

**UDC 130.3**S. V. VOZNYAK<sup>1\*</sup>, V. S. VOZNYAK<sup>2\*</sup><sup>1\*</sup>Vasyl Stefanyk Precarpathian National University (Ivano-Frankivsk, Ukraine), e-mail stepanwozniak@gmail.com, ORCID 0000-0003-2268-5736<sup>2\*</sup>Drohobych Ivan Franko State Pedagogical University (Drohobych, Ukraine), e-mail volim\_s@ukr.net, ORCID 0000-0002-6877-3785**The Anthropological Content of Thinking: The Place of Thinking Among the Essential Forces of Man According to Hegel**

**Purpose.** By appealing to Hegel's philosophy, the article aims to understand the role of thinking through its relation to other essential human forces – feeling and will. Such a problem statement reveals the anthropological content of thinking, which is necessary for conducting a critical analysis of human nature. **Theoretical basis.** To realize the set purpose, the dialectical-logical method of categorical-reflexive analysis for texts and realities of human existence in the world is applied. **Originality.** The authors proceed from the fact that the usual way of interpreting thinking as existing alongside feelings and will is theoretically unsatisfactory since thinking is taken in a reduced way – only in its mental form. Thinking, as the mind itself, does not exist next to feelings and will, but permeates them through, at the same time being enriched by their definitions. In this case, thinking appears as an activity following the objective laws of reality itself, which implies a necessary and conscious change by the subject of the forms and schemes of its activity. The authors claim that the Hegelian paradigm of the interpretation of thinking as the substance of everything spiritual makes sense and provides an opportunity to adequately understand the nature of both feelings and will. **Conclusions.** Accusing Hegel of absolutizing thinking, attributing to him "panlogism" appears unfounded, since Hegel understands logic itself in a fundamentally different way. The interpretation of feelings and will as a kind of specifications of thinking by no means reduces them to thinking, but allows us to see their imbued with thinking as an orientation to reality itself in its essence, and not to partial features of the subject. Such an understanding of human nature is capable of adequately orienting pedagogical theory and practice toward the formation of a holistic culture of the individual as a culture of mind, feelings, and will.

*Keywords:* essential human forces; anthropological content of thinking; thinking (mind); sensuality; will

**Introduction**

The problem of the relationship between the essential forces of a person – thinking (mind), feeling and will – does not lose its relevance, since the modern anthropological crisis requires a deeper and more adequate understanding of human "arrangement". In the course of the development of civilization, we can observe a change in the emphasis of this relationship, the dominance of one of these essential forces, and the suppression of others – at the present stage, the tendencies of a reduced understanding of thinking are clearly active. Hegel's experience of understanding this problem, in our opinion, not only has not lost its significance but also opens new horizons in the theoretical disclosure of human nature.

The philosophy of the outstanding representative of European rationalism Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel does not cease to be the subject of close attention of researchers in the most diverse directions of philosophy. Hegel's work is encyclopedic in nature, and historians of philosophy, aesthetics, and legal scholars are interested in his heritage, but it is Hegel's logic that concentrates the main attention even in the 21st century. Stephen Glynn Houlgate (2006) calls "The Science of Logic" a monumental work that remains a closed book for most philosophers and sets out to show the subtleties of Hegel's thought, consistently revealing its significance for actual human thinking. John Burbidge (2023) calls his reading of Hegel an interpretation (p. 482), that is, he considers his comments somewhat arbitrary, based on his own assumptions and the first

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such assumption indicates the distinction between how people actually think and what logical necessity requires: "Logic is not concerned with the way people actually think; its primary goal is to establish the necessary links that bind concepts to concepts. ... For Houlgate, pure logic lies in a realm of necessity, independent of any actual thinking" (p. 483). Based on such statements, it is possible to see the Hegelian understanding of thinking as irrelevant to human life, but it is precisely the discovery of the possible arbitrariness of human thinking that is exactly the real task that always faces a living person, concerned with thinking according to the object itself, and not according to their own settings.

