Purpose. The article aims to problematize the forms of correlation between the fundamental category of freedom and the phenomenon of resentment in the context of the formation of ethical discourse, as well as to consider the symbolic mechanisms of the collective imagination in the formation of a picture of the human world.

Theoretical basis. The study uses the method of historical and philosophical analysis and methods of the humanities – hermeneutics and phenomenology. Originality. An attempt is made to comprehend the correlation between freedom as a category of philosophical anthropology and practical philosophy and the phenomenon of resentment.

Conclusions. The ethical category of freedom, explicitly or implicitly, significantly shapes the content of the process of choice and social action by a person, which can be manifested in discursive practices and narratives of ideologies, public opinion and collective imagination. Symbolic mechanisms of human consciousness record the paradoxical correlation and at the same time the antithesis of reality reception and meaning generation between rational awareness and existential experience, humanization and appropriation of freedom and emotional-affective, reactive attitude of a person to narratives, motives, symbols and images of resentment. At the same time, freedom can presuppose the conscious content of resentment, while resentment deforms the concept of freedom into arbitrariness or violence, appealing not only to the archaic values of tribalism, but also to the rational basis of individual freedom of the individual, on which the philosophical tradition of the West is based. The resentful forms of thinking and emotional reception of reality function as symbolic constructions, that is, they can have a wide and internally contradictory field of interpretations. Western philosophical thought has a significant potential to reinterpret the challenges of the phenomenon of resentment based on the tradition of ontotheology and ethics of discourse due to the specific rationalism of the vision of the philosophy of freedom.

Keywords: man; freedom; resentment; existentials; being

Introduction

Modern philosophical anthropology, when interpreted as a practical philosophy (A. Loi (2010), A. Laktionova (2013), etc.), must necessarily problematize the issue of ethical discourse of the subject, social groups of various degrees of generality, cultural, religious and political communities, nations, and states. Ethical discourse reveals the symbolic content of the collective imagination and becomes a marker of both the conceptualization of the problems of philosophical anthropology (in particular, the nature of man, self-identification, the nature of the social), and indicates the moral choice of individuals, groups, and society as a whole. In particular, the category of freedom should be considered within the system of social ethics, i.e., to go beyond the boundaries of an autonomous moral subject. It should be noted that an action-oriented interpretation of ethics, which involves special attention to the category of freedom and the concept of choice, necessarily involves the problematization of the boundary conditions for the awareness of freedom, the cognitive and emotional-affective mechanisms of consciousness that ensure such awareness, and the concept of collective imagination. The boundaries of this imagination, based on individual and collective experience of social and socio-political action, are formed in the process of social communication and social discourse. At the same time, ethical discourse is formed with the help of both discursive and presentational symbols (S. Langer) and appeals to...
the spheres of the rational and the emotional. In this context, it seems appropriate to carry out a comparative examination of the category of freedom and the concept of resentment (Nietzsche) from the perspective of philosophical anthropology in order to clarify the essential connections between them. We mean, first of all, the correlation between the category of freedom and the phenomenon of resentment, which implies other semantic configurations beyond direct antithetcity. The intuitions of the classics of philosophical anthropology, as well as the ideas of domestic philosophers, served as a basis for developing the research issues. A. Loi (2010) studied the correlation between philosophical anthropology and practical philosophy. V. Yermolenko (2018) examined the palingenesis of ideologies in the collective imagination of the West in the 19th–21st centuries. M. I. Boichenko studied the problems of understanding freedom and other existential aspects of human existence (Boychenko, 2017). S. A. Datsiuk (2022) proposed a new vision of the typology of the phenomenon of resentment. A. Laktionova (2013) considered the activity aspect of practical philosophy from the perspective of philosophical anthropology. V. V. Khmil studied the philosophical and psychological dimensions of social expectations of the individual (Khmil & Popovych, 2019).

It seems obvious that, as a social phenomenon, resentment is an integral part of any human sociality both at the level of conceptualization of meanings and at the level of value orientations, motivational systems, and reactive activity stereotypes. We will be primarily interested in the transformation of the phenomenon of resentment in the current conditions of the emergence of new structures of the information space in the context of the conditional confrontation between the traditions of ontotheology (in the tradition of M. Heidegger) and atheistic irrationalism (J.-P. Sartre) in Western philosophy and modern explications of this phenomenon. The modern development of political populism, the formation of the digital media space, AI as a communication agent, along with the crisis of scientific expertise and the rapid transformations of "fluid ideologies" (V. Yermolenko), worldview doctrines and the picture of the world in general represent the transformation of cognitive and emotional-affective mechanisms of social and socio-political actions that substantiate changes in symbolic behaviour (L. White, V. Turner), habitus (P. Bourdieu) of the subject, social groups, and entire societies. Therefore, the question regarding the forms of determination, the immanence of the phenomenon of resentment in human sociality and its genetic connection with the category of freedom as a fundamental value of a person, communities and entire societies, to achieve which activity should be directed, seems relevant. It should also be noted that the symbolic mechanisms of human interaction and communication, which cover the cognitive and emotional-affective spheres, form individual and group experience, the meaning-generating mechanisms of individual consciousness, which are provided before the emergence of the collective imagination and find their expression in discourse.

