaptation* to environmental challenges.

Keywords: apriorism; innate and acquired ideas; evolutionary theory; evolution of consciousness; human adaptation; anthropology; memes; culture

Introduction

Although the idea of a priori knowledge has been known since the time of Plato, the principle of apriorism became crucial in Kant's philosophy, since for him it is precisely these pre-experiential forms of knowledge that are always (as if eternally) present in our consciousness that allow us to avoid empirical chaos and randomness and to bring general order and necessity to the justification of the scientific sphere of knowledge. Kant was proud of the fact that he made a *"Copernican Revolution"* in philosophy, according to which it is not our thinking that should

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be in line with the external world, but our a priori guidelines that make it possible to know the world. In this way, he tried to show the possibility of the existence of a real true philosophy, since he believed that philosophical knowledge is formed through a combination of formal schemes (or forms) and substantive empirical material. In other words, a kind of synthesis takes place in the process of cognition, but in order for this synthesis to take place, he needed the thesis that there is something in the mind itself that is not reducible to empirical experience.

This is the so-called principle of a priori, which he extends to all levels of cognition: from sensuality to sense and even higher – to reason. In other words, we can say that Kant's entire philosophy is based on this concept of a priori. It is thanks to a priori forms of thinking that cognition is possible and acquires such properties as necessity and generality. Thus, all levels of human cognition are based on the idea that a priori forms of thinking make it possible for science to take place at all (Kant's famous questions about how such sciences as mathematics, natural science, and philosophy are possible). In the history of philosophy, there have been repeated attempts to prove the imperfection of this approach, although to this day there are attempts to prove the importance of the Kantian approach for the development of cognitive sciences (Westphal, 2024).

Purpose

The purpose of the study is an attempt to determine the place and role of a priori topoi of knowledge in the overall process of evolution of human consciousness, to clarify the relationship between innate and acquired human abilities. On the basis of the evolutionary approach, to determine the creative potential of a priori and acquired human abilities; to find out the basic intentions of a person that allowed him or her to reach a new level of adaptive behaviour.

Statement of basic materials

Turning to the history of this issue, it can be said with some simplification that Kant borrowed the concept of a priori from Descartes' "innate ideas", although there is a certain difference. After all, Descartes recognised only a few clear and self-evident ideas (which he considered innate), and he had some doubts about most categories (Kolesnykova & Malivskyi, 2022). Locke's criticism of this thesis of innateness was justified by the fact that if we mean a child at an early age (i.e., he uses child psychology for his argument), then the child has no ideas about freedom, God, and so on, until we tell him or her about it. From this point of view, the thesis that there are some innate ideas becomes false, i.e. it loses its basis.

Later, Leibniz defended the Cartesian position and proposed the following clarification of the existence of innate ideas: it is not that innate ideas exist ready-made in the mind of any person, but that they are only preformations, that is, they are not quite ready-made forms, but something that allows us to perceive and understand this or that idea later. In 1989, the journal "The Monist" published an article by Guenter Zoeller (1989) entitled "From Innate to *a Priori*: Kant's Radical Transformation of a Cartesian-Leibnizian Legacy", in which the author tried to clarify the question of how Kant's position differs from that of his predecessors and to what extent. Kant's position is based on the assumption that there are empty, contentless forms in the mind itself that have the property of generality and necessity. He calls them a priori, since they cannot be derived from experience. However, unlike Leibniz, when asked whether they are innate or acquired, Kant answers as follows: they are not innate but *acquired*. Moreover, in his opinion, those philosophers who consider them to be innate act from the position of "lazy people" who refuse to think properly about the matter.