Houlgate (2023) quite justifiably does not recognize as relevant the accusations of his position in *opposing* real thinking and the logical necessity of thinking, noting that it is important for him to emphasize: "The movement from one category to another is thus not 'implemented' by our 'intellectual functions' but is made necessary by the categories themselves" (p. 517). And this is what makes training our thinking relevant, which occurs when thoroughly entering Hegel's philosophy.

So, we record the return of attention exactly to the Hegelian type of consideration of thinking, eliminating the dominance of Kantian criticism, characteristic of the twentieth century. Robert Pippin (2019) removes the usual accusation of authoritarianism and dogmatism of Hegelian thinking, reading its logic metaphysically, distinguishing between pre-Kantian metaphysics and new metaphysics, which concerns "the authority and legitimacy of our claims to know" (p. 190). In this case, Hegel's logic is understood by the exposition of the structure and activity of the Kantian "synthetic unity of apperception" (Pippin, 2019, p. 131), which brings Kant and Hegel closer together. This interpretation causes disagreement (Koch, 2019), but it should be noted that the anthropological dimension of thinking is strengthened. Koch (2019) emphasizes that logic concerns the activity of thinking, more precisely, it is the activity not of an immaterial thinking subject, but of people like us who answer telephone calls and are embodied in flesh and bones, are not so much the comprehension of some content, but rather productive force, spontaneity (p. 1050). But if he makes it his task to return to thinking as performed in judgments (Koch, 2019, p. 1050), that is, he insists on discursiveness, then we offer a slightly different version of understanding thinking as an activity of people "in flesh and bones". And it is important that this is possible through the reading of Hegelian logic – the understanding of thinking as a speculative activity allows this.

The convergence of Kant's transcendental logic and Hegel's speculative logic is not always accepted, and Stephen Glynn Houlgate (2018) disagrees with this interpretation: "In the work of Robert Pippin and others, this has led to an 'apperception'-oriented interpretation of Hegel's logic, according to which Hegel follows Kant in taking logic to be primarily concerned with the nature of human self-conscious subjectivity" (p. 101). As mentioned above, Houlgate needs to identify those points where actual human thinking evades the logical necessity present in the movement of categories, but the attention to "human self-conscious subjectivity" interfere with this path, Hegel's logic and is an explication of its "structure".

Such a disagreement often appears as a defense of the significance of Hegelian logic and its originality, which became the topic of young researchers Thomas F. Whaling (2018) and Irad Kimhi (2018). Thomas F. Whaling (2018) emphasizes the importance of the ontological dimension of thinking, eliminating the psychologism of interpretations: "Thought as such, or thought thinking thought, precedes all finite consciousness and is that medium by which finite thought is possible at all" (p. 213). Kimhi (2018) adheres to the thesis that the two principles of non-contradiction – the ontological principle and the psychological principle – are actually aspects of

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the same capacity, manifested differently in thinking and being. In developing his argument, Kimhi relies on the ideas of Aristotle, Kant, and Wittgenstein.

The approach to Hegel's logic in the context of metaphysics corresponds to the renewal of interest in metaphysics in analytic philosophy in recent decades. But it is much more important that access to metaphysics allows us to read Hegel's logic anthropologically, which is precisely possible through the discovery of the place of thinking among the essential forces of a person. That is, revealing not so the instrumental-operational content of thinking, even if we see thinking as the ability to move along the contours and logic of being (a milder version – to the subject), as revealing the liberating power of thinking, which is possible by understanding thinking as the active ability to transcend the self and the ability to see the world through the eyes of humanity, or the gap between the past and the future, as Hannah Arendt does, emphasizing that thinking has no place, it is everywhere and therefore nowhere, and Evald Ilyenkov (2017), who interprets the phenomenon of education in the context of the formation of thinking as the development of the ability to look at the world from the viewpoint of the human race (p. 208). According to Arendt (1981), thinking is a way of interrupting the automatism of everyday activity, it transfers a person "into some never-never land, the land of invisibles" (p. 85). And this is not a fictional utopia, but the reality of human actions – we adhere to such an understanding of thinking that connects it with ethics, continuing the vector of thought that links thinking with freedom, therefore "compels a person to transcend his own finitude and thereby constitute the sphere of the spirit" (Voznyak & Lipin, 2020, p. 103).