The study of the essence of resentment should be based on various philosophical, anthropological and social theories, which together form a new approach to understanding the mechanisms and causes of this phenomenon. Therefore, our research aims to outline the forms of correlation between the fundamental category of freedom and the phenomenon of resentment, which, in the situation of the crisis of liberal theories, traditional ethical systems, and democracies, complicated by the non-linear influences of modern media space and virtual culture (J. Lanier), can help clarify and further understand the current state and directions of the transformation of the human world in the dimension of symbolic social communication. The use of interdisciplinary approaches to the study of the nature of resentment can be useful for finding effective
mechanisms to overcome the negative consequences of this phenomenon. The above considerations determine the relevance of our study.

**Purpose**

The purpose of this article is to find forms of correlation between the fundamental category of freedom and the phenomenon of resentment in the context of the formation of ethical discourse, as well as to consider the symbolic mechanisms of the collective imagination in the formation of a picture of the human world.

**Statement of basic materials**

*Freedom as a superrational symbolic whole*

Since the category of freedom is the fundamental basis of philosophical anthropology, it is impossible to address the meaning of human existence in all spheres of human self-realisation without its interpretation. Contemporary literature emphasises individual freedom of choice, which ensures human identity and self-realisation in the existential, cultural, political and other dimensions of human existence (Denysenko, Ostapets, & Pryvalov, 2016).

"…Self-realisation of a person involves conscious goal setting..., identification of individually significant components in the structure of supra-individual goals..., formation of self-awareness, self-knowledge, self-determination, self-identification and self-esteem" (authors’ transl.) (Sliusar, 2012, p. 101).

Moreover, human will, consciousness, self-awareness and identity are intentional not just on a free from coercion evaluative decision about their own motives for action, but on building a holistic picture of the world that would combine the characteristics of the external object environment and existential self-positioning and self-awareness in it. If we consider freedom of choice only as an abstract conditionality that can give rise to slavery (the tradition from Plato to J.-J. Rousseau, I. Kant and G. Hegel) and is at the same time a necessary condition for real freedom, then the latter requires both the definition of its own boundaries (moral law) and the space in which the choice takes place. And this very space is a symbolic meeting point for the Self and the Other, the individual and the community, the citizen and the state. In fact, the modern division of models of freedom into individualistic and communist ones (A. Wellmer) points to Kant’s juxtaposition of theoretical and practical reason. After all, the realisation of a person within the framework of his or her activity is a way beyond theoretical constructions of thinking and images of imagination and involves, first of all, the use of the semiotic code of language and other codes within social communication, existential communication and interaction. Hence, human freedom in the practical dimension is not only a projection of the theoretical understanding of a certain type of causality, but also a combination of will and reason for the purpose of doing something. Thus, at the level of practical reason, the concept of freedom reaches the limits of the rational and symbolically points to irrational experience and sources of will. In this sense, freedom "is on the verge of being and non-being. One has to come to the very edge and look into the abyss to realise and experience what freedom is. /.../ Such freedom is beyond any rationality and irrationality" (authors’ transl.) (Shapoval, 2010, p. 96).