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So, unlike Descartes and Leibniz, who defended the existence of innate ideas, Kant proposed to approach this problem from a different angle, namely, to find something in our thinking that does not come from experience. And he finds a whole branch of knowledge that is a product of reason, not derived from experience. This is a science like mathematics. As Kant (2000) noted, "mathematical science affords us a brilliant example, how far, independently of all experience, we may carry our a priori knowledge" (p. 42). Accordingly, Kant faced the task of finding such a priori forms in other sciences. In his opinion, this would allow justifying mathematics, natural science and philosophy as indisputable sciences, since in them we find something that does not come from experience – necessity and universality. In the end, Kant concludes that "Mathematics and physics are the two theoretical sciences which have to determine their objects a priori. The former is purely a priori, the latter is partially so, but is also dependent on other sources of cognition" (Kant, 2000, p. 23). In other words, according to Kant, it is these a priori thought forms that allow us to form the necessary and general, structured knowledge of the transcendental picture of the world.

However, one way or another, the questions arise: what is behind this term "acquired", where do they come from, and if they are acquired in some way, to what extent do they correspond to the laws of the external world? Answering the first question, Kant referred to the "epigenesis of pure reason". That is, a priori forms of thinking are a product of reason itself.

If we consider further philosophical debates on the topic of apriorism, including modern implications, the answers to this question were different.

In logical positivism, the truths of logic and mathematics were considered a priori because they are schematic transformations of the language of science. Analytical philosophy also assumed that a priori judgements exist because there is a certain sphere of logical inferences, or some ideal normativity, which form the so-called "Third World" (according to Popper).

In his research, Max Scheler not only expanded the scope of the idea of a priori, but also filled it with new content. In his work "Formalism in Ethics and Non-formal Ethics of Values" (Scheler, 1973), he set himself the task of refuting the type of ethics that is based on formalism. He analyses in detail the eight provisions of Kantian ethics that constitute the prerequisites for his position. As we know, Kant fundamentally rejects the material ethics of values on the grounds that the latter depends on circumstances, historical conditions, traditions, customs, etc. And that is why he was inclined to formalism in ethics, since then, the relativism that any material ethics suffers from cannot be applied to moral prescriptions. According to Scheler, Kant is right that ethics cannot be justified on the basis of inductive experience. That is, one must still look for a priori grounds for it. But, for Scheler, a priori has a slightly different context. While Kant’s model of a priori is mathematics, Scheler, based on a phenomenological approach, argued that a material a priori already exists in the form of Wesensschau (vision of essence). Thus, Scheler rejects Kant’s schematic apriorism from the standpoint of phenomenology. In this context, Kant’s "moral law" is an arbitrary construction. Instead, the existence of the "vision of essence" allowed Scheler to legitimately use such concepts as emotional a priori, moral a priori, and religious a priori. That is, he assumed that a person has a certain disposition to perceive ordo amoris, beauty, emotions, etc.

However, even in this case, it is probably quite legitimate to raise the question of the source of these a priori, since it remains unclear what the self-evidence and self-givenness of the "facts" of phenomenological intuition are based on and where they come from.

Here it is appropriate to recall F. Bacon’s hypothesis about the existence of "idols of the mind" in our consciousness, which *prevent* us from objectively perceiving the picture of the

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world and its laws. These are the "idols of the tribe" (misconceptions that are inherent in the entire human race, the imperfection of our minds, which is a distorted mirror), "idols of the den" (prejudices that manifest themselves at the individual level), "idols of the market" (misconceptions that arise in the course of public communication due to incorrect use of words, expressions, fruitless arguments, etc.), "idols of the theatre" (prejudices that come from generally accepted or traditional philosophical systems). Regarding the nature of these 'idols', we can conclude that the "idols of the tribe" are innate, the "idols of the den" are partly innate and partly acquired (as he mentions customs, education, etc.). The last two types of "idols" are acquired.

Thus, while for Kant the principles of a priori knowledge gave him the basis for making generalisations about the validity of our knowledge in the status of science, Bacon emphasised the uncertainty and fallibility of a priori judgements. Therefore, great and persistent work is needed to "liberate and purify" the human mind (Klein, 2012).