David Bakhurst (2023) emphasizes this understanding of thinking, revealing the specifics of thinking about the thinking of Evald Ilyenkov, for whom "logic describes the 'laws of thought', but this is more than the articulation of argument forms and principles of inference" (p. ix).

In this context, the work of Isabel Jacobs (2024) is very interesting and significant for Hegelian studies, which analyzes the ideas of Alexandre Kojève in the context of Russian Hegelianism, and therefore the interpretation of Hegelian logic in another tradition. Along with I. Ilyin, Isabelle Jacobs includes works of Ukrainian philosophers Dmytro Chyzhevskiy and Gustav Shpet dedicated to Hegel (the latter she calls the "Kyiv philosopher"). We will return to the thoughts contained in Isabelle Jacobs's article later.

However, English-language philosophical literature has in a certain way bypassed the question of Hegel's understanding of the place of thinking among other essential forces of man.

Hegel in his "Phenomenology of Spirit" quite clearly pointed out the objective orientation of human consciousness and its openness to the world. It is through consciousness that the world is given to man as it is. Thinking in this context appears as reflective and critical work with the material of consciousness, ultimately with the content of reality.

The problem of anthropological reading of thinking is also present in such a direction of philosophy, which is closely related to the theory of cultural and historical activity, which in Ukraine is often identified with Marxist doctrine and therefore does not pay attention to it, but it remains authoritative and influential in world opinion. Among the most recent works in this direction, we should mention the book by David Bakhurst (2023), in which, following the author, the main focus is on the legacy of Evald Ilyenkov and Lev Vygotsky, although other figures are also touched upon. Explaining the title of the book, he mentions Ilyenkov:

Ilyenkov was fond of the expression, 'sut' dela', which has been variously rendered by his translators as the 'essence', 'crux' or 'gist' 'of the matter',

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though, in my view, the most attractive translation is often 'the heart of the matter'. Ilyenkov uses the expression to characterise the ends of thought. On his view, thinking should not rest content with a superficial characterisation of surface phenomena but aspire to transcend appearances and disclose the nature of things, thereby explaining both why things are as they are and why we tend to see them as we do. Thought, in other words, gets to the heart of the matter, and thus the phrase is a fitting title for this collection. (Bakhurst, 2023, p. ix)

Bakhurst (2023) refers to Evald Ilyenkov's analysis of the Hegelian concept of thinking, highlighting the thesis of the openness of human thinking: "Human beings are creatures of the natural world, but our mindedness does not consist in the occurrence of a special class of events inside us; rather, it lies in our mode of engagement with the world, a mode of engagement possible only because we are social beings" (p. 132). This is consistent with the statement regarding the revolution in logic carried out by the German thinker, which is explained by E. Ilyenkov: criticizing the entire previous tradition of logic, Hegel claims that language, and speech are not the only forms of manifestation and realization of thinking, since the latter is carried out in all historical in the process of human creation of culture and civilization, in the development of science and other spheres of spiritual activity. So, according to the opinion of the German thinker, it is necessary to bring the science of thinking (logic) into line with this real, valid thinking. In this way, Hegel creates his "Science of Logic". Ilyenkov writes:

From Hegel's standpoint the real basis for the forms and laws of thought proved to be only the aggregate historical process of the *intellectual development of humanity* understood in its universal and necessary aspects. The subject matter of logic was no longer the abstract identical schemas that could be found in each individual consciousness, and common to each of them, but the *history of science and technique* collectively created by people, a process quite independent of the will and consciousness of the separate individuals although realised at each of its stages precisely in the conscious activity of individuals. (Ilyenkov, 2008, p. 177)

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In this way, Hegel overcomes the prejudice of the previous understanding of thinking, when it is fixed as one of the subjective-psychic abilities of a person along with others – with contemplation, feelings, memory, will – and at the same time as opposed to them as something that is not with them nothing in common

Regarding the ideological legacy of the eminent philosopher Evald Ilyenkov, it is worth noting that the last decade witnessed a revival of interest in Ilyenkov's reading of classical thought in Europe: translations, new articles, publishing plans, conferences, creation of the "International Friends of Ilyenkov" group. On May 16-17, 2024, an international conference dedicated to the 100th anniversary of the philosopher's birth is planned in Germany "Images of the Ideal. Evald Ilyenkov at 100" (Leibniz-Zentrum für Literatur- und Kulturforschung).

