

UDC 130.1A. O. OSYPOV^{1*}^{1*}Dnipro University of Technology (Dnipro, Ukraine), e-mail anatoslipova2@gmail.com, ORCID 0009-0005-9337-4734**Kant: on the Way to Understanding the Spiritual Nature of Man**

Purpose. The main purpose of the study is to examine Kant's first experience in creating a methodology for determining the holistic, spiritual nature of man, firstly, in terms of identifying the range of phenomena that should be included in the analysis of the spiritual essence of man, and secondly, this experience may be indicative for identifying dead ends in the research of spirituality of modern philosophers. **Theoretical basis.** The study is based on the methodology of philosophical anthropology formulated by M. Scheler, which, on the one hand, integrates the achievements of philosophy of life, phenomenology, existentialism and philosophical hermeneutics, and on the other hand, is based on the premise of the initial direct unity of the opposition of mental and physiological processes of human life. The basis for further expansion of the theoretical framework is the experience of spiritual practices of the Ancient East and religious practices of the Christian Middle Ages. Particularly noteworthy is the experience of modern psychotherapeutic practices, which, for all their diversity, have their roots in the depths of primitive beliefs and mysteries of ancient civilisations, and the tips of their branches reaching to the ideas of modern transpersonal psychology. **Originality.** Firstly, the author uses M. Scheler's ideas about the spiritual nature of man and the unity of his essential forces: corporeality, senses, feelings, thinking, values of worldview principles and the Absolute to analyse Kant's anthropological concept. Secondly, Kant's position on the way of describing human nature reveals contradictions. These contradictions are caused, on the one hand, by the prevailing mechanistic picture of the world, and, on the other hand, by the philosopher's intuitive assumptions that did not follow from the provisions of his dualistic position (the concepts of mind and soul as used in Kant's work "Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View"). Thirdly, the author identifies those fragments of the said work where Kant assumes the presence of corporeality, but does not clearly formulate its role in building the integral nature of the spiritual man. **Conclusions.** Immanuel Kant was one of the first to raise the issue of the primary study of human nature in comparison with issues of ontology, epistemology, morality, etc. However, the philosopher failed to create a concept of holistic human nature, the essence of which would be its spiritual core. Kant based his methodology of studying human nature on the dualistic opposition of the essential forces of man. This methodology was conditioned by the dominant mechanistic picture of the world. Kant's researches in the field of morality, aesthetics, and science were carried out in the cognitive-theoretical plane, so they were unable to reach a true synthesis of the essential forces of man by their methodology. Such a synthesis is possible on the basis of spiritual practice. The results of the study of the experience of the achievements and mistakes of the outstanding philosopher in the study of human nature open up the possibility of further refinement and development of philosophical and anthropological methodology in understanding the spiritual nature of man as a whole through comprehension of the mechanism of spiritual practice and, on this basis, understanding of the phenomenon of spirituality in all historical forms of its manifestation.

Keywords: essential human forces; spiritual practice; spirituality; physicality; sensuality

Introduction

"All the successes in culture that serve as a school for man have the purpose of applying the acquired knowledge and skills to life. But the most important object in the world to which this knowledge can be applied is man, for he is the ultimate end for himself" (transl. by A. O.) (Kant, 1912, p. 3).

The phenomenon of spirituality attracts the attention of a significant number of researchers today, given that the question of the prospects for the further development of humanity on a global scale poses many challenges, the answer to which can only be adequate if humanity is directed towards spiritual development. The question of the nature of spirituality can be raised and resolved in two aspects: theoretical and practical. The paradigm of theoretical comprehension of the nature of spirituality begins, in fact, with the emergence of philosophy, the main tool, form of

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cognition of which is *thought* as a way of operating with concepts, statements, conclusions in order to determine the *cognitive* content of the subject of research and its truth. However, life experience as a practice of life existed long before philosophising as a theoretical way of comprehending reality. Wisdom was accumulated for centuries in the mythological worldview, the epic of ancient civilisations as a result of comprehending life experience, experienced and transformed by all the fibres of the human being into the primary syncretic unity of the essential human forces.

If we turn to modern anthropological studies of human nature, we can conclude that the prevailing tendency is to define the concept of a person and certain aspects of his or her being (Hazniuk, 2008; Heidenreich, 2010; Khamitov, 2017; Kremer-Marietti, 1976; Viola, 2014); to review the diversity of points of view on the essence of man (Tabachkovskyi, 2005). These works have a theoretical orientation and are largely focused on identifying the existing state of affairs regarding human features from a traditional epistemological point of view. They do not address the question of the internal mechanisms of formation of spirituality as the core of the human being.

On the other hand, the *practical* aspect of the study of spirituality, outlined, for example, by the methodology of religious studies, does not take into account the factor of corporeality (Stolz, 2005) as an important factor in the formation of the integrity of the individual. It is aimed primarily at studying value attitudes, worldview beliefs and ideas about God. In other cases, corporeality is considered by itself, without correlation with other essential human forces (Hazniuk, 2008; Homilko, 2003; Wehrle, 2023). Dr. Michael Bordt (2020) from the Institute of Philosophy and Leadership (Munich) emphasises that spirituality also exists outside of religion and emphasises the role of meditation as an important factor in a person's self-knowledge of his or her own essence and the establishment of harmony with the outside world. However, the researcher does not raise the question of the role of corporeality and the interconnection of essential forces in the acquisition of human integrity. Within the framework of the interdisciplinary approach, programmes of phenomenological and existential anthropology are being formed "on the spirit of psychopathology" (Müller, 2023, pp. 338-340), which is promising in studying the role of crisis situations in the spiritual growth of the individual.