As for the later implications of this idea, it should be noted that at some stage, those sciences that used the evolutionary approach made a significant contribution to understanding this problem. Thus, back in 1941, K. Lorenz (1941) published an article entitled "Kant’s Doctrine of the A Priori in the Light of Contemporary Biology", in which he posed the following question: Is it possible that the laws of our cognitive apparatus are not related to the laws of the real external world? After all, since evolution is largely a spontaneous process, it is quite possible to assume that our cognitive apparatus is adapted to a certain type of orientation in the environment. And would it be an exaggeration to assume that our apparatus is capable of shaping the world of phenomena in all its various guises? Lorenz pointed out that by studying the behaviour of animals, one can conclude that they have some innate tendencies that resemble a priori forms. However, these predispositions are the result of a previous evolutionary process that resulted in the formation of a certain cognitive apparatus for the survival of the organism in the relevant conditions. Thus, Lorenz concluded that at the level of the individual we have a priori predispositions, but for the species as a whole they are a posteriori. This statement to some extent undermines the understanding of a priori forms proposed by Kant.

Later, in 1975, the German physicist and philosopher Gerhard Vollmer (1975) published a book entitled "The Evolutionary Theory of Knowledge". In this book, he collected all possible answers to the questions: what is a priori? How possible is it? How did it arise? Is it really innate or acquired? And so on and so forth. His answer to these questions is that the most correct position is the one based on the *evolutionary* approach. According to this position, not only the brain itself, but also its functions (thinking, forming concepts, etc.) are considered to be the result of evolutionary development.

After all, it is from K. Lorenz that the idea of creating an evolutionary epistemology that undermines the foundations of the traditional theory of knowledge originates. M. Celentano (2018) in his work "From Konrad Lorenz’s 'Phylogenetic Apriorism' to the Birth of Evolutionary Epistemology" calls him the first promoter of evolutionary epistemology. In his view, Lorenz’s approach both strengthened and weakened human claims in the cognitive domain (Celentano, 2018, p. 332). While Kant argued that it was impossible to positively know real things in themselves, Lorenz argued that previous evolutionary success does not mean that all our innate hypotheses are true, but only that they cannot be completely false. The same idea was expressed by K. Popper, who criticised the common sense position regarding the truth of our beliefs. In his work "Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach" he wrote:

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> Since 'belief is closely connected with expectation and with readiness to act, we can say that many of our more practical beliefs are likely to be true, as long as we survive. They become the more dogmatic part of common sense which, though not by any means reliable, true, or certain, is always a good starting-point. However, we also know that some of the most successful animals have disappeared, and that past success is far from ensuring future success. (Popper, 1972, p. 69)

Thus, the process of survival of organisms includes beneficial mutations and the ability to adapt to changes in the environment. Popper (1972) sees a kind of *"logic of the situation"* in this, which explains the "logical, or a priori, components in Darwinism" (p. 70).

That is, there is a lot of evidence that living beings have pre-programmed abilities to navigate in three-dimensional space, to quantify more/less, to determine distance, and so on. There are also examples of the fact that although there are no ready-made innate concepts, on the other hand, neuroscience has recently shown that there are some innate properties that allow us to perceive causality. In particular, animals have the ability to imagine three-dimensional space. This property is innate, since an animal can understand from birth that space is three-dimensional. A lot of additional material on this topic has been provided by ethology, the science that studies animal behaviour. It also provides evidence that birds and mammals are born with certain dispositions that allow us to say that they are innate. In particular, Vollmer (1975) provides these data in the subsection "Innate structures and the Kantian a priori".

