ANTHROPOLOGICAL PROBLEMS
IN THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

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Freedom as an Anthropological Problem in the Christian Philosophy of Aurelius Augustine and Hryhorii Skovoroda

Purpose. The study aims to define and comprehend the phenomenon of freedom as an anthropological problem in the Christian philosophical heritage of A. Augustine and H. Skovoroda. The objectives of the study are: a) to identify the main aspects of the problem of freedom in the Christian philosophy of Augustine; b) to clarify the essence and specificity of understanding of freedom in the philosophical anthropology of H. Skovoroda; c) to compare the peculiarities of the statement of the problem of freedom by Augustine and Skovoroda. **Theoretical basis.** The achievement of the purpose is based on theoretical-methodological, historical-philosophical and comparative analysis of the content of the concept of freedom within the philosophical views of A. Augustine and H. Skovoroda. Also, the analysis of the original sources of the thinkers has allowed to formulate the theoretical and practical significance of their ideas in this field and their importance for the further development of world philosophy. **Originality.** It has been confirmed that in the religious philosophy of Augustine, freedom appears on an immanent-spiritual plane and is a phenomenon manifested as a person's ability of self-determination in his actions. Augustine explains freedom by raising the question of free will, evil, salvation, predestination and divine grace. It is substantiated that the analysis of the problem of freedom in the philosophy of H. Skovoroda presupposes an understanding of the main components of his philosophical and anthropological theory: ontological (the doctrine of "two natures" and "three worlds"); gnoseological (the concept of self-knowledge); ethical (the problem of happiness, good, etc.). It is determined that human freedom in the work of both philosophers is defined in conceptual and semantic aspects as a moral and ethical choice between good and evil. It is established that both Augustine and Skovoroda emphasize the discovery by man of the moral, spiritual law and life in accordance with its norms – this is a kind of idea of positive freedom ("freedom for"), and the call to escape from the world of evil is the idea of negative freedom ("freedom from"). **Conclusions.** Thus, we continued the historical-philosophical study of the peculiarities of the understanding of the concept of human freedom in Ukrainian philosophical thought, which is manifested by comparing it with the theoretical heritage of world philosophy, with the spiritual and philosophical experience of the past. The ideological kinship of the concepts of freedom of Aurelius Augustine and Hryhorii Skovoroda is obvious.

Keywords: freedom; good; evil; sin; divine grace; predestination; providence; self-knowledge; "natural work"

Introduction

Since the issue of "freedom" as well as "love" is one of those that have experienced philosophical pluralism the most, this is evidence that they are of crucial importance not only in the life of an individual, but also in the history of all humanity. Obviously, the problem of the will as the capacity for choice (and therefore freedom) was also of greatest interest to Augustine in his philosophical and theological reflections, therefore the philosophy of freedom undoubtedly occupies an important place in his work, and the result of his reflections forms one of the most important European concepts of freedom. The basic principles of his philosophy lay the foundation for an understanding of human freedom as one of the most important ethical categories in Christianity, as a

spiritual phenomenon based on moral choice. It is these principles that underlie the understanding of freedom as an anthropological problem in the philosophy of H. Skovoroda as well. In his concept, human freedom opens up through the process of self-knowledge, which gives awareness of the spiritual essence, moral and ethical principles, abilities and talents, as well as through the practical realization of these truths in life. For the Ukrainian sage, freedom is a property inherent in man by his nature, it is the highest gift and good, and lack of freedom is the domination of evil, which leads to immorality, anti-human values and disorder of society.

It is these Christian-anthropological philosophical ideas that unite Augustine and Skovoroda. For the latter, Augustine was an indisputable moral and ideological authority.

The study of the problem of freedom in Augustine's philosophy took place in the context of works on the history of medieval philosophy, and was also the subject of separate special studies.

Recent special studies include the works of such Western authors as A. Chronister; M. Brown; P. King; B. Peterson; D. E. Burns; B. Long and F. Feng; L. Holm; S. Harrison; C. Wilson; I. Coban; C. Tornau; G. Bonner.

Among the latest domestic studies we can mention: T. Murga (2021) "The Concept of 'Freedom' in the Western Philosophical and Theological Tradition", which notes the originality of Augustine's concept of freedom: "Aurelius Augustine does create his own, original and quite systematic doctrine of the freedom of will of man, the influence of original sin and Divine predestination on him" (transl. by M. P.) (p. 74); M. Potsiurko (2016) "Reconciliation of Free Will and Predestation as the Basis of Antipelagians Controversy Augustine"; L. Sanhaievska (2007) "Freedom to Choose between Good and Evil as a Moral Aspect of Christianity"; O. Turowska (2018) "General Remarks on Human Freedom from the Point of View of Christianity. The Relationship between Human Freedom and the Omniscience of God in the Philosophy of Saint Augustine".