In view of the need to define the basic provisions regarding human nature that could cover the diversity of approaches to understanding the spiritual core of the individual, it is advisable to consider the process of forming the origins of the philosophical and anthropological tradition. It is worth noting that in recent years, there have been original and innovative studies of the anthropology of pre-critical Kant that shed additional light on an aspect of his philosophical heritage that has not yet been sufficiently covered in the research literature (Malivskyi & Yakymchuk, 2022). We also turned to the works of I. Kant, in particular, to his main anthropological study "Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View". Given that the categorical apparatus used by Kant in the presentation of anthropological issues has already been previously formulated, in particular, in the "Critique of Pure Reason", the material from Part I, "Transcendental Aesthetics", of this work was used in the analysis. It is known that this part, in particular, deals with the question of the relationship between sensuality, mind and soul, which is related to the problem of the place of corporeality in the context of human existence.

Purpose

The purpose of the study is to identify the foundations on which Kant based his study of the spiritual nature of man.

This goal is to be achieved through the following tasks:

- to study the categorical apparatus of Kant's philosophy in terms of its ability to describe the spiritual nature of man;
- to identify the contradictions in Kant's views on the integrity of the human being;
- to determine the function of corporeality as the basic level of human existence for the development of the essential forces of personality.

Statement of basic materials

Answering the question of human nature, Kant in his work "Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View" (1789) outlines the following subject of study:

Firstly, Kant emphasises two aspects of the study of human nature (anthropology) – physiological and pragmatic. The philosopher notes: "Physiological knowledge of the human being concerns the investigation of what nature makes of the human being; pragmatic, the investigation of what he as a free-acting being makes of himself, or can and should make of himself" (Kant, 1912, p. 3).

This statement shows, firstly, that Kant contrasts these two aspects, emphasising that the subject of study should be man from a pragmatic point of view. Here, Kant acts in accordance with the spirit of his dualism, contrasting the "thing in itself" (the physiological aspect of the study of human nature) and the "thing for us" (the pragmatic aspect of the study of human nature). However, at the same time, the philosopher immediately notes that if the knowledge of physiological anthropology is consciously *used* by a person in his or her activities for own development, then this knowledge is integrated into pragmatic anthropology. Therefore, a person as a "freely acting being" (Kant, 1912, p. 3), we say, cannot but take into account the qualities that nature has endowed him or her with, and only on the basis of these qualities is he or she capable of self-development. Kant, on the other hand, does not accept this line of thought.

The philosopher goes on to introduce a provision that characterises the peculiarities of understanding the *spiritual* nature of man. He notes: "it (anthropology – A. O.) becomes pragmatic only when it studies man as a world *citizen*" (Kant, 1912, p. 4). This means that the comprehension of human nature, according to Kant, is not limited to moral and ethical relations between people, but should be raised to the scale of the universe. However, this tendency was not developed in the text of this work, although, of course, the idea of the categorical imperative was proclaimed at one time. Kant (1912) further notes: "The expressions 'to know the world' and 'to possess the world' are still quite distant from each other in their meaning: one *understands* only the game he has *watched*, and the other has *played* it. (emphasis mine – A. O.)" (transl. by A. O.) (p. 4).

In other words, the philosopher distinguishes between the *theoretical* aspect of reality – knowledge (understanding), which is obtained as a result of *intuitive representation* of reality in the process of cognitive activity, and the *pragmatic* aspect, which is based on the effective and practical participation of a person in the process of his or her life. However, Kant built his own methodology of studying human nature in his work "Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View" on the basis of the "intuitive" position.

It should be emphasised that "observation" and "play" differ significantly from each other in terms of the degree to which all the essential forces of a person are integrated into a single integrity. In the case of observation, only sensuality and thinking are activated (here we are talking about knowledge). In the case of play, however, if one is sufficiently motivated, virtually all aspects of the essential powers of a person become active. After all, when Kant speaks of "man as

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a world citizen", he means, in particular, that such a person embraces all theoretical and practical issues based on morality and good neighbourliness that are relevant to the whole humanity. In other words, we could say that Kant understands the relevance of raising the issue of cultivating spirituality as an important factor in the integration of humanity into a single whole, although he does not explicitly formulate it.

Second, considering the doctrine of man from a pragmatic point of view, Kant divides the content of his work into the following parts: *Part I*: Book 1: On the faculty of cognition; Book 2: The feeling of pleasure and displeasure; Book 3: On the faculty of desire. *Part II*: Anthropological Characteristics, in which the philosopher notes the psychological characteristics of the individual: character, temperament (Kant, 1912, p. v). Each of these sections analyses the activity of certain essential forces, which the philosopher traditionally (in accordance with the content of his three Critiques) divides into sensibility, reason and intellect (*Book I*). The first impulse to cognition, according to Kant, is the universal human capacity for *self-awareness*, i.e. the awareness of the self, through which sensuality, imagination, perception, external and internal sensations, representations, memory and foresight are revealed. However, in this form, Kant sees awareness as another kind of "a priori construct" devoid of existential content. It is merely stated.