However, when it comes to the innate and acquired abilities of humans, we find convincing evidence in Stanislas Dehaene's book "How We Learn" (2021), in which a separate chapter is devoted to the study of the "Babies' Invisible Knowledge". The author proceeds from the position that "the nascent brain already possesses considerable knowledge inherited from its long evolutionary history" (Dehaene, 2021, p. 71). Thus, in the course of scientific research, scientists have found out that babies have a whole set of innate abilities that allow them to recognise objects, numbers, shapes, probabilities, and faces. And this is not a complete list. In particular, modern experiments have refuted several basic theses of the Swiss psychologist Jean Piaget, who believed that the abstract concept of quantity is formed over several years. In fact, it has been proven that "concepts of objects and numbers are fundamental features of our thoughts; they are part of the "core knowledge" with which we come into the world, and when combined, they enable us to formulate more complex thoughts" (Dehaene, 2021, p. 76). The author also argues that people are born with everything they need to make probabilistic reasoning. The human brain is equipped with intuitive logic from birth (Dehaene, 2021, p. 77).

But later on, these abilities are supplemented by the possibility of improving them through training and education. A long period of preparation for full-fledged adulthood allows us to hone our innate abilities and bring them to a higher level. Initially, training and transfer of skills, and later education as a duty for most citizens of society, laid the foundations for the further scien-

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tific and technological development of civilisation. With the creation of large social communities, a new history of mankind began in the form of civilisations. This made it possible to apply cultural and social innovations on an unprecedented scale.

Interesting ideas on this issue can be found in Daniel Dennett's work "Darwin's Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life" (1995), in which the author defended the thesis that in the process of human evolution and development, certain forms of adaptation to the environment were formed, the same as in other biological organisms. But at some stage of development, humans acquire language, language communication, and, ultimately, a civilisation is created that lives according to different laws than the animal world. At the level of civilisation, we already have completely different forms of adaptation, where we are talking not about primitive adaptation, when if you do not adapt, you have to disappear, but about higher levels of adaptation, when a world of hypotheses, innovative ideas, models, etc. stands between us and reality.

In this work, the researcher distinguishes four levels of adaptation of organisms to the environment (Dennett, 1995, pp. 374-380). At the lowest level are the so-called "Darwinian creatures", which are programmed for a certain type of activity (their skills are rigidly fixed and they are not capable of learning). The next step in the evolution of skills is "Skinnerian creatures", which, in addition to fixed predispositions, have a tendency to consolidate a certain type of behaviour in response to "reinforcement" (thus, new types of behaviour appear and the chances of survival increase). However, evolution does not end there, as higher beings develop skills and abilities that Dennett refers to as "Popperian creatures", which are able to acquire information from the environment and test *hypothetical* behaviours. As a result, this further enhances the creatures' ability to survive, as only hypotheses and models die in the event of unsuccessful decisions at some stage of existence.

However, at the highest level, there are also "Gregorian creatures" (named after psychologist Richard Gregory, who drew attention to the presence of various tools, both abstract and concrete, which together form the so-called "potential intelligence"). In other words, humans have another way of adapting: not by adapting to the environment, but by being able to transform the world. As soon as humans acquired tools such as language and a brain that allows us to ask questions about ourselves and the evolution we have undergone, the possibility of cultural innovation emerged, which enabled technological development, scientific experimentation, and widespread access to distributed "potential intelligence".

In one of Daniel Dennett's latest works "From Bacteria to Bach and Back: The Evolution of Minds" (2017), he argues that the skills of organisms arise without any prior intention. That is, this process is purely spontaneous, without any programming. That is, evolution in Darwin's understanding is devoid of teleology. Dennett noted that Darwin performed a kind of inversion, as he showed that a certain type of perfect creature can appear as a result of blind species selection, without any preliminary design. There is a "strange inversion of causality" (Dennett) when an effect (skill, ability) appears without a specific cause.

