

UDC 1(091):172L. A. SYTNICHENKO^{1*}, D. V. USOV^{2*}^{1*}H. Skovoroda Institute of Philosophy, the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine (Kyiv, Ukraine), e-mail L.Sytnichenko@i.ua, ORCID 0000-0002-7198-9157^{2*}Cherkasy Institute of Fire Safety named after Chernobyl Heroes of the National University of Civil Protection of Ukraine (Cherkasy, Ukraine), e-mail dimausov@i.ua, ORCID 0000-0002-8898-9743**The Problem of Recognition in Modern Philosophy:
Social and Anthropological Dimensions**

Purpose. The purpose of the article lies in studying the main socio-anthropological measurements of the problem of recognition represented primarily by the philosophy of recognition of Alex Honneth, which is actualized by the struggle of the Ukrainian people for their existence and national-cultural recognition. A consistent analysis of the communicative paradigm in contemporary philosophy led to the understanding of its transformation into the reality of the problem of recognition and the identification of the main forms of recognition in it, which determine an individual's perception of the social space as fair or unfair, where his dignity is disrespected. **Theoretical basis.** Turning to the works of Jurgen Habermas, Otfried Hoeffe, Ernst Tugendhat, Stefan Gosepath, and Thomas Rentsch made it possible to supplement the mainly procedural, theoretical-communicative way of philosophizing with a philosophical-anthropological, existential, contextual principle of awareness of recognition as a fundamental principle of justice and the understanding that the brutal, unjust destruction of the "living world" of a person and the state is synonymous with their physical destruction. The thesis of Francis Fukuyama about the relationship between the desire for recognition and human dignity inherent in human nature has acquired an important theoretical and methodological meaning. **Originality.** The article investigates the modern philosophical discourse of the problem of recognition in the socio-anthropological measurements, in the context of the relationship between recognition, the "living world" and justice, non-recognition, humiliation of human dignity, and injustice. And it was also found that the image of recognition represented by modern philosophical thought, as a horizon and condition of human existence, is based on the following components: justice, solidarity, dignity, and care. Exactly addressing the problem of recognition made it possible to answer the question about the anthropological-ontological, existential meaning of the desire of individuals, nations, and states for recognition and outline the ways of transforming recognition as a variant of "communicative utopia" into a real socio-cultural project. **Conclusions.** In contrast to justice, the theory of recognition comes from asymmetrical human relations, which, in the struggle for recognition, must become symmetrical. Although justice takes precedence over ethics of care and recognition, they are not actually in competition with each other, but belong to different but complementary dimensions of human existence. The perspective of philosophical understanding of the problem of recognition itself requires the deepening of its analysis with an existential-anthropological understanding rooted in a new, tragic life experience. Only under such conditions, it is possible to overcome the gap between often abstract philosophical reflections and real personal and social practices.

Keywords: recognition; living world; justice; injustice; humiliation; trust; dignity; Axel Honneth

Introduction

The tragic events in Ukraine in recent years have made it understand that the human attitude of people to each other requires special virtues, especially – a sense of justice, recognition and respect for human dignity. We must assume that recognition is one of the leading places among other moral and social values: it is one that people must take into account in their relationships because, without recognition, social relations lose any sense.

The title of this article, as well as its main problem, arose due to the latest work "Recognition. A European History of Ideas" by the famous German philosopher, the student and the follower of Jürgen Habermas – Axel Honneth (2018). It was A. Honneth, thanks to his many years of research on the phenomenon of recognition, not only initiated numerous discussions and works on this problem, he became its main researcher and outlined his important ways for us not "rehabili-

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tation" but further development of practical philosophy through consistent filling its particular content. It goes about a constant search for the moral bases of modern society when the basic ethical guidelines and values must leave and, ultimately, leave the sphere of interpersonal relationships, and private life and gradually represent the peculiarities of modern social practices, the ways of building a just, based on recognition, equality, responsibility, and freedom of democracy legal society. It is also worth underling that the problem of recognizing the contextual peculiarities of its interpretation gained new relevance after the translation in 2021 of the already-mentioned book by Honneth into English. According to the special issue of the journal on philosophy and social theory "Critical Horizons", initiated by the article by A. Honneth and Miriam Bankovsky (2021), the sociocultural, philosophy anthropological contexts of the problem of recognition of not only Western European but also post-Soviet one need special attention, its Ukrainian measurement. Particularly the discussion of our colleagues, embodied in the quoted journal, testifies to the organic belonging of the subject of this article to international philosophical research on the problem of recognition. The relevance of our chosen aspect of the study of the problem of recognition in modern practical philosophy is also evidenced by the articles of Matthew Congdon (2020) and Danielle Petherbridge (2021). If the author of the first of them seeks to critically understand the fundamentally important conditions for the possibility of a critical role of recognition in modern social theory, then D. Petherbridge turns to the analysis of theories of recognition by J. Habermas and A. Honneth, especially in the context of our vulnerability and trust, and special place of "canvas of trust" in the "network of recognition".