Among the works analysing the problem of freedom in the philosophical heritage of H. Skovoroda, the following should be noted: D. Bahalii (1992) "Ukrainian Vagrant Philosopher Hryhorii Skovoroda", covering the problem of freedom, considered in its close connection with the spirituality of man, in the presentation of the general philosophical concept; the collective monograph of I. Zakhara, M. Kashuba, and O. Matkovska (1998) "The Problem of Man in Ukrainian Philosophy of the 16th – 18th Centuries", which reveals the approach to understanding freedom as a consequence of knowing the invisible nature of man through the heart and feelings; the article by A. Pashuk (1994) "The Problem of Freedom in the Philosophy of Hryhorii Skovoroda", where the question of freedom is connected with the idea of "natural work", self-knowledge, happiness, with pantheistic and rationalistic background; one of the last comprehensive works – "H. Skovoroda: Philosophy of Freedom" by M. Popovych (2007), which presents the idea that the philosophy of freedom of the thinker cannot be called mystical, – in this context, different types of knowledge in the world philosophical thought, particularly mystical and rational knowledge and their relationship to the philosophy of Skovoroda are analysed; a series of works by M. Potsiurko (Zakala, 2008), in particular "Subsoil of Rationalism of Freedom of Man is in Philosophy of Hryhoriy Skovoroda", which examines in detail various aspects of the problem of freedom in the Ukrainian thinker's works.

Purpose

The purpose of the article is to compare philosophical and anthropological ideas of freedom of St. Augustine and H. Skovoroda, to highlight the main aspects of the problem, to define its

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essence, as well as to critically examine the role and significance of the ideas of both philosophers for the formation of modern philosophical and anthropological discourses of understanding the phenomenon of freedom. The objectives of the study are: a) to identify the main aspects of the problem of freedom in the Christian philosophy of Augustine; b) to clarify the essence and specificity of understanding of freedom in the philosophical anthropology of H. Skovoroda; c) to compare the peculiarities of the statement of the problem of freedom by Augustine and Skovoroda.

Statement of basic materials

To begin with, let us analyse the philosophical and anthropological views on freedom of Aurelius Augustine.

According to C. Tornau (2020), Augustine is probably for the first time in the history of philosophy comprehensively and very thoroughly approaches the question of free will: "Augustine comes closer than any earlier philosopher to positing will as a faculty of choice that is reducible neither to reason nor to non-rational desire. It has therefore been claimed that Augustine "discovered" the will".

A. Chronister (2016) emphasizes the inextricable connection between Augustine's teaching on freedom and the previous tradition (in particular, the Christian one): "I argued there that Augustine consistently employed these quotations –and the opinions they evinced – in order to prove that his own doctrinal views were simply those that the Church had always taught" (p. 291). That is why, Chronister (2016) emphasizes, Augustine's freedom dispute with Pelagius was logically connected to the Christian tradition: "In this sense, while Bonner and many others are correct to call Augustine the Doctor Gratiae, perhaps we should also recognize another title for Augustine that could be just as apt: Doctor Traditionis or, perhaps, Doctor Traditionum…" (p. 296).

According to S. Harrison, Augustine philosophically rationalizes, consistently and clearly substantiates his doctrine of will and there is no argumentative inconsistency in it. "The form and structure of On Free Choice of the Will that give philosophical content to Augustine's theory of will. The dialogue constitutes a 'way in to the will' that itself instantiates a concept of will" (Harrison, 2006, p. 1).

Moreover, Harrison compares Augustine to Descartes:

> The book goes on to investigate how Augustine's 'way in' relates to these cogito-like arguments as they occur in Augustine's major and most read works… The ideas of freedom and responsibility are illustrated and instantiated in the acquisition of knowledge: one is free not to know, not to want to know, and no one else can do your learning for you. (Harrison, 2006, p. 1)

Researcher L. Holm in the interpretation of freedom traces the connection between Augustine and Socrates:

> In this way, St. Augustine's definition of free will being good is much
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> like Socrates' definition of a perfectly just man… He concludes that a
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> man who performs just actions reaps greater reward than a man who per-
>
> forms unjust actions. Like St. Augustine's definition, the just man feels
>
> better within his soul. He feels complete, rather than empty and craving –
>
> the ultimate outcome of one who freely chooses wrong or one who
>
> chooses unjust actions. (Holm, 2022)

Augustine introduces the sign of freedom into the very definition of the will as a movement of the unconditioned Spirit. Therefore, for the will to be possible, it must have the autonomy expressed in its definition: the will is the desire of the soul, unconditioned by anything. This does not mean that the free will is not limited by anything, but it must be independent of any external basis.

The free decision of the will itself should be the ultimate basis of any volitional causality, that is, postulate causation from freedom. A person freely decides only what he wants, and everything that depends on him is in his will, and above all, the will itself.

> But what, finally, can be the cause of the will before the will? For both
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> it is the will itself; and from that root of the will he will not depart: ei-
>
> ther there is no will and he has no sin. Therefore either the will itself is
>
> the root cause of sin, or no sin is the root cause of sin. And there is no
>
> one to whom sin is rightly attributed except the sinner. (transl. by M. P.)
>
> (Augustinus Hipponensis, n.d., 3: 17.49)

As researcher P. King aptly points out, Augustine presents his basic concept of free will in three theses:

> First, he holds that we are responsible only for acts done out of free
>
> choice … freedom is a necessary condition for the ascription of moral re-
>
> sponsibility. … Second, the will is completely self-determining … The
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> freedom involved in free choice must therefore be a radical freedom,

such that nothing whatever can determine its choice, including its own

nature. Third, we are responsible for not having a good will, since it is

within our power to have one. (King, 2010, p. xix)

Closely related to the problem of freedom are questions about evil, justice, judgment, fair punishment, responsibility for sins and salvation and justification of sins – these are the philosophical and theological questions that accompany Augustine's life and to which he seeks answers in almost all of his works.