Book 2 analyses sensual and intellectual pleasure and their relation to suffering. Giving examples of playing cards (for money), impressions of performances, love, etc., the philosopher argues that the feeling of *suffering* is "a stimulus for our activity" (Kant, 1912, pp. 153-182). Here Kant reveals one of the essential existential and anthropological factors of constitution of the spiritual principle in man – the presence of *crisis situations* and their role in activation of all essential human forces (levels of anthropo-being) (Osypov, 2008). However, the process of transformation of the individual's psyche under the influence of suffering, which would be inherent in the modern philosophical and anthropological approach to the study of human nature, remains beyond the scope of the philosopher's consideration. In this matter, Kant remains on the descriptive point of view inherent in the descriptive-intuitive position and modern philosophy of consciousness.

Book 3 is devoted to the analysis of the capacity of desire and its manifestations: affects and passions, ambition, power, self-interest, moral and physical good (Kant, 1912, pp. 183-224). These emotionally intense states are described from the previously mentioned "intuitive" position, which is an example of an epistemological analysis of the multilevel process of interaction of the essential human forces, which (this process) by its nature is not amenable to theoretical comprehension. After all, theoretical comprehension is based only on thinking and does not activate, for example, corporeality.

In addition, the philosopher's attention is not focused on the sphere of *corporeality*, the existence of which is undoubtedly constantly assumed by the author both in the description of emotional situations and in cases of the ability to desire. Only when considering the moral and physical good does the philosopher conditionally distinguish the corporeal and physical component, however, noting: "Both kinds of good, moral and physical, cannot be combined, because in this case they would neutralise each other and would not contribute to the goal of true happiness!" (transl. by A. O.) (Kant, 1912, p. 217). At the same time, the physical component of the good is interpreted by Kant (1912) as well-being, that is, in terms of the philosophy of consciousness, in contrast to the moral good, and not as a component of human existence as a *physical* being – corporeality (p. 18).

Therefore, we can say that concerning the problem of the physical and material component of human existence, the philosopher remains in the classical epistemological paradigm. He takes

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into account not the actual physical being of a person and the mechanism of its functioning – corporeality – but its mental construct. This would be a sign of a philosophical and anthropological approach to the study of human nature. The purpose of this approach is to study the mechanism of interaction between the material, mental and spiritual levels of human nature. Kant traditionally confines himself to the descriptive-intuitive, *cognitive* aspect of studying this process.

In the *second part* of his work, considering the correlation between *character and temperament*, Kant notes:

But simply to have a character signifies that property of the will by which the subject binds himself to definite practical principles that he has prescribed to himself irrevocably by his own reason. Although these principles may sometimes indeed be false and incorrect, nevertheless the formal element of the will in general, to act according to firm principles (not to fly off hither and yon, like a swarm of gnats), has something precious and admirable in it; for it is also something rare. Here it does not matter what nature makes of man, but what man himself makes of himself, for the former belongs to the temperament (where the subject is merely passive) and the latter shows that he has a character. (Kant, 1912, pp. 234-235)

Thus, the philosopher emphasises that in any human action, there is an interaction between independent will and thinking, on the one hand, and natural processes acting through the physicality, on the other. However, as can be seen from the passage, Kant *contrasts* these two aspects of human activity – the "natural" one and the one caused by the activity of human thinking and psyche. Thus, in his reflections on the essence of man, Kant, on the one hand, often refers to nature as a factor by which the philosopher explains the peculiarities of man. On the other hand, he takes the position of opposing the natural and the pragmatic-human. In this case, the philosopher acknowledges the influence of natural processes ("thing in itself"?) on the peculiarities of human nature, both bodily and spiritual. It should be noted here that the opposition between "thing in itself" and "thing for us" exists only in the cognitive, epistemological context. This opposition disappears when a person is considered from a *pragmatic* point of view, which is based on the understanding of the *integrity* of the material and spiritual nature of man (Osypov, 2023).

The philosopher refers to *nature* (the field of study of physiological anthropology according to Kant), which determines certain properties of a person. Thus, he argues that "*nature tends ... in a given nation of the same race ..., in the same tribe, in the same family, to infinite diversity*" (emphasis mine – A. O.) (transl. by A. O.) (Kant, 1912, pp. 273-274). The philosopher continues:

Nature has planted in man the seed of discord, and has willed that its own reason bring concord out of this, or at least the constant approximation to it. (...) but in actuality the former (discord) is the means, in *nature's plan*, of a supreme and, to us, inscrutable wisdom: to bring about the perfection of the human being through progressive culture, although with some sacrifice of his pleasures of life. (emphasis mine – A. O.) (Kant, 1912, pp. 274-275)

Here it can be noted that Kant's idea that human improvement in the historical and cultural context is associated with depriving a person of the pleasures of life, found its fruitful development in M. Scheler's (1947) position on the ascetic nature of man as an *antagonist to life*.