It is appropriate here to explain what Dennett meant when he used the word "back" in the title of his book. That is, it is quite clear that the path from bacteria to Bach is a natural evolutionary process, a biological evolution. It is a process of spontaneous creativity, creativity without understanding. It is an *upward* process. However, with the emergence of language, reason and self-reflection, another type of creativity emerges: creativity that proceeds from a pre-determined goal, the development of ideas, hypotheses, etc. In other words, it is a process that is the reverse of the previous one. If the natural evolutionary process does not involve understanding and com-

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petence, then thanks to the mind and its abilities, people have gained a "space for creation" that was almost inaccessible to natural evolution. If natural evolution is a bottom-up process, human creativity is a top-down process, i.e. a *downward* process. A typical example is teleology, which comes from the Creator. In this case, we seem to take on the role of the Creator and construct and reconstruct what nature has been doing unconsciously for hundreds of millions of years.

However, Dennett emphasised that with the development of culture and the emergence of the tools it provides to humans, a new round of evolution begins. In civilisation, development occurs through the evolution of "memes" (cultural elements), which evolve in the same way as genes in the field of biological life. They can survive and become the basis for further development, or they can disappear after a while. (For example, humanity reinvented the wheel several times until it worked to its full capacity).

There is no doubt that thanks to the achievements of civilisation, we have greatly accelerated our process of exploring the world and transforming it. To put it tentatively, in about 10,000 years, we have made such progress in transforming the world that we are now facing the question of whether the entire world is in danger of extinction. Thanks to science, humanity has acquired such means of destruction as nuclear weapons, or is conducting experiments with viruses and bacteria that can destroy us. Not to mention the fact that we can destroy the environment in which we live. We are talking about the possibility of a so-called ecological disaster. In other words, as Dennett pointed out, one day we may return the planet to our bacterial relatives, who will continue their humble journey of creating a new world. Alternatively, we can continue to evolve in the environment we have created from artefacts with the help of those same artefacts.

Dennett also pointed to the opportunities that open up in the process of creating artificial artefacts, which in turn can create new artefacts. This refers to the Turing machine, the creation of the first computers and the further development of this scientific discipline. The researcher emphasised that the inventor did not need mathematical knowledge to create a machine for mathematical calculations. And that this process resembled biological evolution, when the replication of simple elements led to the emergence of complex organisms. From this, Dennett (2017) drew an important conclusion: "Darwin's 'strange inversion of reasoning' and Turing's equally revolutionary inversion were aspects of a single discovery: competence without comprehension" (chap. 4).

Looking back, we can say that humanity has been slowly and gradually moving towards the development of the algorithms that it has found and invented in the course of civilisation, and the computer, thanks to its ability to learn itself, is already reaching this level much faster. Accordingly, we seem to be returning to natural evolution (similar to biological evolution), but at the level of artefacts. In the end, Dennett (2017) concludes that it is thanks to artificial intelligence that we will be able to continue our existence, although we must take measures to protect ourselves from dependence on and blind trust in machine intelligence (chap. 15).

There is a lot of debate about whether we should stop research into artificial intelligence. Indeed, there are certain risks to its future application. After all, if humanity is too trusting of the solutions offered by artificial intelligence, it could eventually lead to irreversible results. Therefore, such fears certainly have a right to exist. However, it is also true that the application of artificial intelligence in specific industries has produced very positive results. Instead, the questions about the future of artificial intelligence remain: are we dealing with a useful assistant, or is it a threat to humanity? In this context, Dennett noted,

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> There is another policy that can help keep the abdication of our cognitive responsibilities in check. Consider technology for "making us stronger": on the one hand, there is the bulldozer route, and on the other hand, the Nautilus machine route. The first lets you do prodigious feats while still being a 98-pound weakling; the second makes you strong enough to do great things on your own. (Dennett, 2017, chap. 15)

Thus, the analysis shows that each of these levels has its own "core knowledge" or a priori topoi. A priori forms have a complex history of origin and formation. Questions arise both about their origin and about the verification of the normative sphere, which, according to Kant, has the status of a priori. The fact is that a set of rules and regulatory principles can have different origins (i.e., they can be either innate or historically acquired). They can also be both true and false. Thus, while Descartes justified the truth of innate ideas by the fact that "God cannot deceive us", F. Bacon, on the contrary, proceeded from the position that human cognitive abilities do not guarantee against mistakes. Moreover, human cognition is burdened with "idols of the mind", some of which are innate and some are acquired. We cannot get rid of the innate ones, but we have to fight against the acquired ones.