Thanks to the works of A. Honneth, the theory of recognition has converted into a concept that not only organically connects the experience of personal injustice and suffering with their social roots, but also outlines the mechanisms, the ways to overcome them – "the struggle for recognition" against discrimination and humiliation. It is also eager to show how everyday experiences of humiliation and discrimination should be interpreted as a normative and motivating source of struggling against economic and cultural injustice.

For a fruitful philosophical understanding of the phenomenon of recognition arises the proposed by Thomas Rentsch principle of primary reason and practically defined intersubjectivity. Rentsch (2000) also (following Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel) emphasizes the need to analyze the constituent principles of the human world and experience, which is called Praxis, the principles that show that man is a communicative being: "Only in the communicative environment of the common world the man can be and become the man" (p. 224). Why is it important to us? Because by exploring the communicative-existential relations of people, or, as he says, "communicative, transcendental, and practical ways of human life", Rentsch (2000) actually speaks about the "diversity of the relations of recognition" (p. 42), he proposes to combine every day and philosophical reflection of recognition. He also postulates the thesis that both dignity and recognition are "not empirical properties of an isolated subject, but interexistentials of humanity" (Rentsch, 2000, p. 43).

Purpose

The article analyzes the latest philosophical discourses of recognition in the context of understanding injustice, and various "abnormalities" of social life. It also shows the complementarity of the intersubjective realistic concept of recognition of Axel Honneth and the critically configured model of recognition of Stefan Gosepath. The sociocultural origins and peculiarities of the theory of recognition are identified and it is proved that modern practical philosophy advocates

the fruitfulness of supplementing the moral principle of equal attitude to people by the norm of a definite duty to an individual and aimed at searching for overcoming of various forms of non-recognition, indignity, and contempt for human dignity.

Statement of basic materials

Recognition in the context of the world of life: problems of methodology

It is thanks to A. Honneth that the fundamental drawback of modern practical philosophy becomes clear – it's focusing mainly on normative principles. To overcome this approach, A. Honneth proposes a realistic model of the theory of recognition: our views about it, as well as about justice, must be derived not in a priori way, but reconstructed as conditions for the possibility of creating a just social life. In fact, moral norms and values are derived not only from a hypothetical agreement but also from the human world experience. It goes about how Honneth (2010) points out in one of his recent works, "I am among us. Notes on the theory of recognition", about a certain, essential for understanding the recognition, justice, and injustice, the horizon of the life world (p. 166). Such important peculiarities of the world of life as its integrity and direct evidence act for the individual as a horizon of all his intentions and interests.

We are also faced with the question of how A. Honneth developed (through the concept of "recognition") the type of intersubjective, communicative philosophizing that Rentsch spoke about above, and which is thoroughly represented by J. Habermas? Honneth does not seek, unlike Habermas, to turn to the analysis of the philosophy of language. As we know from his classic "Struggle for Recognition", he tries, first, to find out the role of recognition in achieving not only mutual understanding but also important for the formation of a personal identity of self-realization. And, secondly, to continue in his own way the tradition of critical theory of his native Frankfurt school and its understanding of the main pathologies of modern life. It is in the "attempt to systematically summarize" the methodological principle of the synthesis of the living world and recognition that Honneth emphasizes that within his study of the three national cultures, we have the following difference in recognizing man by other people. In France, not only in the modern era, but still today, the main thing is "the danger of losing oneself, which is the result of a constant desire for social status or a socially secure, prosperous existence" (Honneth, 2018, p. 190). In other words, it is a desire to respect honor, or at least a prosperous life. This is embodied, in part, "in the desire to gain an advantage over other people, as well as in the desire to be a legitimate member of the social community" (Honneth, 2018, p. 183). For the British, recognition is also important, but it is "not so much about the advantages over other people, but about the desire to become a recognized member of the community" (Honneth, 2018, p. 184).