The very problematisation of the hypothetical super-rational status of freedom takes it beyond the traditional dichotomies of ratio-emotio, formal freedom and coercion, being and nothing, and allows us to speak about the symbolic nature of this concept in general. The ostensive nature of
this complex of meanings in modern conditions, fluidity, ontological polysemy as "flicker" (tradition from Augustine to E. Cassirer) are relevant both for existential and individual comprehension and experience of freedom, and at the socio-cultural level of its implementation and manifestation through social action and communication. We can assume that the heuristic potential of philosophical anthropology regarding symbolic forms of meaning is an integral part of the tradition. For example, A. Malivskiy (2019) points out that in the modern context, the understanding of anthropology as a basis for ethics and metaphysics allows us to extend the intentionality of Cartesian "metaphysical anthropology" to the modern philosophical tradition. The anthropological dimension of the symbol, symbolism, and symbolisation as essential features of not only human cognitive settings but also of the comprehension and experience of irrational forms of experience represents the cognitive power of this approach. In this sense, the symbolism of the existentialism of freedom lies in the fact that it is not an intermediate link between semantic patterns, but can ontologise its own content, depriving the generated meanings of their instrumental and purely descriptive nature. In fact, the anthropology of man and the human world is symbolic by definition, which is fully reflected in the history of the concept of freedom in Western philosophy. According to A. Loi (2010), philosophical anthropology "through its own reflection has to strike a balance between different modes of action that are constitutive of life and man at the same time" (authors’ transl.) (p. 49). The philosophy of freedom is also meaning-generating for the symbolic landscape of human consciousness (Kretov & Kretova, 2017). Thus, the philosophical and anthropological vision of social philosophy, ethics, political philosophy, and sociology combines their problematic fields with the horizon of meanings of practical philosophy. After all, it explores both the sphere of prescriptive (normative issues) and the sphere of truth descriptions, which are represented within social communication through a system of discourses, narratives and speech practices. Based on the assumption that "political philosophy is adjoining to practical philosophy as a philosophy of morality and applied ethics" (A. Yermolenko, 2020, p. 7), the interpretation of freedom involves symbolic forms of representation of anthropological meanings. The anthropological understanding of freedom as a superrational sense-generating complex of meanings implies its functioning in the human mind as an open symbolic structure. This happens both at the cognitive level and at the emotional-affective level, on the logical "plane of immanence" (G. Deleuze). Therefore, it seems heuristic to raise the question of the correlation between freedom and the phenomenon of resentment.

Correlation of freedom and resentment and its explanation in the political discourse of populism

The concept of resentment is usually associated with Nietzsche’s early work "On the Genealogy of Morals" (1887), although it is known that it was first used by S. Kierkegaard (1846). Later, in the twentieth century, it was considered by M. Scheler, M. Weber, G. Deleuze, R. Gerard, M. Onfray, F. Fukuyama, P. Sloterdijk, and others. If we consider resentment as a transference and compensatory mechanism of the psyche at the level of individual and mass consciousness, we can find out that this phenomenon, like, for example, the phenomenon of post-truth, is as old as human sociality. Symbolic interactions and the historical events associated with them have been described in the philosophical and literary tradition, starting with Plato’s "Republic" and ancient historians. In general, resentment can be seen as a deeply irrational feeling of hostility towards what a subject or community interprets as the cause of their own dissatisfaction, humiliation, insult, failure, lack of freedom, etc. Despite the apparent antithetical nature of ratio and emotio in the mechanism of resentment, it seems important to appeal not just to the sphere of
the emotional, to the sphere of existentials (M. Heidegger), but to the free expression of negative emotions and states, and thus to freedom not only as a category of ethics but also as a phenomenon of social and symbolic behaviour. To sketch it out (well within the grammatical frames of language): is it freedom of resentment or resentment of freedom? In other words, does freedom necessarily presuppose resentment as a form of expression and practical philosophy, together with its inherent discourses and narratives, collective imagination and social myths, symbolic series and motivational guidelines? Or are the forms of manifestation of resentment an extreme subset of free behaviour and worldview that completely relativize the ethical philosophical meanings of the category of freedom, bringing it to absurdity, levelling existence into nothing? It should also be borne in mind that the apparent obviousness of the concept of resentment, if interpreted at the level of everyday experience and interpersonal communication, can lead to simplification and even silence of the problem of resentment (Datsiuk, 2022). A contemporary researcher proposes a typology of resentment, which includes: historical, collective memory, primordial, and mirror. The author insists that resentment is not reflected, blocks thinking, and is a distorted form of emotional intelligence and gives rise to a resentful identity and a resentful language (Datsiuk, 2022). It seems that the very existence of discursive practices and the symbolic landscape of consciousness that they form testifies to the possibility of understanding resentment even outside the phenomenological tradition of sentient intelligence (X. Zubiri). Another thing is that the rational content of resentment, considered as a complex of existentials (hostility, envy, burden, vengefulness, anger, etc.), can be conceptualised only at the boundary between the Self, the subject of social or socio-political action, and the Other, groups and communities, in the space of choice and decision-making. In other words, the resentment plays a significant role in generating the meanings of the world picture and descriptions of reality for individual and collective consciousness. And it is the communicative ethics of discourse that shows that resentment is its universal component, which is not fully subject to rationalization. If freedom is counterfactual (we are talking about the probabilistic rather than substantive nature of factuality), then in its space "the entire factuality of human existence appears as constructed" (Loi, Brystrytskyi, Boichenko, & A. Yermolenko, 2017, p. 12). Actions and changes in human life take place in its space. And this may well apply to the phenomenon of resentment. Thus, if we are talking about counterfactualy as a mode and mechanism of transformation (Loi, Brystrytskyi, Boichenko, & A. Yermolenko, 2017) of a person, this primarily indicates the discursive construction and reinterpretation of the facts of existential and social existence of a person in the space of a specific experience of resentment. First of all, the point is that resentment can not only relativize ethical values, but also paradoxically and dialectically attest to a person’s stay in the space of freedom. Another thing is that the comprehension of a resentful action is inverted, usually occurring after the fact. If a person constructs the factuality of his or her life in the experience and description of reality, then, in relation to the phenomenon of resentment, this may mean a substitution of reality both at the level of symbolic reception and at the level of conceptualisation. Such an exit beyond the limits of natural guidance (E. Husserl) means freedom not only to transform the ethical (including the very concept of freedom), but also to change the discourse and symbolic landscape, social expectations (Khmil & Popovych, 2019). Obviously, this actualises the relevance of discursive ethics within philosophical anthropology.