It is also known today that there are basic intentions in both humans and animals. In animals, they are usually innate (the ability to build nests, etc.), while in humans there are more variations. Innate abilities can be a trap for animals, because circumstances can change and there is no corresponding ability to adapt. In humans, most adaptive capacities are acquired (through training, long preparation for adulthood, etc.). However, this also carries certain risks, as we have to make mistakes, experience trials and certain losses to reach more or less adequate responses to environmental challenges.

Finally, let us return to the question we posed at the beginning. So, does a priori knowledge really exist in the form in which Kant imagined it? The conclusion that emerges from recent advances in neuroscience is that there are many different variants of pre-experiential knowledge, both innate and acquired. In particular, the a priori that Kant talked about in terms of forms of contemplation of space and time have different aspects of origin and formation. After all, there are innate learning mechanisms, predispositions, programmed dispositions, expectations, etc. that perform functions similar to those that were assigned to the classical a priori. That is, we can probably say that some of them are largely innate, and some are the result of the evolution of human civilisation. For example, most examples of innate forms of perception found in animals relate to space rather than time. Whereas humans had different ideas about time (cyclic time, the "arrow of time", etc.). And the mathematics that Kant relied on to confirm the existence of a priori has taken on completely different forms in our time (non-Euclidean geometry, set theory, etc.), and therefore cannot be considered something apodictic.

Originality

The article substantiates the thesis that the evolutionary theory of consciousness allows explaining both the genesis of the a priori sphere and determining the mechanism of action of arti-

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ficial formations or the achievements of human civilisation. Since people have gained the ability to generate and test hypotheses about reality instead of directly dealing with specific threats, the likelihood of wrong decisions and false preferences has arisen and is constantly growing. Therefore, in general, we have an urgent need for a double reflection – both on the limits of the application of a priori forms of knowledge and on the intentional attitudes of the human habitus.

Drawing on the achievements of the evolutionary theory of consciousness, the author points to the possibility of a much broader approach to the problem of the a priori, which distinguishes not only different forms of knowledge, but also attitudes, biases, and intentions. In other words, the epistemological a priori is only a subdivision of the general sphere of innate and acquired human abilities. Hence, it can be argued that basic intentionality is also a kind of a priori, but it is widespread both in the field of ethics and in human behaviour.

Conclusions

Thus, the preliminary analysis shows that we have a fairly broad scope of knowledge that can be classified as so-called a priori knowledge. These are abstract ideas, logical and mathematical norms, innate inclinations, prejudices, superstitions, "idols of the mind", the sphere of normativity, and so on. All of them are different in terms of their origin, method of formation, and their role in human life. For Kant, a priori forms play a completely positive role in substantiating the universality and legislative power of the forms of thinking used in science and in moral prescriptions. For Bacon, on the contrary, they are either false prejudices or innate inclinations that prevent us from knowing the world objectively and impartially. In the end, there are very real reasons for both points of view. Since the emergence of human civilisation has made all processes of adaptation and environmental cognition much more complex, this raises questions about the limits of the application of the concept of a priori in a particular science, as well as the need for critical and reflective thinking in the process of verifying scientific theories and hypotheses. This was once pointed out by K. Popper, who emphasised that the way of science is constant rational criticism and that this is the significant contribution of Kant to the development of philosophy. Today, it is necessary to expand the scope of critical thinking, as this approach is needed not only in the field of science, but also in other areas of human activity. The computer revolution and the emergence of artificial intelligence are creating a new environment in which risk-taking is becoming a characteristic feature. Therefore, the ability to think critically and test hypotheses is of great importance today.