However, the main thing that interested Honneth here and became, in our opinion, a continuation of his famous "Articles on Practical Philosophy" (Honneth, 2000) – is how in these different socio-cultural contexts, horizons of life interpretation "recognition" and how it affects subjects of this very process of recognition.

In particular, in the context of German existence:

It goes not about what a person aspires to but about the conditions of the possibility of becoming an intelligent, self-sufficient being; and the basis

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of this dependence of each person of his recognition by other people lies in the realizing that only in the relationship of our abilities can we secure ourselves and be guided in our activities not by empirical rules, but by consciously created norms. (Honneth, 2018, pp. 184-185)

Mutually recognized in this context is the ability to focus on reasonably established norms. However, it was Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel who debunked and dehistoricized this transcendental adjustment and insisted on the historicity of basic forms of recognition, which gradually increased human self-consciousness, one's passion, and reduced the space for the embodiment of human natural impulses. However, according to Honneth, it is necessary to further understand these approaches in order to better understand their differences. In the first case, it goes about certain personal qualities, due to which the individual can get a common perception or even admiration (Honneth, 2018, p. 186). The philosopher's research of these three paradigms has enabled the following important conclusions, which, as underlined in the introduction to the article, have become the subject of active discussion and even negative review by researchers of French literature.

After all, Honneth (2018) notes the following: if in the first case, we have a negative or even destructive image of the individual, "because here the intersubjective meeting appears as a danger of losing yourself or a danger of splitting personality" (p. 188), the second paradigm looks positive, because it denotes the possibility of regulatory control over their own social practices. But the author's greatest support (as it will be found out below) deserves the third, the German paradigm. "Recognition here is a double act of moral self-measurement, which can occur between at least two individuals, in order to prove to each other their reasonableness and thus the belonging to a community of intelligent beings" (Honneth, 2018, p. 187).

Thus, supported by Honneth (2018) as a truly methodologically fruitful third paradigm of understanding recognition is rooted in the "practical philosophy of German idealism" (p. 189). In his opinion, it is in this exact third conditionally highlighted tradition the act of mutual recognition of individuals arises as a condition for the possibility of one's own mission, designation, understanding and formation of one's own destiny. In other words, such interpreted recognition "as a sphere of mutual reasonable subjectivity enables its performers to be free within social communities" (Honneth, 2018, p. 190). These three paradigms of recognition singled out by Honneth are about the meaning and model, the image of human interaction. However, according to Honneth, the next step must be taken. As well as answers to the most important question: "What are the consequences of the reconstructed here paradigms of recognition for modern disputes about recognition" (Honneth, 2018, p. 191).

It is also worthwhile to understand the ways in which they interact, but Sartre's views on recognition already show difficulties in reconciling his "negative" and "positive" models. It is said that what is important for us is not so much about the practices of recognition, but about the methodology of its comprehension. On Charles Taylor's dilemma of the universalism of human nature and specific historical features, practices of its functioning. This is also emphasized by J. Habermas, on the dependence of the interpretation of legal norms on the new needs and interests of the community. An in-depth understanding of these paradigms indicates the complexity

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of their combination, which is associated with both significantly different definitions of recognition, and differences in methodological approaches.

According to Honneth, it is the tradition of German idealism, its reasonable recognition can be used as a basis for the integration of all three models of recognition. These are the communicative conditions of recognition that have already been established in Immanuel Kant's intersubjectively interpreted notion of respect, without which it is impossible to describe social recognition (Honneth, 2018, p. 191).

The theory of recognition as the theory of justice

Alex Honneth and other well-known representatives of modern philosophy (Karl-Otto Apel, J. Habermas, Otfried Höffe, John Rawls, Stefan Gosepath, Amartya Sen, Ch. Taylor, Ernst Tugendhat, Rainer Forst, Nancy Fraser) comprehensively develop and defend the idea of the untouchability of each person, based on justice, which he can neither lose nor give up, even for the sake of society as a whole. The same refers to Höffe's theory of exchange since it presupposes a mutual refusal from violence in the sphere of human existence that no one can reject. Forming his theory of recognition as a theory of justice, A. Honneth (1997) states that the quality of social relations, and their justice "cannot be measured only by an honest and fair distribution of material goods; moreover, our ideas of justice are fundamentally related to understanding how the agents accept each other" (pp. 25-26). Previously I. Kant, and after him, J. Rawls, proposed an understanding of man as a moral and rational personality, based on the concept of autonomy. As we know, the latter means the observance by a person of the laws, norms, and values that are not something foreign and external to him, but established by his mind and moral sense (conscience), which not only make a person free but also give him a sense of self-worth. Exactly the latter, Kant emphasizes, becomes an obstacle to the over-rational, instrumental vision of a man and the attitude to him, and initiates the possibility of not only a legal but also a moral vision of justice and recognition.