### Purpose

*The purpose* of the article is to understand the role of thinking concerning other essential human forces – feeling and will, based on the rational meaning of Hegel's interpretation of this issue. This statement of the problem reveals the anthropological content of thinking, which is necessary for conducting a critical analysis of human nature.

### Statement of basic materials

Let's return to the already mentioned article by Isabel Jacobs (2024), in which the analysis of such a version of Hegel's reading is realized, which is not carried out in line with the analytical tradition, but on the intuitive-phenomenological ground, which is characteristic of Slavic thought. Accepting the general trend of her opinion, we believe that some aspects of her interpretations need to be clarified. Jacobs notes:

Ilyin explored in great detail Hegel's method, arguing that it has to be distinguished from dialectic... Rather than a method, for Ilyin, dialectic is the essence of both thinking and concrete reality. Under the influence of Husserl, Ilyin argued that Hegel's method was in fact not dialectical but intuitionist and phenomenological. (Jacobs, 2024, p. 43)

She believes that "Kojève radicalizes Ilyin and Koyré's views on method, stating that Hegel was the first philosopher who voluntarily abandoned method as such" (Jacobs, 2024, p. 44). We note that we can talk about abandoning the method in the case when "method" is simply understood as a certain type or way in which a philosopher carries out cognition, that is, within the framework of a purely instrumentalist paradigm of interpretation of method. However, the fact is that Hegel radically rethinks the nature of the method as such. By the way, as Isabelle Jacobs points out, this understands The British researcher cites the following words of Chyzhhevsky:

Ilyin... refuses to see *dialectic* as the main content of Hegel's philosophy. Above all, Hegelian dialectic is not a method, or better, it is the

"method of the object to be recognized itself". Dialectic is "method-life" or "method-realisation". Therefore Hegel's method is better called *not dialectical* but *intuitive*. (Jacobs, 2024, p. 46)

This point is where one can dispute – both with the mentioned authors and with Isabelle Jacobs since she does not try to disagree with them on anything. Why is Hegelian dialectic not a method? Is it possible to apply to the philosophy of the German thinker those interpretations of the word "dialectic" that we find in previous philosophy – starting from antiquity? After all, it was Hegel who gave the concept of dialectics complete meaning and significance, turning dialectics into genuine logic. On the other hand, in Hegel, logic also becomes a dialectic, organically including metaphysics with its categories. Yes, for him, the method is the dialectic of the subject itself, therefore the method is not an external form applied to the subject, but the self-moving soul of the content itself. This self-movement is noticed by many researchers of Hegelian logic, among the latter we can mention Houlgate (2021). And when we use such a clear method, we do not apply some external measure to the subject but turn to its own meaningful form, expressed, however, in the form of the universal. But this is its, subject, universal, grasped by logical categories as a way of our movement in its content.

Isabelle Jacobs (2024) cites the following opinion of Alexandre Kojève: "Hegel's method is nothing but the self-revelation of reality; in other words, it is conceptualized being or realized concept" (p. 53). The construction itself just testifies to the dialectic, which since the time of the ancient Greeks can move into its opposite – conceptualized being and realized concept and is a way out into its other. This feature of dialectical thinking is directly related to the topics of this research – the ability of thinking to "go beyond" the boundaries of a purely theoretical and contemplative form and permeate sensuality and will, realizing their pure universal forms.

The fact is that Hegel's philosophy should not be approached with the ideas and concepts of the previous philosophical tradition. He understands everything differently than before, reveals it more fully, and brings it to its own concept. That is, to understanding. This applies not only to "method" and "dialectic", but also to the categories "abstract-general" and "concrete-universal" (a repeated feature in a certain class of objects – and a way of communication in the composition of a certain integrity), the nature of the categories themselves as forms thinking, identical to forms of being, categories "abstract" and "concrete". In the same way, the Hegelian "concept" is fundamentally different from the usual "concept" in formal logic: it is not a word or phrase that reproduces the essential features of an object, but a synonym for understanding the essence of the matter, the concrete unity of the universal, singular and special, the truth of being and essence.