The collective imagination as a social phenomenon (C. Taylor) is a complex of worldviews, structures of social relations, social expectations, life forms and underlying concepts and images fixed in the semiotic codes of culture and language. They respectively form a system of social
communication and a network of discourses. The collective imagination relies on symbolic mechanisms of consciousness, as it mainly visualises meanings. In addition, based on the synthetic nature of symbolism, collective imagination both precedes and is conditioned by cognitive processes and conceptualisation of meanings. The distorted reality of the resentment is fixed in a discourse based on images and symbols of the collective imagination. Such a discourse is extremely conditional, relativistic about the ethical grounds of communication and social action, and deforming in terms of ethics in general. First of all, this may concern the category of freedom in the discourse of populism and in the media space.

It should be noted that the media space in the context of digitalisation, globalisation and the fifth STR does not just enable social communication in all its possible forms. It can take over the function of organising and structuring the human world on the border of the ontic and the ontological (M. Heidegger), multiplying the branched systems of simulations of reality and simulacra (J. Baudrillard) within the model of recursive sense-making, enabling a kind of interference between the boundaries of a person’s life and his or her horizon of meaning and the news industry. Populism can be interpreted as a flexible, eclectic set of ideologemes that usually performs an instrumental function of achieving situational political advantage by shaping public opinion. Therefore, it uses the motives of resentment, and creates and disseminates these motives in the collective imagination and mythology (Nadler, 2019). From the perspective of Kantian anthropology, which is the basis of his political philosophy (Reichert, 2022), this situation can be seen as a paradoxical correlation between the causality of nature and the "cunning of reason", which operates on the principle of expediency. The media space enables populism to influence people and communities by uniting them. Through symbolic practices and narratives, the discourse of populism uses the phenomenon of resentment to undermine this unification and the strategic interests of human development in order to achieve Kantian eternal peace (Weltrepublik). Therefore, in the contemporary literature, populism as a form of ideology and politics is sometimes defined as a pathological (Hirvonen & Pennanen, 2019) version of the Kantian-Hegelian theory of recognition. Due to the negative existentials of identification of the Other and Others inherent in resentment, its specific identity is formed, which is not universal, not communitarian (Iser, 2019). It emphasises difference, which can take the form of political and existential separation, self-absorption, and negative autarky. At the same time, the discourse of populism does not form a meaningful ideology. Its deviance is justified by its uncertainty as the absence of a clear ethical basis, not just the motivation of goal-orientation (Morgan, 2022). A contemporary Dutch researcher even compares the ideological content of populism and its discourse with Wittgenstein’s concept of language games (Ceci, 2019). She argues that in the discourse of populism, use and context shape the meaning, that is, discursive practices are combined according to the family resemblance principle (L. Wittgenstein) formally, not on a substantive basis. It should be noted that such a functioning of the populist discourse is ensured by the symbolic mechanisms of language and speech. In addition to the phenomenon of resentment, this process is further enhanced by an accentuated appeal to emotio, emotional-affective aspect of perceiving reality, understanding its challenges, making choices and actions. Given the variability of populism and the contradictory messages of its discourse, V. Mazzarella argues that there is no clearly defined anthropology of populism. The researcher notes that populism captures the rise of the collective power of communities that can no longer be structured by the prevailing social forms (Mazzarella, 2019). At the level of discourse, when the ethical foundations of communication as a practical philosophy are undermined, freedom of interpretation and action can take the form of arbitrariness.
or absurdity, when the collective "common sense", appeals to which are the foundational feature of populist discourse, contradicts reason. In other words, populist discourse tries to combine political slogans with a critique of liberal norms from the point of view of anthropology. It seems essential that it is a mattering-forth of the collective flesh, of society as an actor of socio-political action, which is alienated from the rational guidelines of liberal ideology. Thus, the contemporary discourse of populism, relying on symbolic communication practices and the motives of resentment, constitutes an irrational aspect of the power of this phenomenon.