In his fundamental concept of recognition for modern philosophy, Ch. Taylor supplements the "freedom of self-determination" that is fundamentally important for just recognition with the meaning of honesty with oneself and other individuals. He also postulates the organic detachment of recognition in the concept of identity, which appears as the immanent identity of the individual himself. Extending somehow Taylor's thesis we can interpret honesty as an attributive feature not only of individual but also of social existence, which provides an opportunity to adequately live a normal, authentic human life without all manifestations of paternalism.

To reconstruct the idea of A. Honneth's recognition, it is necessary to actualize the thesis of J. Habermas that in discursive ethics instead of the categorical imperative of I. Kant, as a principle of moral justification of general norms and values, goes about a method of moral argumentation based on impartiality, equality of all participants, and making fair decisions. In other words, Habermas proposes to rely on an understanding of morality as an effective protection of a man from unjust, contemptuous treatment. In this sense, morality must (as it was consistently developed by A. Honneth) recognize its untouchability based on equal respect for the dignity of each individual, as well as the latter's belonging to a particular community, that is the rights of the individual must be asserted for the sake of his community.

Based on the philosophy of J. Habermas, it can be argued that the recognition of a man as well as his dignity is an effective mechanism for combining the morals of equal respect and human rights. Habermas is eager to focus on social, socio-cultural recognition and suggests ways to

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solve the problems of multiculturalism, actualized by life itself and by the work of Charles Taylor, and shifts the focus of his research from Kant's concept of autonomy in the stream of practical existential and ethical self-determination.

Important for the reconstruction of contemporary philosophy of reconstruction, especially in the sense of development by Honneth's (2010) non-procedural theory of justice became his work "The I in We: Studies in the Theory of Recognition", because, as it will be clarified below, the areas of recognition outlined by Honneth (2000) are fundamentally important aspects of protecting personal identity and the core of his practical philosophy, which seeks to answer the question "how and why the being appears for its participants as an unfair one?" (p. 149), and also interprets recognition as a practice that enhances the freedom. In addition, the work "The I in We" is an important embodiment of A. Honneth's transformation of the communicative paradigm of J. Habermas and the reception of the idea of recognition concerns the critical social philosophy of the Frankfurt School. Is it true that if we take care of justice, then recognition will follow immediately? The section of Honneth (2010) on the limits of modern proceduralism is devoted to the answer to this vital question (pp. 51-78). It is here that he identifies the following main components of almost all modern theories of justice: proceduralism, the idea of distributive justice which is the core of the two underlined components of normative theories of justice. Only after understanding the essence and measures of the idea of distribution should be taken the next step to find a modern image of social justice and answer the question of how we can interpret social justice when the idea of the distribution of material goods is insufficient (accompanied by paternalism, populism, authoritarianism and etc.). So where does the real "canvas" of social justice come from, when the rules of distribution of public goods become unjust, based only on power and force, but not on reasonable, honest principles, which, for example, Rawls is eager to establish? These very questions should be a refrain for understanding the critical realization of the distributive model of justice, which is actually the basis of its procedural interpretations.

In order to "weave" a real "canvas" of social justice, "we must emphasize not" the importance of public goods in themselves, but in attitude to them (Honneth, 2010, p. 60), as well as move from the autonomous personality to their recognition, as "autonomy for its origin and existence requires mutual recognition of individual; we position ourselves not only according to our inner world, but also according to relationships with other people who evaluate us as we can evaluate and respect them" (Honneth, 2010, p. 61). Before presenting his own concept of recognition, Honneth notes that some conceptual shifts in J. Rawls's ponder about self-esteem indicate the difficulty of implanting the relationship of recognition into the distributive paradigm of justice. However instead of welfare (which becomes basic for the theory of distributive justice) we should talk about the relationship of recognition, and instead of distribution, think about other ways of fulfilling justice.