In this regard, Augustine distinguishes freedom from the natural or psychological will in relation to the moral content of the will, that is, freedom from sin. Here he distinguishes: 1. the impossibility of sinning, which belongs only to God; 2. the possibility of not sinning, or the free choice between good and evil. (This possibility belonged only to the first men before the Fall); 3. the impossibility not to sin, or freedom only to evil, or the necessity of evil and impossibility of good. (This is what man is after the Fall).

In the work "On Free Choice of the Will", Augustine raises the question of whether free will is good or evil and whether God gives us this freedom. If free will allows us to sin and do evil in the world, can it be good? The philosopher believes that true goodness is the desire to live a righteous and honest life and achieve the highest wisdom. Furthermore, all good comes from God. For the will to achieve good, it must be in harmony with the will of God. Since the nature of the will is to choose, we see that if it chooses to turn to God, it is good, but if it returns to itself, it chooses bad. Furthermore, "…if a man has some good and cannot do good unless he wills, he must have a free will, without which he cannot do right" (transl. by M. P.) (Augustinus Hipponensis, n.d., 2: 1.3).

Also, the nature of the body is on a lower level than the nature of the soul, and therefore the soul is a greater good than the body. A blessed life for Augustine is the liberation of the soul from bodily filth, that is, life in accordance with the rational part of the soul: "But evil is its abhorrence of the invariable good and its conversion to changeable goods: this abhorrence and conversion, however, since it is not compulsory, but voluntary, is accompanied by a just and fair punishment of suffering" (transl. by M. P.) (Augustinus Hipponensis, n.d., 2: 19.53).

In connection with this, Augustine speaks of the struggle of the *two wills*, spiritual and bodily: "Ev. – What is good will? Avg. – The will with which we strive to live rightly and honestly, and to attain the highest wisdom?" (Augustinus Hipponensis, n.d., 1: 12.25). Therefore "…those who keep the eternal law in good will need no temporal law…" (transl. by M. P.) (Augustinus Hipponensis, n.d., 1: 15.31).

Obviously, freedom is a power based on *reason* and will, to act or not to act, to do this or that, to perform actions and be responsible for them: "For if you had not seen it with your mind, you would in no way have known or desired…" (transl. by M. P.) (Augustinus Hipponensis, n.d., 2: 9.27).

As we can see, for Augustine, the will, like memory and thought, is a constitutive element of the mind: "Therefore I believe that it is necessary that the mind should be able to do more than the will, by the very fact that it rightly and justly dominates desire" (transl. by M. P.) (Augustinus Hipponensis, n.d., 1: 10.20). Will is closely linked to love and hence the scope of moral evaluation. We act well or badly if and only if our actions are derived from good or evil will, which is

equivalent to whether they are motivated by right (i.e., God-directed) or wrong (i.e., self-directed) love: "Therefore the eternal law commands to divert love from temporary things and convert it pure to eternal love" (transl. by M. P.) (Augustinus Hipponensis, n.d., 1: 15.32).

Augustine defends the passions or emotions from their Stoic condemnation as aberrations in rational judgment, redefining them more neutrally as voluntates, which can be good or bad depending on their objects. "Nothing else makes reason the companion of desire, but its own will and free will?" (transl. by M. P.) (Augustinus Hipponensis, n.d., 1: 11.21).

Thus, Augustine's understanding of free will is closely related to thoughts about *evil*, it is from such thoughts that his work "On Free Choice of the Will" begins. Evodius asks Augustine: "Please tell me: is not God the cause of evil?" For God is all-good, and if God is all-powerful, then it is obvious that something else can be the cause of evil against God's will. To answer this question, Augustine will have to turn to the question of human freedom, because only this can be the only explanation. For the evil found in the world created by God would have to be God (either directly, determining our will, or indirectly, as creating causes that determine our will). At this point, Augustine simply states how an act of faith convinces us that God is good and just and therefore cannot be the cause of evil: "But if you know or believe that God is good, for otherwise it is not right, he does not evil: again, if we admit that God is just, for to deny it is also sacrilege, since he rewards the good, therefore he punishes the bad" (transl. by M. P.) (Augustinus Hipponensis, n.d., 1: 1.1).

A person cannot choose the good without being able to choose. Only the will is responsible for this: "Everything is good from God, you can understand that even man is from God. For man himself, since he is human, is a kind of goodness; because he can live right when he wants to" (transl. by M. P.) (Augustinus Hipponensis, n.d., 2: 1.2).

Related to this is a moral theodicy: God is not the creator of evil, the sole creator of dissonance and disorder or moral evil in the world, and in himself, is a person endowed with freedom of choice.

Therefore, if a person does not have free will, then the evil he does is not his fault and cannot be punished, and if God punishes him for it, he is unjust: "And thus both the punishment and the reward would be unjust, if man had no free will. But there must be justice in both punishment and reward; since it is one of the blessings that come from God. Therefore, God had to give man free will" (transl. by M. P.) (Augustinus Hipponensis, n.d., 2: 1.3).