Likewise, the essence of thinking in Hegel's philosophy is understood in a fundamentally different way, thereby interpreting its place among the essential forces of man, its relationship to feelings and will in a new way. Let's focus on understanding the thinking inherent in Hegel's philosophy, on that essential thing that has enriched the history of world philosophical thought, and that someone else's things often remain unaddressed by modern philosophers, psychologists, and educators.

According to Hegel, thinking itself is the basis of the content of human consciousness, but initially, it does not appear in the form of thinking, but in the form of feeling, contemplation, and

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representation. Therefore, the specified forms of sensory cognition are already full of thinking, although they do not possess the form of thinking itself.

Traditionally, the German thinker is accused of exaggerating the role of thinking in the structure of human cognitive abilities, among the essential human forces. However, Hegel does not consider it necessary to consider thinking alongside sensuality, will, etc. His approach to the problem is fundamentally different. In our opinion, the philosopher's thinking appears as an activity that essentially corresponds to the essence of the matter, to reality itself, to the movement of objects. Here he writes: "But when we think, we renounce our selfishness and particular being, sink ourselves in the thing, allow thought to follow its own course, and if we add anything of our own, we think ill" (Hegel, 2013, p. 141). It is here that the fundamental moment of Hegel's understanding of thinking is hidden – the renunciation of oneself (from "one's" – we will see the meaning of this later, considering the will), such immersion in the subject, which corresponds to the essence of the subject, the logic of the unfolding of its content. Only then will thinking to be *independent*, that is, determined by reality itself, and not somehow by our own peculiarities, some "specificity of thinking". Let's pay attention: usually under "independent thinking" one means a rather philistine statement that "everyone thinks in his/her own way". In fact, the specificity of thinking lies in its universality, in other words, in the absence of "specificity". Therefore, to ensure such universality, thinking should not apply its *ready-made* scheme to the subject, but change it according to the essence of the matter to ensure the coincidence of subjective and objective, the movement of thought with the unfolding of the dimensions of the subject's essence.

Let's listen to the following words of Hegel:

If thought is the constitutive substance of external things, it is also the universal substance of what is spiritual. In all human perception thought is present; so too thought is the universal in all the acts of conception and recollection; in short, in every mental activity, in willing, wishing, and the like. All these faculties are only further specialisations of thought. When it is presented in this light, thought has a different part to play from what it has if we speak of a faculty of thought, one among a crowd of other faculties, such as perception, conception, and will, with which it stands on the same level. When it is seen to be the true universal of all that nature and mind contain, it extends its scope far beyond all these, and becomes the basis of everything. From this view of thought, in its objective meaning as nous, we may next pass to consider the subjective

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sense of the term. We say first, Man is a being that thinks; but we also say at the same time, Man is a being that perceives and wills. Man is a thinker, and is universal; but he is a thinker only because he feels his own universality. (Hegel, 2013, pp. 139-140)

Therefore, to be a properly thinking being means to move and live in the realm of the universal. The latter appears in the form of "pure forms", categories as forms of thinking, identical to forms of being. Categories, in our opinion, permeate both contemplation (feelings) and will, although they are not activated, they are not aware of them. True, even at the level of rational thinking, they, the categories, are not realized.

The German thinker is often called a "panlogist", ignoring the fact that logic itself is understood in Hegel in a completely different way than in previous philosophy. Already in Kant, we can see the distinction between "general logic" and "transcendental logic". Although still in many researches, logic is considered to be only traditional formal logic.