In postulating the distributive concept of social justice, its adherents ignore those who distribute the goods, as well as the fact that injustice, humiliation, and poverty are primarily the result of economic and political exploitation, economic and political abuse. After all, the first question of justice is the question of power, the question of the leaks of unjust social relations. And human dignity is violated when a person only receives his/her, given above share of justice, and does not create it independently, as well as his/her existence in general. Critical understanding of the distributive model of justice turns Honneth to fruitful ways of development, adding a communicative way of philosophizing the concept of "awareness of injustice", which is embodied in the feeling of the inconsistency of society with the sense of justice embodied in unwritten social

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morality. Eventually, the experience of social suffering and lost hopes can destroy through the illegitimacy of social institutions, and society itself. Analysing the communicative practical philosophy, A. Honneth speaks about the lack of moral experience of the participants and continues the transformation of the communicative paradigm into a stream of recognition. Precisely in the context of the latter, the agents of social interaction communicate in the horizon of mutual expectations of recognition of themselves as moral and socially valuable individuals.

In the stream of comprehension of "dynamics of social contempt and disregard" Honneth seeks to develop an intersubjectively – theoretical concept of the individual. It is quite logical that instead of a justly criticized classical understanding of human life as an adherence to a certain life project, comes the idea of weakening normative rigor, the desire to follow the general, universal norms and values under any circumstances. Expanding his thesis on the need to overcome the normative-oriented reasons of modern practical philosophy, Honneth emphasizes the need for the responsible-contextual use of Universalist moral principles. And the refusal of one's own unrestricted freedom can become the basis for acceptance of the naturalness of such a refusal following other people in certain specific historical circumstances. Just here there is where the idea of abandoning contempt and violence is rooted. Honneth, developing Paul Ricœur's thought of the social nature of recognition, fairly believes that the humiliation of man destroys his self-esteem, leads to the destruction of his consciousness and capacity. In other words, the violence, destructive (combined with pain and power) interference in a person's life destroys their identity and confidence in themselves and the world.

Yet his "The Struggle for Recognition" A. Honneth (1994) begins with understanding the organic connection between recognition and a sense of injustice. In the horizon investigated by him mutual expectations (rights, love, and solidarity), there is not only a shift from the right to moral recognition, but also the moral principles of justice and human dignity are singled out and constituted. The above-mentioned work "Recognition: A Chapter in the History of European Ideas" not only outlines the main components and directions of development of the European philosophy of recognition but also emphasizes that the experience of human indignity actualizes such concepts as honour, dignity, and respect. After all, people are outraged against the neglect as strongly as against the violation of their interests. And when it goes not about the mechanical use of just even laws, but about the respect for people, recognition of their thoughts and desires, people can often sacrifice even their private selfish interests.

Honneth constantly draws attention to the close connection between the neglect of a man and his/her dignity and injustice. To his mind, people consider unfair the social order in which their rights, which seem integral to them, are violated. He singles out three main forms of recognition, which determine a person's sense of social order as just, or vice versa, which is – unjust, one where his dignity is neglected. If it goes about the first individual level, so it is love, on the social level we can talk about law and solidarity. The subject of A. Honneth's careful analysis is the opposite of recognition, which is neglect as a form of personal, institutional, and cultural-historical injustice. The three main ways of neglect for a man and his/her dignity are responsible for, according to Honneth, the destruction of basic forms of recognition. In Honneth's conception, these forms of neglect have acquired the status of the main forms of social injustice with its inherent destructive meaning and consequences.

It is primarily about an extreme form of social injustice, about violence, as a threat to the simple survival of man, embodied in the assault on his life and the ability to freely dispose of his/her body. Individual injustice, which is embodied in the impossibility of gaining recognition

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for their achievements, and individual characteristics and is accompanied by the loss of personal dignity and self-esteem, also becomes painful for a modern person. The main thing that A. Honneth emphasizes is that not only the material but also the moral depth of social conflicts becomes the basis of the struggle for justice.

The result of modern philosophy's thinking on the recognition of people in a just society is that people who are considered in the institutional and personal dimensions (measurements) as worthy of respect for individuals can become not only objects but also subjects of justice. Due to overcoming political paternalism and the existence of the individual as a subject of political action happens a profound re-emphasis of the recognition of the narrow field of interpersonal communication and individual existence and the formation of a new understanding of social justice based on human dignity and honesty.