That is, responsibility for moral evil lies only with man. Therefore, if wrongdoing is punished by God's justice, only such action for which man is responsible is punished: "For from him (God) he has received that he may do right when he wills, from him he has received that he will be miserable if he does not do it, and happy if he does" (transl. by M. P.) (Augustinus Hipponensis, n.d., 3: 15.43).

So, together with King (2010), we can summarise Augustine's arguments in defence of free will: "Every case of genuine moral evil in the world stems from the voluntary choices of free agents… It is better for there to be a world in which there are beings with free choice of the will, even at the cost of genuine moral evil, than a world in which there is neither" (p. xx).

This raises another question. If the choice of the will is free and the Supreme Justice guarantees the preservation of the moral universe, then there must be a *moral law* that imputes to the moral subject the laws of his behaviour. Such a law is established by God as the supreme law of the supreme justice and is imprinted in the heart of every human being. It is the "inner truth" that judges the laws of justice. The denial of free will leaves the moral law and its precepts meaning-

less. *Sin*, accordingly, is non-fulfilment of the moral law (commandments) by will. Augustine defines sin as the desire to gain or strive for something unjustly.

At the same time, it should be taken into account that the autonomy of the will consists in the principled ability to act in a way that does not conform to moral law. Such autonomy is based on the freedom causality and is characterised by the total absence of external coercion:

> The will, therefore, by adhering to the common and immutable good, acquires the first and greater good of man, since it is itself the means of a certain good. But when the will turns away from the unchangeable and common good and turns to its own good, either external or inferior, it sins. (transl. by M. P.) (Augustinus Hipponensis, n.d., 2: 19.53)

At this level, the moral quality of the action is irrelevant: good and evil actions must be equally free. The very freedom of an evil (immoral) act indicates the fundamental possibility of doing good and vice versa. A person should, if he has received free will and sufficient opportunity for its realization, use his capacity for good:

> This is our freedom when we obey these truths: and this is our God who liberates us from death, that is, from the state of sin. For the Truth itself, even when a man speaks to men, says to those who believe him: if you abide in my word, then you are truly my disciples, and you will know the truth, and the truth will set you free. (transl. by M. P.) (Augustinus Hipponensis, n.d., 2: 13.37)

Therefore, reflection leads Augustine to the conclusion that it is only with Supreme help that the will acquires wholeness. The paradox of Christian freedom is that one who is free in slavery is happy to fulfil the will of his master. That is why any comparison between freedom and arbitrariness is excluded, because in Christianity, slavery is subjugation to evil, and voluntary agreement with the moral law is freedom.

Accordingly, whoever is a servant of sin is free to sin. And therefore he will not be able to do right until he is delivered from sin and becomes a servant of righteousness. A free person voluntarily submits to the moral law and takes pleasure in a righteous deed, because he is obedient to the will of God. Sinners are free only to the extent that they can sin, for they are slaves to sin. But the righteous are redeemed and servants of Christ, and therefore through Him they are free to do good, which is "true freedom".

Augustine argues that through the disobedience of Adam and Eve, man lost the natural capacity for self-determination, which can only be corrected and restored by divine grace, revealed in

the incarnation and sacrifice of Christ and working within to free human wills from their slavery to sin. Confession of sins and humility are, therefore, the main Christian virtues.

Many researchers emphasize the presence of a certain contrast *between human free will and God's omnipotence* and Augustine's efforts to resolve these issues within the limits of philosophy and theology. For example, O. Turowska (2018) states: "He always proclaims two truths: the first one: God controls every activity and the second one: people have freedom to choose… So, how can we explain both statements are true? As philosophers, we can only show that it is not possible to deny either of those statements" (p. 6).

It is obvious that within the limits of Christianity there can be no opposition and contradiction between human freedom and God's will. This opinion is confirmed by the researcher I. Coban (2010) rightly noting that: "In fact, Abrahamic religions necessarily support the idea of the compatibility between divine knowledge and human free will".

Therefore, we also agree with M. Brown (2005), who proposes to consider the solution of the problem of the relationship between human freedom and Divine grace, free choice and predestination in two planes – philosophical and theological ones (p. 65).

This opinion is confirmed by B. Long and F. Feng, asserting that Augustine interprets the Platonic understanding of freedom in the spirit of the Christian tradition:

> We see that it is due to survival of Augustine's personal experience,
>
> make originally incompatible the two ideas: Plato's "goodness principle"
>
> and Christian "save the concept" combined with Augustine's concept of
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> freedom. Therefore, Augustine's free will, not only is the choice of human right and evil, but people in God's love, accept the grace of God…
>
> to meet their yearning for the good. (Long & Feng, 2015, p. 41)

As a conclusion, M. Brown (2005) summarizes: "The only possible positive explanation is theological. In Christ are both divine activity and human freedom. We live and act in grace, freely entering into the covenant freely offered by God. We learn this through Revelation…" (p. 65).

Augustine considers the concept of *"providence"* to be only a trap of the human mind that is incapable of thinking about eternity and can only partially and conditionally apply it to God. Higher knowledge alerts human decision only logically and not at all temporally or causally. What is foretold does not necessarily happen because God forces man to choose this or that decision, but because God does not make mistakes. Accordingly, providence acts not as an predestination, predetermination, but as foreknowledge. Thus it turns out that we do not deny the providence of all future events and prefer what we want.