Kant (1912) gives many more examples of how a person's *external* features (what nature has given to a person: gestures, facial expressions, limb movements, etc.) can indicate his or her *mental characteristics*, the nature of thoughts, etc. (p. 247). Thus, defining the subject of physiognomy, Kant (1912) emphasises: "It is the art of judging a person's disposition or way of thinking by his visible form, meaning both his way of feeling and his way of thinking – here he is considered not in a sick but in a healthy state, and not when his soul is in motion but when it is at rest" (transl. by A. O.) (p. 239).

Thus, on the one hand, referring to the experience of physiognomy, the philosopher agrees that external bodily features correlate in a certain way with the inner-soul traits of the individual. On the other hand, calling physiognomy an art, he emphasises that it is impossible to find out the connection between the external bodily and internal mental processes of human activity by *generally accepted scientific methods of cognition* (i.e. by means of concepts, thinking):

It is incontestable that there is a physiognomic Characteristic, which however can *never become a science*, because the peculiarity of a human form, which indicates certain inclinations or faculties of the subject being looked at, cannot be understood by description according to concepts but only by *illustration and presentation* in an intuition or by an *imitation* of it. (emphasis mine – A. O.) (Kant, 1912, pp. 240-241)

Kant speaks of *imitation* as an important tool in the process of entering into an object in terms of cognition of its internal state. However, his mechanistic approach to understanding the nature of the human body as a *physical* body (and not as a *living* body – corporeality) does not allow him to include imitation in the arsenal of methodological approaches to comprehending the inner

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state of the individual. According to Kant, the interpretation of an object through imitation cannot be the basis for verifying the inner content of the human consciousness and psyche. Of course, in our time, the methodology of philosophical hermeneutics, and the methodology of the humanities in general, offers such possibilities. For Kant, physics and mathematics are the model of science.

In defining the field of action of pragmatic anthropology, in contrast to physiological anthropology, Kant contrasts the action of natural processes with the fact that a human can act as a free person in terms of moral values. In other words, the level of corporeality is removed by the philosopher from the field of activity of the subject and is left to the action of nature. Holding an a priori dualistic position on the relationship between the external natural world and the sphere of human cognitive activity, Kant argued that in identifying *physical* causes (e.g. memory) we can only guess, theorise about what is happening in the brain, that "in the play of his imaginations man is a mere spectator" – a person must "give this process to nature". And this is the subject of physiological anthropology. At the same time, if a person uses his knowledge of memory to develop his memory, then this "forms part of pragmatic anthropology" (Kant, 1912, p. 3).

Here it can be noted that in matters of pragmatic anthropology, Kant methodologically moves in the direction later developed at the theoretical level by his student J. G. Fichte in his doctrine of the *activity of the Absolute Self* and its emanation through the opposition of the Self and the non-Self. This, together with the understanding of the material-bodily world as a "thing in itself", led the philosopher to a dualistic position and an inability to formulate the basis for understanding the holistic nature of man as a result of conscious cultivation of spiritual practice.

It is well known that in building his philosophical and epistemological concept of the nature of scientific knowledge, Kant used mathematics and physics as a model of science in his work "Critique of Pure Reason". On the examples of the cognitive process in mathematics and physics, the philosopher builds his concept of a priori and a posteriori knowledge, understanding of phenomenon and noumenon, and the opposition of things in themselves and things for us. It served as a methodological basis for *all* his subsequent Critiques and for his work "Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View". The philosopher notes: "Mathematical science affords us a brilliant example, how far, *independently of all experience*, we may carry our a priori knowledge. It is true that the mathematician occupies himself with objects and cognitions only in so far as they can be represented by means of *intuition*. (emphasis mine – A. O.)" (Kant, 2000, p. 42).

This statement shows that Kant *consciously* connects the idea of a priori knowledge only with *a limited number of objects and knowledge* that can be presented "only in intuition". At the same time, based on the context of the entire text of the work, it is clear that Kant is referring to the intuition of a subject given to the researcher in advance – mathematics or physics. However, the philosopher further emphasises by default that mathematical and natural science cognition are the *universal* standard for the paradigm of cognition of any subject.

Thus, in the part of the first book of the "Critique of Pure Reason" – "Transcendental Aesthetics" – Kant extends the scope of his approach to a wider range of tools for studying subjects:

In whatever way and through whatever means a cognition may relate to

objects, that *through which it relates immediately to them*, and at which

all thought as a means is directed as an end, *is intuition*. This, however,

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takes place only insofar as the *object is given to us*; but this in turn, is possible only if it *affects* the mind in a certain way (das Gemüt... affil-
iere). The capacity for receiving representations (receptivity) through the mode in which we are affected by objects is called *sensibility*. (emphasis mine – A. O.) (Kant, 2000, p. 56)

Firstly, one can raise the question of the expression "relates immediately to objects": is the immediate relation to objects limited to the spatio-temporal dimension only; is sensibility limited to the orientation towards an *external* object? And what about the intra-bodily processes of the subject that *precede* the processes of awareness? Abstraction from this kind of sensuality is possible if it corresponds to the subject matter of research, which is the case in the *natural* sciences. However, if we are talking about a human being as a whole, with the totality of his essential powers, then the scalpel of abstraction from sensibility, which includes *intra-bodily* processes, can be applied only in certain cases, which is what Kant does, relying on examples from mathematics and physics alone.