An important feature of the philosophical discourse of social justice of A. Honneth is the definition of the phenomenon of justice as recognition as a fundamental factor of human existence and a universal philosophical concept, his interpretation of human existence primarily in the horizon of mutual expectations of recognition of each other as moral and socially significant, unfair consequences of violation, damage of this mechanism. Yet at the beginning of his thinking about the meaning of intersubjective recognition, Honneth (1994) emphasizes the organic connection between neglect and injustice, as well as the fact that "addressing the typology of forms of recognition simultaneously embraces the thesis that forms of neglect make it possible to understand if they damage or completely destroy the self-esteem of the individual" (p. 150). In his opinion, people consider it unfair that social order in which their rights, which seem inalienable to them, are violated.

It is no exaggeration to say that Honneth, instead of the post-metaphysical, based on universal pragmatics, the concept of justice of J. Habermas, offers justice recognition as the basis and measure of impartiality of social and individual relations of its subjects, as well as what he calls "to another justice". And this point of view successfully continues the tradition of understanding the phenomenon of justice in the "critical theory" and provides opportunities to deepen this understanding in modern philosophy.

Basic forms of recognition and its limits

In order to understand the social dynamics of disrespect, and injustice, Honneth identifies three main forms of recognition, which define a person's sense of his individual and social spaces as fair, or vice versa – unjust, one where his dignity is despised. If we are talking about the first individual level, it is love, at the social level we can talk about law and solidarity. In addition, Honneth emphasizes that these forms of recognition have both positive (as a condition for the possibility of self-realization as an individual) and negative (as a precaution against individual and social distortions and injustices) meanings.

The German philosopher concluding his "The Struggle for Recognition" (Honneth, 1994, pp. 274-287) draws attention to the ways of recognition as algorithms of free and fair behaviour, which help not only to overcome loneliness but also to use the positive potential of law and solidarity as kinds of synthesis of independence and rootedness. However, as further investigations by Honneth testify, it is neglect, and backwardness as a form of personal, institutional, and cultural-historical injustice, that become the subject of his careful analysis. However, as further investigations by Honneth testify, it is contempt, and backwardness as a form of personal, institutional, and cultural-historical injustice, that become the subject of his careful analysis. He em-

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phasizes the close connection between personal (we will add collective) identity with the processes of its neglect. It goes primarily about an extreme form of social injustice, about violence, as a threat to the simple survival of a man, which is embodied in the assault on his life and the ability to freely dispose of his body. This first of the forms of neglect analysed by Honneth as the forcible deprivation of a man of the right to be a free corporeal being has the negative consequence of destroying trust both in him and in the world. Injustice in the form of contempt for a person as a bearer of fundamental rights (up to their deprivation) and ignoring his belonging to a community, which is interpreted as a disadvantaged community, also has a deep negative ontological meaning. Injustice in the form of contempt for a person as a host of fundamental rights (up to their deprivation) and ignoring his belonging to a community, which is interpreted as a community of the second kind, also has a deep negative ontological meaning. Destructive and painful for a modern man is individual injustice, which implements itself in the inability to gain recognition at the level of its specific achievements and individual characteristics and is accompanied by loss of personal dignity and inability to have adequate self-esteem (Honneth, 1994, p. 211). The main thing that A. Honneth emphasizes is that the awareness of the injustice of the above-mentioned forms of contempt has both moral and social meanings. So it is not so much the material as the moral and socio-cultural tension of social conflicts that becomes the basis of the collective struggle for justice.

Stefan Gosepath, a Professor of Practical Philosophy at the Free University of Berlin, does not accidentally begin his answer to the question of why people tend to seek justice and seek recognition with the possibility of substantiating social human rights as an essential component of human rights in general. Gosepath is gradually developing the thesis that people have a moral right to be treated with equal respect. In this context, Gosepath's interpretation of human autonomy in the broadest sense of the word deserves special attention as to general personal self-determination of how a person wants to live his life. It should be underlined that Gosepath forms his practical philosophy in a constructive theoretical dialogue with A. Honneth and Ch. Taylor.