**Originality**

The originality of the study lies in an attempt to comprehend the correlation between freedom as a category of philosophical anthropology and practical philosophy and the phenomenon of resentment in the context of its discursive representation (discourse of populism) and its manifestation in the symbolic mechanisms of social communication and collective imagination.

**Conclusions**

As a result of the above considerations, we have come to the following conclusions. The ethical category of freedom, explicitly or implicitly, significantly shapes the content of the process of choice and social action by a person, which can be manifested in discursive practices and narratives of ideologies, public opinion and collective imagination. Symbolic mechanisms of human consciousness record the paradoxical correlation and at the same time the antithesis of reality reception and meaning generation between rational awareness and existential experience, humanization and appropriation of freedom and emotional-affective, reactive attitude of a person to narratives, motives, symbols and images of resentment. At the same time, freedom can presuppose the conscious content of resentment, while resentment deforms the concept of freedom into arbitrariness or violence, appealing not only to the archaic values of tribalism, but also to the rational basis of individual freedom of the individual, on which the philosophical tradition of the West is based. Thus, resentful forms of thinking and emotional reception of reality function as symbolic constructions, that is, they can have a wide and internally contradictory field of interpretations. In social discourse, which records social relations and social communication, this correlation between freedom and resentment is manifested in numerous small narratives (J. Lyotard) that can be used to distort the ethics of discourse by political populism and authoritarian regimes. In the current situation of the emergence of the digital media space, a simple distinction between the concepts of freedom and resentment or their approximation can be seen as a technique of post-truth, as they do not take into account their essential correlation. Western philosophical thought has a significant potential to reinterpret the challenges of the phenomenon of resentment based on the tradition of ontotheology and ethics of discourse due to the specific rationalism of the vision of the philosophy of freedom. The problem of the influence of the phenomenon of resentment on the theoretical definition of the existentialism of freedom in the collective imagination and public opinion requires further development.

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ТОПИКАЛЬНІ ВИМІРИ ФІЛОСОФСЬКИХ ДОСЛІДЖЕНЬ


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Мета. Стаття спрямована на пошук кореляції між фундаментальною категорією свободи та феноменом ресентименту в контексті формування етнічного дискурсу в розгляді символічних механізмів колективної уяві та формування світогляду людини. Теоретичний басис. У дослідженні використано метод історико-філософського аналізу та методи гуманітарних наук – герменевтики та феноменології. Наукова новизна. Здійснено спробу осмислення кореляції між свободою як категорією філософської антропології та практичної філософії і феноменом ресентименту. Висновки. Етична категорія свободи експліцитно чи імпліцитно суттєвим чином формує зміст процесуальності здійснення вибору та соціальної дії людиною, що може знаходити свій вияв у дискурсивних практиках і натаривах ідеологій, громадській опінії та колективній уяві. Символічні механізми свідомості людини фіксують парадоксальну кореляцію і водночас антитетичність рецепції реальності та смислогенерації між раціональним усвідомленням й екзистенційним переживанням, олігодіяним і привласненням свободи та емоційно-афективним, реактивним ставленням людини до натаривів, мотивів, символів і образів ресентименту. При цьому свобода може передбачати свідомісний зміст ресентименту, тоді як ресентимент деформує поняття свободи до сваволі чи насильства, апелюючи при цьому не лише до архаїчних цінностей тріябізму, але й до раціонального підгрунтя індивідуальної свободи особистості, на якій грунтується філософська традиція Західу. Ресентиментні форми мислення та емоційної рецепції реальності функціонують як символічні конструкції, тобто можуть мати
широке та внутрішньо суперечливе поле інтерпретацій. Філософська думка Заходу має значний потенціал реінтерпретації викликів феномену ресентименту в опорі на традиції онтотеології та етики дискурсу завдяки питомому раціоналізму візії філософеми свободи.

Ключові слова: людина; свобода; ресентимент; екзистенціали; буття

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