Secondly, by emphasising "that the object in a certain way affects the soul", Kant again significantly narrows the concept of "soul", reducing it to sensuality in an external-subject context. Such a position was quite appropriate in the paradigm of mathematical and natural cognition, which was typical for the philosophy of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. However, if we consider a human being as a whole, in which the emotional and intuitive component (subjective) is directly incorporated into the logic of thought, then from the point of view of the philosophical and anthropological approach to understanding human nature as an integral structure, this position is unacceptable. The following statement by Kant gives us confidence in the previous conclusion:

I call all representations pure, in the transcendental meaning of the word, wherein nothing is met with that belongs to *sensation*. And accordingly we find *existing in the mind à priori*, the pure form of sensuous intuitions in general, in which all the manifold content of the phenomenal world is arranged and viewed under certain relations. This pure form of sensibility I shall call pure intuition. (emphasis mine – A. O.) (Kant, 2000, p. 57)

How sensations and sensuality, on the one hand, and spirituality, on the other, are related – remains beyond the scope of the philosopher's attention. The notion of mind, at least in this case, remains undefined and is used on an intuitive level. This suggests that Kant uncritically assumes the existence of soul in his thinking. After all, the activity of corporeality covers a whole range of bodily-emotional-intuitive processes of the human psyche, which cannot be anatomised by the abstracting scalpel of thinking.

Kant goes on to confirm our previous conclusion:

Thus, if I *take away* from our representation of a body, all that the understanding thinks as belonging to it, as substance, force, divisibility, etc., and also whatever belongs to sensation, as impenetrability, hardness, color, etc.; yet there is still something left us from this empirical intuition, namely, *extension and shape*. (Gestalt). These belong to pure intuition, which exists *à priori* in the mind, as a mere form of sensibility, and without any real object of the senses or any sensation. (emphasis mine – A. O.) (Kant, 2000, p. 57)

And in relation to this statement, one can ask a question: What is the status of the *self* that performs the operation of separation, how can we determine its ontological status? Does the existence of this *self* presuppose the existence of *corporeality*? If it does, then in what form is its existence constituted in Kant's thought? If not, then, according to Kant, this *self* must be endowed with the status of *a priori*. In fact, Fichte took this path, with which Kant disagreed.

Or, for example:

In the science of transcendental aesthetic accordingly, we shall first isolate sensibility or the sensuous faculty, by separating from it all that is annexed to its perceptions by the conceptions of understanding, so that nothing be left but empirical intuition. In the next place we shall take away from this intuition all that belongs to sensation, so that nothing may remain but pure intuition, and the mere form of phenomena, which is all that the sensibility can afford *à priori*. From this investigation it will be found that there are two pure forms of sensuous intuition, as principles of knowledge *à priori*, namely, space and time. (Kant, 2000, p. 57)

The same remarks can be made about this statement as about the previous one, with a slight expansion of their meaning: Using the words: "I take away"; "we shall first isolate sensibility"; "we shall take away from this intuition all that belongs to sensation", the philosopher does not

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think about who is the subject ("I", "we") who performs such operations? What powers does it have to be a "judge" of these processes? *What form of being* was inherent in him, which would give impetus to the further opposition a priori vs a posteriori, which Kant uses.

Kant does not see the importance of these questions. But, assuming the existence of such a subject who carries out analytical procedures in order to find "pure contemplation", the philosopher would then have to assume the prior existence of some *other substance* of such a subject. This substance would, in turn, have to perform an a priori function in relation to all procedures of analytical and synthetic "experience". And so it would be possible to move towards an infinity of reflections, relying on the *speculative procedure of self-awareness as the only* mechanism for acquiring new, higher levels of consciousness content. Kant probably felt this danger and therefore introduced the *ultimate* concept of the "thing in itself". In this way, Kant could be said to have stated the impotence of intellectual and analytical, reflective procedures as a universal tool for philosophising.

This was the path followed by Fichte and Hegel. Overcoming Kant's dualism, they tried to resolve these issues on the basis of speculative procedures of *self-determination* of the Absolute Self (Fichte) and the Absolute Idea (Hegel). In fact, the modern *philosophy of consciousness* is also moving along this path, inspired by the achievements it makes by relying only on *thinking* as the *main* tool of cognition. Here, this tradition is not far removed from R. Descartes, who, with his principle of cogito ergo sum, on the one hand, directed his gaze to the depths of the human spirit, and on the other hand, narrowed the scope of the search for forms of true being, limiting the tools of this search to *thinking*.

However, let us return to the further analysis of the categorical apparatus of the Critique of Pure Reason. Analysing the essence of space and time, Kant again appeals to the mind as the centre in which their a priori nature is constituted. In doing so, the philosopher uses the concept of *soul* to reveal the relationship between pure inner sensibility and mind:

Inner sense, by means of which the mind (Gemüt) intuits itself or its inner state, yields indeed no intuition of the soul (Seele) itself as an object; but there is nevertheless a determinate form [namely, time] in which alone the intuition of inner states is possible, and everything which belongs to inner determinations is therefore represented *in relations of time*.