Developing his concept of substantiating the principles of "Liberal Egalitarianism", Gosepath relies on the thoughts of the classic German philosophy E. Tugendhat, who claims that without the recognition of members of the moral community as fundamentally equal, there is no way to develop moral sense and feeling. It goes about justifying moral features not only for me, but also about their mutual justification, that is, "about a relationship in which no one can do what he wants, or what is best for him, and all together create a system of regulations that, although it limits the autonomy of everyone, through the limits of the autonomy of everyone else" (Tugendhat, 2006, p. 25). Tugendhat, adhering to the principle of universalization as the recognition of a norm to be just or justified, rejects the cognitive assumptions of the ethics of discourse and its objections to monologism. He, like J. Habermas and O. Höffe, believes that the philosophy of justice, as well as modern practical philosophy in general, should act therapeutically and against the injustices of individual and social life to use the healing power of reflection to find conditions for a just solution to conflict situations.

Stefan Gosepath himself is going, and he must go further in his project, the image of justice. In fact, equality and justice are so closely linked that justice is most often associated with equality, and injustice with inequality. However, a closer look at the problem denies this apparent simplicity, and many cases of inequality seem quite fair to us. For Gosepath, the presumption of equality became also an opportunity to take the next step, which is to build a convincing theory of distributive justice that would help determine what and by whom it is distributed and on what

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basis. An important feature of Gosepath's discourse of justice is also the clear formulation of the basic approaches to its understanding inherent in modern German philosophy, which can be described as the acquiring of justice by a new sociocultural dimension and the transformation of a man from an object to a subject of justice. It is going about initiated by Rainer Forst (2007) in the "Contexts of Justice" and finished in one of his works under the title "Right to Justification. Elements of a Constructivist Theory of Justice" thesis concerning justice as a universal and fundamental right of every person to justify certain social norms and actions.

Gosepath formulates his vision of the relationship between justice and recognition in the context of answering the question: if justice has a prominent place among other moral and social values, then how to deal with equality, where is its place? After all, justice is not just a moral value that coexists with other values, such as freedom, community, or moral relationships, but the scale by which the basic components of our existence are measured. The peculiarity of Gosepath's approach and his merit is the substantiation of the primordial nature, the value of justice, and its advantages over other moral and social values. And this is fundamentally important if we interpret justice as the existential human existence. And the desire for justice is the desire for recognition and self-realization as intersubjective principles of identity creation. The theory of justice should perceive the theory of recognition as a deep, but partial, image of the individual. It is no coincidence that Gosepath's understanding of morality as a whole encompasses, along with justice, "other justice", but justice has advantages over its moral rivals – the ethics of care and recognition. Thus, the theory of recognition, the ethics of care, and the theory of justice do not compete with each other but belong to different dimensions of human existence.

Gosepath tells about the difference between care and justice: if justice insists on the doctrine of moral principles, care requires the development of moral dispositions. The next difference concerns the form of moral thinking: from the point of view of justice, the problems must be solved with the help of moral principles; care is shown in each separate case. And the third difference concerns moral orientation: justice focuses on rights and honesty, and care does on responsibility and personal relationships. Agreeing with the opinion of A. Honneth and Ch. Taylor about recognition as a universal human need, Gosepath tries not to talk about the dilemma of justice and recognition, initiated by the famous discussion of A. Honneth and N. Fraser. He believes that recognition is a significant prospect for the theory of justice. However, recognition is not a good that can be distributed: "Not everyone receives an equal right to public respect, because then that respect will have no value. However, everyone (on fair equal terms) must receive an equal right to the opportunity to achieve public respect and recognition" (Gosepath, 2004, p. 106).

However, S. Gosepath, postulating the distributive concept of social justice, ignores the one who distributes wealth, as well as the fact that injustice, humiliation and poverty are primarily the result of economic and political abuse. After all, the first question of justice is a question of power, human dignity is violated when a person only receives his, appointed from above, a share of justice, and does not create it independently, as well as his being in general.

Originality

The article accounts for the recognition itself as an existential need of a person, because s/he forms his/her identity in dialogue and struggles with "significant others". Recognition also determines the self-realization of the individual, as well as the fundamental "vulnerability" of human existence. And most importantly, it emphasizes that the contempt for man and his/her life

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world destroys the basis of the constitution of his/her identity, becomes a cause of social conflict, and is the most painful embodiment of social injustice. In addition, our dignity depends on the recognition of us by other people, and humiliation, disrespect, and non-recognition not only reduce our self-esteem, but it appears to be unfair. Moreover outlined in the famous discussion of liberalism and communitarism of practical philosophy strive to highlight the ways of theoretical understanding and provide practical recipes for overcoming dilemma between individual and community.