Evald Ilyenkov was in solidarity with Spinoza and Hegel in his interpretation of thinking, overcoming instrumentalist interpretations of it. As Isabel Jacobs points out:

For Ilyenkov, thinking is not reducible to science; we cannot grasp it by measuring brain waves. We think through many organs, including our bodies, hands, tools and friends. Ilyenkov's sharp critique of cybernetics and technocratic capitalism gains new relevance in contemporary debates on artificial intelligence. While opening a door to non-human thinking, Ilyenkov ultimately defends the specific capacities of the human mind. (Jacobs, 2023)

According to Evald Ilyenkov, thinking appears as the human ability to carry out activities per the objective laws of reality (any activity, including in the field of signs), transforming forms of activity precisely to ensure such compliance.

Isabel Jacobs underlines:

In the act of thinking, I participate sensually in the object of thought. In the same way, we have to read Hegel: "in order to comprehend Hegel one must attempt to approach his philosophizing *phenomenologically*, i.e., to reveal the internal structure of his thought act". Understanding Hegel



means "to grasp his *mode of thinking* in order to then reenact this mode

with one's own soul and assimilate it". (Jacobs, 2024, pp. 48-49)

It is very important and significant to state that it is necessary to *sensibly* participate in the subject of thought in the act of *thinking*. This is the *specific relationship between sensibility and thinking* in Hegel's philosophy. Of course, this method can be called phenomenological, but, in our opinion, this is the essence of the German thinker's dialectical method. The fact is that dialectic as a method does not work if you stay within the limits of the detached intellect with its special procedures. In the act of thinking, "participating sensibly in the subject of thought" means realizing in this act the integrity of human nature, human nature, and human presence. To be *completely* in the content of the subject – this is what the *act of thinking*, grasped in Hegelian terms, means.

As for sensuality, it should not be interpreted superficially and reduced only to a certain stage of the cognitive process. First of all, sensuality is a sensual *activity* that captivates a person completely. This is a state of indifference, immediacy. In its developed, true form, sensuality is not a person's experience of himself or herself, but rather an experience of reality in its meaningful unfolding. Feelings are able in their practice to relate to a thing for the sake of the thing itself, to become a kind of "theoreticians".

It is known that categories appear as forms not only of thinking but also of activity and contemplation, that is, of sensuality. Thanks to them, the world is given to man as it is in its objectivity.

The same applies to such an important essential human power as the will. Will as the driver of our actions always seems to be something frankly subjective. However, what did Heraclitus of Ephesus mean when he said that *arbitrariness* should be extinguished faster than fire? It seems that from human arbitrariness (in the Christian language – "lawlessness") only trouble and disaster should be expected. That is why the ancient Greek thinker called to listen to the Logos, and not to one's own will. Christianity affirms the same: "Thy will be done, not mine". The true dimension of an intact human will is to be able to define oneself by the absolute dimensions of being, truth, goodness, and beauty.

The will is capable and must be determined by thinking, mind (not instrumental reason). This is what makes a person a truly free being. At the same time, thinking itself should not bypass the work of self-critical reflection, all the time checking its *compliance with the essence of the matter*, checking the "matter" itself and its "essence" for *truth*, appropriateness, and *humanity*.

The act of human volition is undoubtedly a cause, which means that there are also categories of cause and effect here. And if we take will not as arbitrariness, but as free submission to "Thy will", then the categorical system will be much more complicated. However, this is the topic of separate research.

If thinking itself is taken only in its mental projection, then one gets the impression that it exists *alongside* other essential human forces, which, in turn, have completely different characteristics. However, then we, as researchers, ourselves fall into the trap of mental reflection, which is unable to understand the true nature of feelings and volition. Then we take the damaged, existing state of feelings and wills as "normal", just as we identify the forms of mind with the essentiality of thinking as such.

Let's recall: Hegel in his "Philosophy of Spirit" singles out three forms of absolute spirit – art, religion, and philosophy. In art, *truth* is given in the form of contemplation, in religion – in the

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form of representation, in philosophy – in the form of a concept. In our opinion, this idea of the German thinker can be developed in this way: art contains the *culture of human sensuality*, religion – *the culture of will*, philosophy – the culture of thinking. At the same time, one should not forget about the internal relationship of these forms of the absolute spirit, as well as about the interpenetration of the mentioned cultures. Actually, it is *one culture* – only in different dimensions.