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В. В. ЛЯХ[1*]

[1*]Інститут філософії імені Г. С. Сковороди, Національна академія наук України (Київ, Україна), ел. пошта vvlvv2012@ukr.net, ORCID 0000-0003-4683-0838

Тема апріоризму в сучасних дискусіях про еволюцію свідомості

Мета. У статті передбачено: 1) визначити місце і роль апріорних топосів знання в загальному процесі еволюції людської свідомості, з'ясувати співвідношення між вродженими і набутими здібностями людини; 2) на основі еволюційного підходу визначити творчий потенціал апріорних і набутих здібностей людини; 3) з'ясувати базові інтенціональності людини, які дозволили їй вийти на новий рівень адаптаційної по-

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ведінки. **Теоретичний базис.** Досліджено генезу і значення ідеї апріорі в традиційній теорії пізнання та її сучасні імплікації в еволюційній теорії свідомості. Еволюційний підхід дозволяє переосмислити досить широку сферу того, що потрапляє під означення апріорності: від аналітики, нормативності, різноманітних установок свідомості до поведінкових реакцій людини. У процесі аналізу апріоризму Канта, який застосував його для обґрунтування можливості існування теоретичних наук, здійснено спробу визначити природу апріорності в контексті еволюційної теорії свідомості. Хоча ідею апріорності критикували як опоненти Канта (спираючись на історичний досвід), так і його послідовники (які виступали проти формалізму апріорного знання), особливу роль у цій критиці і подальшій розробці цієї теми відіграла еволюційна теорія свідомості, яка сприяла більш детальному розгляду питання генезису так званих апріорних форм. Зрештою, завдяки поєднанню різних форм навчання і сукупності соціокультурних форм освоєння світу людина зуміла отримати доступ до "потенційного інтелекту" і новий "простір для творення". **Наукова новизна.** Обґрунтовано тезу, що еволюційна теорія свідомості дозволяє пояснити як генезу апріорної сфери, так і визначити механізм дії штучних утворень, або напрацювань людської цивілізації. Оскільки люди отримали здатність генерувати й тестувати гіпотези щодо реальності замість того, щоб безпосередньо мати справу з конкретними загрозами, виникла й постійно зростає ймовірність хибних рішень і помилкових уподобань. Тож на загал маємо нагальну потребу в подвійній рефлексії – як щодо меж застосування апріорних форм пізнання, так і щодо інтенційних установок людського габітусу. Спираючись на здобутки еволюційної теорії свідомості, автор вказує на можливість значно ширшого підходу до проблеми апріорного, у якому виділяє не тільки різні форми знання, а й установки, упередженості, інтенціональності. Тобто епістемологічне апріорі є лише підрозділом загальної сфери вроджених і набутих здібностей людини. Відтак можна стверджувати, що базові інтенціональності – це теж своєрідні апріорі, але які розповсюджені як у сфері етології, так і в поведінці людей. **Висновки.** Спираючись на ідеї природного добору Дарвіна, дослідження в галузі етології, антропології, дані нейронаук, сучасні уявлення про свідомість тощо, представники еволюційної теорії свідомості запропонували більш детальний підхід до вивчення сфери апріорного. З одного боку, була підважена віра в аподиктичну достовірність апріорних форм, а з іншого – з'ясована складна природа тих форм пізнання, які Кант вважав апріорними. Зрештою, ідея апріорності виводить нас на питання щодо здатності людей до навчання, формулювання завдань, гіпотез, теорій тощо. Зокрема, еволюційна теорія свідомості дозволяє поглянути на пізнавальні спроможності людини під кутом зору *адаптації* до викликів навколишнього середовища.

Ключові слова: апріоризм; вроджені і набуті ідеї; еволюційна теорія; еволюція свідомості; адаптація людини; антропологія; меми; культура

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