Augustine is faced with another important question about the basis on which supreme justice exercises selection. If one does not take into account the merits of a person and everybody is equal, then the selection cannot make any sense. God has chosen and predestined to salvation, according to his purpose, those who, as he foresaw, would believe and follow His calling. In this case, there are many who are called, but few who are chosen. In turn, the consent to act according to the vocation depends on the decision of the will. A positive decision constitutes the merit

of faith, in which case one is able to fulfil the precepts of the law without difficulty and willingly – because faith accomplishes what the law commands. Accordingly, a negative decision is counted as a sin and punished. Thus, Augustine views the problem of freedom through the prism of divine grace. This is what caused Pelagius to criticize his teaching.

Pelagius substantiated the opinion that sin is not born with a person, it can only be a personal decision. From this it follows that grace is completely unnecessary, since a person has a full-fledged natural ability to achieve good on his own, to build his own destiny. A free decision is thus completely autonomous. The autonomy of the will is revealed in three main characteristics: the ability to live without sin, the will that desires it, and the action that achieves it.

Now let us consider the main aspects of posing the problem of freedom in the philosophical anthropology of H. Skovoroda.

The Greek term Eleutheros (ἐλευδερος), which means freedom, is close to the term erchomai – one who can go anywhere, who is master of himself, independent of others. In this regard, free will by definition is the ability of a person to self-determine his actions. It seems that there is no better example of the implementation of this definition in practice than the life of H. Skovoroda. His student and biographer M. Kovalynsky writes: "Skovoroda began to feel a taste for freedom from the vanities and passions of life in a poor but cheerful state, in solitude, but without disorder with himself" (transl. by M. P.) (Skovoroda, 1973b, p. 445). Therefore, no one forced him to act in a way that he did not feel in his spirit. For him, freedom did not mean seclusion and escape from people, on the contrary – it was life for people, he completely devoted himself to them in love and education. His real freedom was not in the ability to do whatever he wanted (that would be arbitrariness), but in the ability to be free from his passions and desires, from himself, and in spiritual freedom of abandoning himself, to reclaim himself. Making himself the lowest, he became the greatest, "true" person. He was free from dependence on himself. Frankness (in Greek ραζζηια), in other words, freedom of speech, which for the Greeks was an important feature of a free citizen, for H. Skovoroda was the courage to speak the truth regardless of the views of others and openness and trust in speaking this truth. We can call such an example genuine freedom, which turned out to be an existential dimension of the essence of man.

Emphasizing in his philosophy the opposition between the inner, personal life of man and the outer, bodily life, H. Skovoroda, in the light of the Christian tradition of Augustine, argues that the latter is a false manifestation of the former. For to live in the full sense of the word means not just to please the body, which means "life", but to care for the soul: "To live means to be born, to be fed, to grow and diminish, and life is a fruitful offering, which has germinated from the grain of truth, reigning in the hearts" (transl. by M. P.) (Skovoroda, 1973b, p. 7).

Since the essence of man is defined by his *invisible nature*, true freedom, according to the Ukrainian philosopher, cannot manifest itself otherwise than through the existence of "true man" in the manifestation of his goodwill. Man acquires value not as possessing material goods, but as having an "invisible nature" within himself, only then does he become fulfilled. Awareness of one's own significance comes only through the discovery of the spiritual essence. Otherwise, a person experiences his worthlessness, the illusion of happiness and satisfaction. And a free, spiritual person no longer feels his helplessness, he is the centre of the universe, holding everything in his hands. The philosopher notes that the invisible nature returns a person to his essence, thus he performs good deeds of his own free will, and not under compulsion: "jurisprudence leads everyone to office by fear, and theology makes the sons and friends of God out of slaves, pouring into the heart their free desire to what the civil laws drag by force" (transl. by M. P.) (Skovoroda, 1973a, p. 131).

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All that concerns corporeality, H. Skovoroda, like Augustine, associates with the *evil will* of man. Therefore the human soul is constantly striving, seeking, until it finds the heavenly rest, the shore in the stormy sea, which is the invisible essence of God, revealing the good will. And in turn the realm of the invisible law of God, which is in man, enables him to find his true freedom to be guided not by human attitudes, strivings and searches, but by his own convictions, free from compulsion. Only what really corresponds to our nature is a real norm, and only when we live in conformity with our moral essence, we feel good and we are free.

Thus, human existence, according to H. Skovoroda, consists of opposition of all human essence and spirituality to the world of material, destructive and contradictory to his freedom. It gives rise to ideas of specificity and authenticity of free human existence in the midst of a world of evil and materiality. His conception of human existence includes the concept of individual freedom as an integral part. Man must choose between appearance (the embodiment of immorality) and spirit (the system of Christian values), otherwise the human soul loses its wings of freedom, it betrays itself, self-destructs. Freedom for the philosopher is first and foremost a state of inner independence from the passions and circumstances of the external world, a state of independence, tranquillity, joy. Man lives in order to understand that there is happiness in freedom and to live in it. Therefore, the state of calm, peace, and freedom should be taken for granted. And a man is able to reach it when recognizing himself, opening his inner world and thus belonging to himself and not being subject to any other circumstances. Therefore, freedom for Skovoroda is the ability always and in all circumstances to be guided by the invisible nature and in all cases of life to choose the spiritual law.