Such a statement has serious philosophical and educational significance. "School must teach thinking!" – Evald Ilyenkov urged at one time. However, this does not at all mean the development of the intellectual sphere to the detriment of the volitional or sensual. With a true understanding of thinking and its nature, the development of thinking in the educational process is interpenetrated with the development of feelings and will and is inseparable from them. In the same way, will and feelings cannot develop outside of thinking itself. It is a pity that pedagogy is still focused on a frankly inadequate understanding of the anthropological structure of a person. For some reason, it neglects philosophy.

Thinking, according to Hegel, in its forms of realization (categories) is identical with being. However, the identity of thinking and being is inherent in both sensuality and true will. To carefully investigate the implementation of the principle of identity of thinking and being in sensuality and volition is an interesting and very valid task of scientific research.

Human history is full of all kinds of distortions of human essential forces – both each of them and their relationship. The proper theoretical understanding of anthropological problems must oppose the orientation and inverted forms of the realization of reason, feelings and will and is called to look for ways to overcome untrue forms of human existence in the world.

### Originality

The originality of the article lies in the explication of the understanding of the relationship between thinking, sensuality, and will as essential human forces through a fundamentally different interpretation of the nature of thinking. If the latter is considered only in its common-sense form, then the usual idea of the existence of essential forces one next to the other is somewhat correct, but thinking is by no means exhausted by reason. Thinking, as the mind itself, permeates both feelings and will, being enriched by their definitions. From a theoretical viewpoint, the widespread idea of the relationship between the essential forces of man is, according to the authors, unsatisfactory.

### Conclusions

Hegel's version of understanding thinking as the substance of all spiritual, in our opinion, has serious advantages. He should not be accused of "panlogism", since logic itself is taken fundamentally differently by the German thinker. The interpretation of feelings and will as a kind of manifestations of thinking by no means dissolves them in the sphere of the intellectual, but allows us to see their penetration by thinking as an orientation to reality itself in its essence, and not to partial features of the subject. Such an understanding of the interrelationship of essential human forces can orient the field of education to the search for ways of forming a complete personality, to the development of the culture of the mind, feelings, and will, to the truth, beauty, and goodness.

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## Антропологічний зміст мислення: місце мислення серед сутнісних сил людини за Гегелем

**Мета.** Стаття спрямована на осмислення ролі мислення через його відношення до інших сутнісних сил людини – почуття і волі, за допомогою звернення до філософії Гегеля. Така постановка проблеми виявляє антропологічний зміст мислення, що необхідно для проведення критичного аналізу природи людини. **Теоретичний базис.** Для реалізації поставленої мети застосовано діалектико-логічний метод категоріально-рефлексивного аналізу текстів та реалій людського буття у світі. **Наукова новизна.** Автори виходять із того, що звичайний спосіб тлумачення мислення як такого, що існує поряд із почуттями й волею, є незадовільним у теоретичному плані, оскільки мислення при цьому береться редуковано – лише у розумовій його формі. Мислення як власне розум існує не поруч із почуттями й волею, а пронизує їх наскрізь, водночас збагачуючись їх визначеннями. У такому разі мислення постає діяльністю відповідно до об'єктивних законів самої дійсності, що передбачає необхідну й свідому зміну суб'єктом форм та схем своєї активності. Автори стверджують, що гегелівська парадигма тлумачення мислення як субстанції всього духовного має сенс і дає можливість адекватно зрозуміти природу як почуттів, так і волі. **Висновки.** Звинувачення Гегеля в абсолютизації мислення, приписування йому "панлогізму" постають необґрунтованими, оскільки Гегель саму логіку розуміє принципово інакше. Тлумачення почуттів та волі як свого роду специфікацій мислення аж ніяк не редукує їх до мислення, проте дозволяє побачити їх пронизаність мисленням як орієнтацією на саму реальність в її істотності, а не на частковій особливості суб'єкта. Таке розуміння природи людини здатне адекватно орієнтувати педагогічну теорію та практику на формування цілісної культури особистості як культури розуму, почуттів і волі.

**Ключові слова:** сутнісні сили людини; антропологічний зміст мислення; мислення (розум); чуттєвість; воля

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