(emphasis mine – A. O.) (Kant, 2000, p. 58)

As we have already noted above with regard to the procedure for determining the correlation between inner sensuality and mind, we observe the same thing in the case of the possibility of contemplating the *soul* itself (Seele), which for Kant is elusive for *contemplation of its internal state*. We would like to emphasise here that it is elusive if we use Kant's cognitive categorical tools, which are conditioned by the mechanistic paradigm of cognition. According to Kant, the only way to intuit the inner state is to define it *only in the "relations of time"*, and not in the *content* of the entire arsenal of senses, emotional impressions, the basis of which is their integrating activity of corporeality. The concept of the soul to which Kant refers remains unverified, intui-

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tive in the context of the categorical apparatus of his theoretical philosophy. To a certain extent, it acts as a loophole through which the philosopher "uncritically" conducts the empirical sphere of consciousness. The philosopher speaks of the a priori nature of space and time. Noting that "space is not an empirical concept which has been derived from outer experiences"; that "Space then is a necessary representation à priori, which serves for the foundation of all *external* intuitions", the author argues that "space is no discursive, or as we say, general conception of the relations of things, but a *pure intuition* (emphasis mine – A. O.)" (Kant, 2000, p. 59).

In modern psychology, it has become a generally accepted fact that the skills of forming spatio-temporal relations are formed from the earliest childhood. The basis for their formation is the infant's *body movements*, which are organised into coordinated movements of the limbs and eyes, and the child begins to consciously master the space-time continuum. Space and time are not a priori abstractions, but representations that are preceded by the *effective bodily function* of any ordinary person. A holistic person is formed in the *process of cultivating spiritual practice*. In the course of this process, the transformation of corporeality and the harmonisation of the essential forces of a person take place. Therefore, it would be more correct to say, using Kant's terminology, that the real "a priori" of sensuality is the *body of a child*, in whose territory of active spontaneous activity the psycho-emotional, sensual gestalt of the subject is formed. Of course, Kant (2000) would most likely have rejected this argument, referring to its *empirical* nature: "That intuition which is in relation to the object through sensation, is entitled empirical" (p. 56).

Modern research in the psychology of perception also shows that when looking at an object (sensory cognition), the pupils of the human eye make subtle movements, thereby ensuring the perception of an image, although the gaze appears to be static. Most of the *psychophysiological* processes are known to take place beyond the scope of our awareness. Therefore, a person is not able to find out their *corporeal and effective* nature. At the same time, the vast experience of spiritual practices of both Eastern and Western traditions, dating back to ancient times, demonstrates the achievement of a new level of development of the essential human forces. A key role in gaining such experience is played by the *awareness of spontaneous processes of corporeality and mastering them*, for example, through *breathing*. Of course, in the context of Kant's mechanistic paradigm of philosophy, which considers the human body as a physical body of classical physics, this approach was excluded.

In general, it should be noted that, starting with the formation of the ideas of the philosophy of life (for example, the idea of A. Bergson's "life impulse"), in the late nineteenth century, a belief was formed that it was impossible to comprehend the depth and diversity of processes occurring in reality by means of thinking. The dependence of mental processes on the state of functioning of human body organs is a topical issue in the entire field of medicine – *psychosomatics*, which studies the relationship between mental and somatic processes. It studies, for example, the impact of a person's prevailing *emotional* state (anger, sadness, aggression, suspicion, etc.) on the occurrence of certain body diseases. All of these are processes that occur beyond the capabilities of direct human perception. The seemingly invisible *movements* in the human body, however, become the basis for the formation of certain mental phenomena.

However, it should be noted (and Kant could have noted this when defending his position on, for example, the relationship between "things in themselves" and "things for us") that the perception of all the above processes is also impossible without a priori space and time. And such a remark may be quite reasonable if we remain in the position that the condition for cognition of an object is the possibility of bringing it *outward*, into the spatial continuum. The

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procedure of "externalisation", even of the internal mental state, moves the imaginary object into the external space-time continuum. For example, in many psychotherapeutic practices, this technique is often used when a client is asked to imagine their pain in the form of an object. That is, in response to the therapist's question: "What does this pain look like?" the client answers: "It feels like a stone on my heart"; or: "My back feels like there is a wooden stake in it". And the therapist quite seriously suggests that the client do something with this object in the body: smash the stone, burn the wooden stake with fire, etc. On the one hand, we have an object in the form of a stone or a stake, which, according to Kant, is a condition for intuiting space and time. On the other hand, these objects cannot be reduced to an externally sensory phenomenon, as is the case in classical physics, on the cognitive processes of which Kant relied in his transcendental aesthetics.

To this seemingly reasonable remark, the following should be noted: the same object, for example, a stone, "exists" in two spatial continua.

The first continuum, let us call it the *object-practical* one, is the one that Kant is guided by. Ideas about this first continuum are formed in the experience of natural science cognition when observing objects. These objects are given to man in advance and can be assumed, in agreement with Kant, to have their true nature hidden in the depths of existence, which the philosopher designated as the "thing in itself". Accordingly, this form of pure sensuality ("there are two pure forms of sensuous intuition, as principles of knowledge à priori, namely, space and time" (Kant, 2000, p. 57)) is associated with an orientation towards the *external* world.