It is important that a person's self-awareness and obedience to the norms of invisible nature allows him to create a new and free self. Therefore, human freedom is manifested in the possibility of self-knowledge and self-creation. And the newly created "true man" in his essence is identical with the spiritual principle, God, who permeates everything. Thus, for H. Skovoroda, there are no external motives – they are inside the person himself, in his invisibility, and this is the source of his freedom.

For the free will that guides a rational being, in the midst of the world of sensuality and appearances, by a moral effort and a feat, leads to the knowledge of "true man", which in turn opens up the space of spiritual freedom, for the possibility of being constantly in it. Thus, the freedom that manifests itself through the activity of consciousness is the basis, the inner spiritual structure of being, of the world, of history, the discovery of all connections and relations in the world. They manifest through cognition, which is the realization of the creative potential of human freedom and testifies to the possibility of true understanding. Human consciousness as a manifestation of spirituality, for the wandering philosopher is the total realm of freedom, so it is the possibility of an act of creativity and the discovery of the mysteries of the universe. Because only man is free and can reveal freedom in the universe as a law of invisibility that permeates it.

For Hryhorii Savych, a person is not "doomed to freedom". Freedom is his inner, spiritual essence, which arises not from necessity, but from a free act given by the power of invisible nature. Man works not because of necessity, hopelessness, he is not motivated by fear of God, but because the invisible divine power turns out in man to be his own desire. He does not become a slave, but a free creator, not a means, but an end; therefore he does not suffer from abandonment, loneliness and his own helplessness, which is in a state of love for the world and its temptations.

In this connection, the main feature by which the spiritual person (the "true man") differs from other people and all other things is freedom, which enables him to choose a moral path in

life, to prefer the internal to the external, to find happiness. The fully conscious choice of man to live in accordance with the laws of his own invisible nature is defined by the philosopher as the realisation of freedom in man's life.

In, We see two worlds in the works by Skovoroda, as well as in those by Augustine. An ordinary person has two natures in himself – *good and evil*, two types of mind, lives according to two laws, has an evil and a good will. The "true man", which is the essence of an individual's life, cannot lead a double life, but must make a choice in order to exist happily, for spirituality, goodwill to prevail, so as not to fall into the bondage of his 'beastly' nature. Therefore, since man has the right to freedom and the right to choose, and, quite importantly, is responsible for his actions, he can freely submit himself to the moral law, which is the highest good as opposed to evil. The blind, unruly will that did not give rest, having found a haven, turns into a holy will that brings everything into order, harmonizes everything, elevates and liberates.

Skovoroda, continuing the tradition of Augustine, distinguishes two wills – evil and good. One is the will to good, the other is the desire for evil, since everything that exists is divided into two: true and false, external and internal. Using one's will to choose evil, the latter ceases to be good. Similar to Augustine, Hryhorii Savych writes:

> Daimon. Who is to blame? Isn't the will given to man?
>
> Varsava. […] Not one, but two wills are given to you… Two wills are
>
> that, a purely natural path – the right and the left. But you, who love your
>
> will more than the will of God, are eternally grieve on the path of sinners.
>
> Wasn't it my fault? (Skovoroda, 1973b, p. 91)

However, the good, divine will for H. Skovoroda (1973a) is not fatum, but a spiritual law that a person discovers in himself through self-knowledge: "And what is God's will, if not a law?" (transl. by M. P.) (p. 225).

M. Kovalynsky writes:

> Skovoroda… divided a person into two: internal and external, calling one
>
> eternal and the other temporary… According to this division, he saw in
>
> one and the same person two minds, two wills, two laws, two lives …
>
> And as the first was to rule, to be in charge, to dominate, the other was to
>
> obey, to serve, to follow his will… (transl. by M. P.) (Skovoroda, 1973b,
>
> pp. 452-453)

H. Skovoroda mentions Augustine, who has a call to destroy one's own evil will, because in this way hell will be destroyed. A person submissive to God's will is not a powerless doer, but

an autonomous one. He can choose to act on his own will and initiative, he chooses good will and does good, realizing freedom, freedom of spirit:

"Augustine sang the truth: there is no hell and there never was,

Will is hell, your will is cursed,

Our will is the furnace of hell to us.

Kill that will, friend, then there is no hell, no torment" (transl. by M. P.) (Skovoroda, 1973a, p. 87).

The Ukrainian philosopher explains that good will and evil are the gates of hell and heaven:

Man's will and God's one are two gates – hell and heaven. He who finds

God's will in the midst of the sea of his own will finds a rest, or rather

another harbour… Who transformed his will into God's will, is chanting

this: "Vanish, my heart" etc. God himself is the heart of this. Will, heart,

love, god, spirit, paradise, harbour, bliss, eternity are the same.

(Skovoroda, 1973a, p. 88)

Therefore, the person who clings to his evil will is actually a slave to the world, darkness. This will only seems to give happiness, but in reality it gives fetters, locks and leads to hell, while obedience to God's will gives freedom. Therefore, "… ungrateful will is the key to hellish torments, but grateful will is all the sweetness of paradise" (transl. by M. P.) (Skovoroda, 1973b, p. 107).