Conclusions

Summing up the understanding of the problem of recognition in modern practical philosophy, it should be emphasized that it is not so much an attempt to develop a theory of recognition in the stream of action theory and epistemology. It is about identifying the inner potential of the phenomenon of recognition. That is to investigate the fundamental possibility of reconciling the formal-legitimate, institutional structures of recognition with the understanding of them as structures, which are justified or truly legitimated by us, the citizens in our social practices. The latest philosophical discourse of recognition transforms the theory of recognition from utopia into a realistic project, namely, considers recognition as the horizon and condition of human existence. This transformation is based on three components: justice as a formally equal treatment of people; solidarity; dignity and care. Further theoretical and practical steps to study the multidimensional phenomenon of recognition should be complemented by addressing the problem of identity, as well as, the issue of meaning of human life. The only recourse to the "canvas of recognition" in people's lifeworld is able to bridge the gap between philosophical reflections, political practices, and personal life experiences. And also not to allow to go beyond "forgetting recognition" as a way to "forgetting being".

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Л. А. СИТНИЧЕНКО^{1*}, Д. В. УСОВ^{2*}

^{1*}Інститут філософії імені Г. С. Сковороди, Національна академія наук України (Київ, Україна), ел. пошта L.Sytynichenko@i.ua, ORCID 0000-0002-7198-9157

^{2*}Черкаський інститут пожежної безпеки імені Героїв Чорнобиля Національного університету цивільного захисту України (Черкаси, Україна), ел. пошта dimausov@i.ua, ORCID 0000-0002-8898-9743

Проблема визнання в сучасній філософії: соціальні та антропологічні виміри

Мета. Стаття спрямована на дослідження основних соціально-антропологічних вимірів проблеми визнання, репрезентованих насамперед філософією визнання Акселя Гонета (Axel Honneth), яка актуалізується боротьбою українського народу за своє існування та національно-культурне визнання. Послідовний аналіз комунікативної парадигми в сучасній філософії зумовив розуміння її трансформації в річище проблеми визнання та виокремлення основних його форм, які й визначають відчуття людиною суспільного простору як справедливого чи несправедливого, де зневажена її гідність. **Теоретичний базис.** Звернення до творів Юргена Габермаса, Отфріда Гюфе, Ернста Тugendгата, Штефана Гозепата, Томаса Ренча сприяло доповненню переважно процедурного, теоретико-комунікативного способу філософування філософсько-антропологічним, екзистенційним, контекстуальним принципом усвідомлення визнання як засадничого принципу справедливості та розумінням того, що brutальне, несправедливе руйнування "життєвого світу" людини та держави є синонімом їх фізичного знищення. Важливого теоретико-методологічного сенсу набула і теза Френсіса Фукуями про взаємозв'язок притаманного природі людини прагнення до визнання та людської гідності. **Наукова новизна.** У статті досліджено сучасний філософський дискурс проблеми визнання в соціально-антропологічному вимірі, у контексті взаємозв'язку визнання, "життєвого світу" та справедливості, невизнання, приниження людської гідності та несправедливості. З'ясовано, що репрезентований сучасною філософською думкою образ визнання як горизонту й умови людського буття базується на таких складових: справедливість, солідарність, гідність і турбота. Саме звернення до проблеми визнання уможливило відповідь на питання про антропологічно-онтологічний, екзистенційний сенс прагнення індивідів, націй, держав до визнання та окреслення шляхів перетворення визнання як варіанта "комунікативної утопії"

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в реальний соціокультурний проект. **Висновки.** На відміну від справедливості, теорія визнання виходить з асиметричних людських взаємин, які в боротьбі за визнання мусять стати симетричними. Незважаючи на те, що справедливість має переваги перед етикою турботи та визнанням, насправді вони не конкурують між собою, а належать до різних вимірів людського буття, які, проте, взаємодоповнюють одне одного. Перспектива власне філософського осмислення проблеми визнання потребує поглиблення її аналізу екзистенційно-антропологічним розумінням, укоріненим у новому, трагічному життєвому досвіді. Лише на таких засадах можливо подолати прірву між часто абстрактними філософськими роздумами та реальними персональними й суспільними практиками.

Ключові слова: визнання; життєвий світ; справедливість; несправедливість; приниження; довіра; гідність; Аксель Гонет

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