Space is a necessary representation à priori, which serves for the foundation of all external intuitions. We never can imagine or make a representation to ourselves of the non-existence of space, though we may easily enough think that no objects are found in it. It must, therefore, be considered as the condition of the possibility of phenomena, and by no means as a determination dependent on them, and is a representation à priori, which necessarily supplies the basis for *external* phenomena. (emphasis mine – A. O.) (Kant, 2000, p. 59)

And, recall, as discussed above, that sensuality arises as a result of the influence on *mind*. Let us present this quote again:

This (cognition of objects – A. O.), however, takes place only insofar as the object is given to us; but this in turn, is possible only if it *affects' the mind in a certain way* (das Gemüt... affilieren). The capacity for receiving

representations (receptivity) through the mode in which we are affected by objects is called *sensibility*. (emphasis mine – A. O.) (Kant, 2000, p. 56)

Further, as mentioned above, Kant establishes a connection between the inner sense, mind and *soul* in the context of the *impact of an object* on sensibility, emphasising that this *does not exhaust* the activity of the soul:

Inner sense, by means of which the mind (Gemüt) intuits itself or its inner state, *yields indeed no intuition of the soul (Seele) itself as an object*; but there is nevertheless a determinate form [namely, time] in which alone the intuition of inner states is possible, and everything which belongs to inner determinations is therefore represented *in relations of time*. (emphasis mine – A. O.) (Kant, 2000, p. 58)

We must pay tribute to Kant when he consciously acknowledges that within his way of thinking, the understanding of the activity of the soul cannot be completely exhausted in terms of time. And in what cases is it still *possible* to "intuit the soul itself", its activity? – we ask this question.

The second continuum is spiritual-practical, focused on the inner world of man. The spatial continuum of the sensuality of the inner world differs significantly from the spatial continuum of the first type in that it is entirely the result of conscious inner activity. In contrast, sensibility, constituted in such a way that "the object in a certain way affects the mind" (Kant, 2000, p. 56), is the passive side of the process of influence on the mind.

We can say that a kind of "a priori space" of the spiritual-practical spatial continuum is the *human corporeality* in the whole set of processes of the human body – in unity with the sensory-emotional and value components of the essential human forces. Thus, corporeality, as a *living human body* (as opposed to the physical continuum of subject-practical space in the mechanistic worldview), is the centre of the unfolding of the *mental* manifestations of the human psyche – the *soul*. The soul, the possibility of intuition of which was impossible by the means, cognitive tools, which Kant (2000) used: "Inner sense, by means of which the mind (Gemüt) intuits itself or its inner state, yields indeed no intuition of the soul (Seele) itself as an object" (p. 58).

The ontological-anthropological turn in the philosophy of the beginning of the 20th century, which took its final form in the work of Max Scheler and his associates (H. Plessner, A. Gehlen), created the basis for building a picture of the existence of a *holistic* person in the unity of all his essential forces: corporeality, senses, feelings, thinking, values, principles, and the Absolute. One of the achievements of the ontological-anthropological turn was that it opened up a new perspective on human nature associated with the study of the "language" of corporeality, which integrates senses and feelings as a single process. The study of this complex of essential human

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forces requires the use of new methodologies and tools for interacting with the subconscious, corporeality, and intuitive cognition. The study of these essential forces goes far beyond the possibilities of thinking, the main tool of traditional philosophical research and philosophy of consciousness. In our opinion, *spiritual practices* are the object of research, on the example of which it is possible to study the mechanism of harmonious interaction of all essential human forces. At the same time, no preference is given to any of the elements of this integrity, as is the case in the traditional style of philosophy.

Originality

Firstly, it consists in applying to the analysis of Kant's anthropological concept, from a pragmatic point of view, the ideas of M. Scheler about the *spiritual* nature of man and the unity of his essential forces: corporeality, senses, feelings, thinking, values of worldview principles and the Absolute. This approach makes it possible to identify both positive aspects of Kant's concept and shortcomings caused by the paradigm of his contemporary philosophy. Secondly, Kant's position on the way of describing human nature reveals contradictions. These contradictions are caused, on the one hand, by the prevailing mechanistic picture of the world, and, on the other hand, by the philosopher's intuitive assumptions that did not follow from the provisions of his dualistic position (the concepts of mind and soul as used in Kant's work "Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View"). Yet building a holistic conception of human nature as a spiritual man implies identifying a single foundation on which the diversity of manifestations of the essential forces of man is built. Thirdly, the study has identified those fragments of the said work where Kant assumes the presence of corporeality, but does not clearly formulate its role in building the integral nature of the spiritual man. After all, it is corporeality, as it is cultivated (and developed) in spiritual practices, that acts as such a foundation.

Conclusions

1. Immanuel Kant was one of the first philosophers in the history of philosophy to put forward the thesis of the need for a *comprehensive* study of human nature. The philosopher's raising of the question of the need to study the essence of man as a priority in comparison with other problems of philosophy was a new step in understanding the problems of the relationship between man, truth, culture, science, and philosophy. This idea was the first swallow of the ontological-anthropological turn in the philosophy of the early twentieth century. The result of the turn was Max Scheler's questioning of the *spiritual* nature of man, which is the centre of gravity of all essential forces.

2. However, the *methodology* of studying human nature, on which Kant relied, was conditioned by the experience of the natural sciences and mathematics developed at that time. The basis of this methodology was a mechanistic picture of the world. The fundamental principles of this methodology were: opposition of the object and subject of knowledge; understanding of the human body as an inanimate substance; reliance on a unipolar (sensualist or rationalist) approach to determining the criteria for the truth of scientific knowledge; dualism in the nature of the cognitive process and the correlation of the essential forces of man.