With the idea that there is a great gulf between the inner and the outer, the philosopher condemns man for hypocrisy and mendacity, emphasising his inner unfreedom. He calls this behaviour putting on a false mask: "…all your outward appearance is nothing but your mask, covering up each your member, according to its kind and likeness, as if in seed, hidden in your heart" (transl. by M. P.) (Skovoroda, 1973a, p. 244). Very often, people who cannot identify themselves as spiritual beings, imitating the behaviour of their bodily nature, are unable to use their free choice: "Our vile nature, being in the shadow, is a monkey, imitating its mistress nature in everything" (transl. by M. P.) (Skovoroda, 1973a, p. 313). The will, under the guidance of reason, strives for knowledge. This is the sign of man's conscious choice and acquisition of individuality.

In addition, a person who has chosen the path of sin constantly feels the lack of purpose and direction of his life: "To sin in the Greek language ʻαμαρτάνειν, means to be without a path, what is a disaster, how to walk without a road, live without a path, walk without counsel?" (transl. by M. P.) (Skovoroda, 1973a, p. 376). A person who has chosen the sweet path of bliss gets the opportunity to direct his ship in the stormy waves of the sea of life. And the ability to manage and freely make choices is the most important thing in life, because in this way a person does not depend on anyone and determines his own path.

Man appears to the philosopher as the centre of the circle of life drawn with a compass, and the transition from the secular to the spiritual life is an increase in the radius of the compass to infinity. It is the ability to know invisibility and to follow one's vocation, rather than, say, money

and title, that makes someone free. Therefore, the personality is shaped by the free choice of life's path, mental and moral components: "A lawful life, a firm mind, a generous and merciful heart is the pure ringing of an honourable person" (transl. by M. P.) (Skovoroda, 1973a, p. 352).

Freedom becomes personal only when man discovers within his being the invisibility, *God*, something most valuable, which gives him the status of free man on another level, so that all other dimensions become unimportant. Only then man can be freed from all authority and become like the child of the free Sarah and not that of the slave Hagar, when the image of God is in him. Nothing governs man's personal freedom anymore, because he is spiritual. The human spiritual essence becomes the embodiment of God, it incorporates the invisible law of existence. This fact is an important anthropological idea in H. Skovoroda's philosophy of freedom.

The whole anthropology of Skovoroda (1973b) is permeated with reflections on freedom of spiritual man: "Spiritual man is free… He sees the distant, sees through the secret, looks into the past, penetrates into the future… Above his head fly seven God's birds: spirit of taste, spirit of faith, spirit of hope, spirit of mercy, spirit of counsel, spirit of insight, spirit of sincerity" (transl. by M. P.) (p. 44).

The thinker stressed that freedom is possible only when one lives according to the laws of true, spiritual existence, while the greatest evil is subordination to secular temptation and material values. This is the profound meaning of the philosopher's wisdom about the world, which did not grasp him. Therefore, "true" man, mentioned repeatedly by Skovoroda, is an invisible nature, which is the embodiment of the divine essence of man, his spiritual existence. This invisible force (existence, mind, spirit, heart), embodied in a person, forms the "circle of humanity" and its greatest advantage – free will.

Freedom from the forces of a finite and evil world, a dimension of the new being defined by the realm of the invisible, is given by Spirit, obtained by a person through self-knowledge. It is spirituality that acts as a defence against lack of freedom and bodily death. H. Skovoroda (1973b) notes this in a letter to M. Kovalynsky: "…death, which destroys the body, makes the soul more free. Yes, free from the body, I will be with you in memory, in thought, in silent conversation: to such an extent, love is stronger than death itself" (transl. by M. P.) (p. 307).

A person constantly chooses between one and the other, there are doubts and excitement in our thoughts. He approaches something and runs away from something, strives, but all this happens only when there is no spiritual direction. For the spiritual man is free, but the external corporeality fetters him in chains, the rough sea of life tosses him like a ship from one wave to another, he is like a bird that cannot break free from its close cage: "What is so narrow and dense as appearance? This is why it is called a ditch. Figures (seem) to fly through the net to the freedom of the spirit?" (transl. by M. P.) (Skovoroda, 1973a, p. 176). Therefore, to live spiritually means to see things and the world from the perspective of invisibility and to build their lives freely, without external coercion. Consequently, the actions of a spiritual person are always a manifestation of freedom, they are not determined by an external evil necessity. The spiritual path is always the path of freedom from dependence and compulsion. For the world, which is a combination of external socio-political and internal morally negative factors, constantly constrains a person and leaves no free choice.

H. Skovoroda does not pose the problem of predestination, as Augustine did. He only tries to interpret the Biblical statements philosophically in the spirit of achieving salvation in himself here and now. This salvation is not thought of as an irrational act of merging with a higher substance, but as a more rational self-knowledge that reveals God in a concrete kindred work. This

idea has a certain determination of man's destiny through his predetermined innate capacities. And H. Skovoroda sees the juxtaposition of God's will and human freedom not as a dilemma, but as a natural state of spiritual existence, since God is not transcendent and immeasurable, but is in man himself, and His will is a recognized necessity of the moral law. In this, we see the similarity of H. Skovoroda with the early Augustine, who extolls the possibilities of mind and free will, as well as some consonance with Pelagius, who states the absolute responsibility of man for his deeds and the possibility to put a free decision into practice.

According to Augustine, man is responsible only for an action that is committed consciously and freely and therefore can be punished and blamed. In the same way, H. Skovoroda places responsibility for evil and violation of harmony and order in the world on the will of man.

For H. Skovoroda, an internal law, acting at the level of invisible nature, is a necessity, the fulfilment of which depends on freedom. Man is free to choose both his way in life and every particular act of good or evil. The realisation of this ability is an act of freedom, and arbitrariness is punished not for this freedom, but for the subject of the will not using it properly. A moral act is difficult, it is always a feat of will. And a person bears responsibility precisely because he can live with dignity if he wants to. The will itself chooses the necessity – duty, goal and way of kinship. This means that the mere awareness of the moral law is in principle sufficient to fulfil it.

Accordingly, whoever is a servant of sin is free to sin. Therefore he will not be able to do right until, freed from sin, he begins to be a servant of righteousness. And this is the truth of Christian freedom, which sounds both in Augustine's and in Skovoroda's works.

Originality

The article for the first time provides a comparative, historical and philosophical analysis of the concepts of freedom in the framework of religious philosophical and anthropological teachings of St. Augustine and H. Skovoroda. It defines the main peculiarities of philosophical comprehension of the freedom phenomenon in the works of both thinkers, as well as their place and significance for the world philosophy. The importance of Augustine's teaching on freedom is argued and the manifestations of common points with Skovoroda's teaching are outlined. The comparison of Augustine's and Skovoroda's concepts of freedom allowed to explicate the content of the notion of freedom in the polyvariance of semantic projections. It is shown that spiritual freedom in the concepts of both philosophers is the highest, valuable dimension of human existence, which reveals the true, full-fledged human essence, capable of self-realization.

Conclusions

Therefore, according to the philosophical ideas of Augustine and Skovoroda, freedom acquires the dimension of spirituality only then, and thus becomes personal, when one recognises God within his being, discovers the commands of the spirit and follows them. Consequently, a free person is one who is one spirit with the sphere of pure freedom. In this connection, "negative freedom" is expressed in liberation from the world of evil, while the space of "positive freedom" is the regularity of spiritual nature. Thus, both philosophers proceed from an understanding of freedom as a realised necessity of moral law.

The content of freedom in H. Skovoroda's philosophy is utterly religious, it is intertwined with the ideas of freedom of Antiquity, Middle Ages, Renaissance and Baroque. Augustine's

philosophy of freedom, showing its close connection with antiquity, is at the same time timeless distinctive and original, therefore it occupies an important place among the world concepts of freedom.

It is possible to agree with L. Sanhaievska (2007) that the basic concepts of Christianity, "freedom", "truth" and "goodness" have religious content, but constitute the basis for rational moral argumentation (p. 156), which is exactly the approach that Augustine and Skovoroda embody in their philosophy.

Since this work has considered the philosophical and anthropological plane of raising the problem of freedom in the works of Augustine and Skovoroda, there is a reasonable prospect of further research on the issue of comparing the concepts of freedom of these philosophers, in particular in the socio-philosophical aspect.

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Свобода як антропологічна проблема в християнській філософії Аврелія Августина та Григорія Сковороди

Мета. Дослідження спрямовано на окреслення та осмислення феномену свободи як антропологічної проблеми в християнській філософській спадщині Августина та Сковороди. Завданнями дослідження є:

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а) виокремити основні аспекти проблеми свободи в християнській філософії Августина; б) з'ясувати сутність і специфіку розуміння свободи у філософській антропології Г. Сковороди; в) порівняти особливості постановки проблеми свободи Августином і Сковородою. **Теоретичний базис.** Досягнення мети ґрунтується на теоретико-методологічному, історико-філософському та компаративному аналізі змісту поняття "свобода" в межах філософських поглядів Августина та Сковороди. Також на основі аналізу першоджерел мислителів сформульовано теоретичну та практичну значущість їхніх ідей у цій царині та значення для подальшого розвитку світової філософії. **Наукова новизна.** Підтверджено, що в релігійній філософії Августина свобода постає в іманентно-духовній площині і є феноменом, що виявляється як здатність людини до самовизначення у своїх діях. Августин пояснює свободу через постановку питання про вільну волю, зло, спасіння, предестинацію та Божественну благодать. Обґрунтовано, що аналіз проблеми свободи у філософії Г. Сковороди передбачає осмислення основних складових його філософсько-антропологічної теорії: онтологічної (вчення про "дві натури" і "три світи"); гносеологічної (концепція самопізнання); етичної (проблема щастя, добра та ін.). Визначено, що свободу людини у своїх творах обидва філософи в концептуальному і смисловому аспектах окреслюють як морально-етичний вибір між добром і злом. Установлено, що й Августин, і Сковорода наголошують на відкритті людиною морального, духовного закону та житті відповідно до його норм – це своєрідна ідея позитивної свободи ("свободи для"), а заклик до втечі від світу зла – це ідея негативної свободи ("свободи від"). **Висновки.** Отже, ми продовжили історико-філософське дослідження особливостей розуміння поняття свободи людини в українській філософській думці, що виявляється в зіставленні його з теоретичними надбаннями світової філософії, із духовним філософським досвідом минулого. Очевидною є ідейна спорідненість концепцій свободи Аврелія Августина та Григорія Сковороди.

Ключові слова: свобода; добро; зло; гріх; Божественна благодать; предестинація; провидіння; самопізнання; "споріднена праця"