3. In Kant's reflections on human nature, this was manifested in the unjustified transfer of mathematical methodologies for studying the physical processes of material bodies to the study of human nature. The discrepancy between the methods of research and the nature of the subject

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of study (human) led to contradictory views, which were manifested in the following positions of the philosopher:

- the opposition of physiological and pragmatic anthropology, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the acceptance of the thesis that nature influences man;
- on the one hand, the recognition of man's spiritual nature as a "world citizen", and on the other hand, insistence on the thesis that knowledge of man's sensual nature should be limited to the means of a priori forms of space and time;
- opposing the action of natural processes to human free will and at the same time recognising that nature influences human character;
- rejection of the role of corporeality, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, an unspoken appeal to corporeality in matters related to the consideration of emotional situations and the action of desires;
- while defining the function of sensuality, the philosopher "uncritically"-intuitively relies on the terms "mind" and "soul" without first establishing their status in the system of basic categories of Kantian philosophy: "a priori", "a posteriori", "thing in itself", "thing for us", etc.

4. The next step in further studying the spiritual nature of man can be a study aimed at analysing the answers to this question that took place after Kant. In particular, the study of how philosophy overcame the contradictions of the Kantian position and how it created new contradictions in the search for the spiritual core of the human being. As is well known, the result of these searches was embodied in the creation of the concept of philosophical anthropology, whose creators formulated basic provisions about the spiritual nature of man. These provisions are being developed today, in particular, through the analysis of spiritual practices aimed at the spiritual improvement of the individual. It is in spiritual practice that a *real synthesis* of the essential forces of man takes place on the territory of corporeality. The result of this synthesis is the formation of a new human status: from a *rational man* to a *spiritual man*.

5. Further development of the topic of the role of spiritual practice in the spiritual growth of the individual is possible in connection with the involvement of the results of research on the nature of corporeality, which have been accumulated in modern psychology, psychotherapy (especially in body-oriented psychotherapy), art history, etc. These results make it possible to determine further prospects for the development of the philosophical-anthropological concept of spirituality.

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Кант: на шляху до усвідомлення духовної природи людини

Мета. Основна мета дослідження полягає у вивченні першого досвіду Канта зі створення методології визначення цілісної, духовної природи людини, по-перше, із точки зору виявлення спектру явищ, які

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повинні бути включені до аналізу духовної сутності людини, по-друге, цей досвід може бути показовим для виявлення тупикових шляхів у дослідженнях духовності сучасних філософів. **Теоретичний базис.** Дослідження спирається на методологію філософської антропології, сформульовану М. Шелером, яка, з одного боку, інтегрує в собі здобутки філософії життя, феноменології, екзистенціалізму і філософської герменевтики, а з іншого – ґрунтується на положенні про вихідну безпосередню єдність протилежності психічних і фізіологічних процесів життєдіяльності людини. Основою подальшого розширення теоретичного базису є досвід духовних практик Стародавнього Сходу, релігійних практик християнського середньовіччя. На особливу увагу заслуговує досвід сучасних психотерапевтичних практик, які, при всій їх багатоманітності, своїм корінням сягають глибин первісних вірувань і містерій стародавніх цивілізацій, а верхівками гілок дотягуються до ідей сучасної трансперсональної психології. **Наукова новизна.** По-перше, до аналізу антропологічної концепції Канта застосовано ідеї М. Шелера про духовну природу людини і єдність її сутнісних сил: тілесності, чуттів, почуттів, мислення, цінностей світоглядних принципів та Абсолюту. По-друге, у позиції Канта щодо способу опису природи людини виявлено протиріччя. Ці протиріччя обумовлені, з одного боку, панівною механістичною картиною світу, а з іншого – інтуїтивними припущеннями філософа, які не випливали з положень його дуалістичної позиції (поняття душевності, душі – як їх застосовано в роботі Канта "Антропологія з прагматичної точки зору"). По-третє, виявлено ті фрагменти вказаної роботи, де Кант припускає наявність тілесності, але чітко не формулює її роль у вибудовуванні цілісної природи людини-духовної. **Висновки.** Імануїл Кант одним із перших порушив питання про першочергове вивчення природи людини порівняно з питаннями онтології, гносеології, моралі тощо. Однак філософ не зміг створити концепцію цілісної природи людини, сутністю якої було б її духовне ядро. Методологію вивчення природи людини Кант будував на дуалістичному протиставленні сутнісних сил людини. Ця методологія була обумовлена панівною механістичною картиною світу. Дослідження в галузі моралі, естетики, науки Кант здійснював у пізнавально-теоретичній площині, тому вони за своєю методологією неспроможні були вийти на дійсний синтез сутнісних сил людини. Такий синтез можливий на засадах духовної практики. Результати дослідження досвіду надбань і помилок видатного філософа у вивченні природи людини відкривають можливість подальшого уточнення й розвитку філософсько-антропологічної методології в питанні розуміння духовної природи людини як цілісності через осягнення механізму духовної практики і на цих засадах – усвідомлення феномену духовності в усіх історичних формах її прояву.

Ключові слова: сутнісні сили людини; духовна практика; духовність; тілесність; чуттєвість

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