UDC (1091):141

A. S. SYNYTSIA^1*

^1*Ivan Franko National University of Lviv (Lviv, Ukraine),
e-mail andrii.synytsia.edu@gmail.com, ORCID 0000-0002-0983-7187

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF LUDWIG

WITTGENSTEIN’S AND MARTIN HEIDEGGER’S

VIEWS ON THE NATURE OF HUMAN

Purpose. The paper is aimed at analyzing in a comparative way the philosophical conceptions of the human, proposed by Ludwig Wittgenstein and Martin Heidegger as the main representatives of the analytic and continental tradition of philosophizing in the XXth century. The theoretical basis of the study is determined by Wittgenstein’s legacy in the field of logical and linguistic analysis, as well as Heidegger’s existential, hermeneutical, and phenomenological ideas. Originality. Based on the analysis of the philosophical works of Wittgenstein and Heidegger, the initial principles of their anthropological concepts in the unity of transcendental preconditions, essential foundations, and correlations to the world in the technosphere are reconstructed. It is demonstrated that, despite the difference in the explanation of the peculiarities in the interpretation of the realm of the transcendental (as an extra-linguistic) and basic characteristic of the inner world of human, both philosophers emphasized the understanding of the human being through the prism of language and the need for anthropologization of science and technology. Conclusions. Wittgenstein and Heidegger developed their own original considerations on the nature of human being, which fully conform to the basic theoretico-methodological principles of their philosophical conceptions. The former focused on how language reflects a human’s world and serves as a means of expressing their knowledge and aspirations. The latter, on the contrary, interpreted the world as a reflection of language that expresses itself through human. As a supporter of analytic methodology and, accordingly, of accuracy in formulations, Wittgenstein came to the concept of the unspeakable in the process of reflection on the being of human over the language. But in Heidegger’s existential discourse, which is full of metaphors and neologisms, being of human is limited by the concept of Nothing. As a consequence, it is noted that the ontological status of values is transcendental to the world according to Wittgenstein, but it is immanent to the world, according to Heidegger. It is argued that the Austrian thinker developed a linguo-psychological approach to the study of human through the prism of the mental, but the German philosopher comprehended the human on the basis of the concept of self in the ontological sphere. It has been demonstrated that both thinkers have pointed to the challenges faced by humans in the development of science and technology while emphasizing the importance of substantiating their anthropological foundations.

Keywords: human; transcendental; existence; mental; self; language; technology

Introduction

It would be no exaggeration to say that Ludwig Wittgenstein and Martin Heidegger are among the most influential thinkers of the twentieth century since interest in their work is not diminishing in our time. The former – an Austrian philosopher, professor at Cambridge University, a specialist in logic, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind – became one of the founders of analytic philosophy and contributed to the fact that the linguistic turn affected almost all areas of philosophical knowledge, including philosophical anthropology. The latter is – a German philosopher and professor at the University of Marburg and the University of Freiburg – made considerable efforts to develop the ideas of phenomenology, hermeneutics, and existentialism, and also influenced the language revolution to change our ideas about human existence and ways of its philosophical thinking. Of course, the analytic and continental philosophical traditions, which they respectively represent, at first glance are so different from each other that the comparison of the views of both thinkers seems very ambiguous. Let us mention only that the analytic tradition of philosophizing is characterized by an appeal to science, orientation to the language of empirical facts, the search for truth through the prism of language analysis, development within the paradigm of knowledge, and application of a problematic understanding of philosophy. While continental philosophy appeals more to literature, politics, and religion, it focuses on metaphysical reality, seeks meaning in the realm of thought, develops within the paradigm of wisdom, and applies a historical understanding of philosophy (Synytsia, 2016). Nevertheless, the creative path of Wittgenstein and Heidegger has a lot in common. And it is not just that both thinkers were of the same age, formed their own views on the basis of German-speaking philosophy, gained popularity in the 1920s, when their opus magnum actually appeared ("Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus" in 1921 and "Being and Time" in 1927), and they were generally familiar with each other’s work. It is important how they explained human’s inner nature, their metaphysical, and transcendental background. As can be noted, at the conceptual level, their views were quite similar, even though their anthropological concepts were formulated on the basis of different methodological principles. It remains to be seen what results they have achieved.

The issues of comparative analysis of the philosophical views of these thinkers were studied by David Egan (2019), who was interested in particular in the correlation between the concepts of grammar and ontology, being-in-the-world and forms of life, and their search for authentic philosophy in general; Manfred Geier (2017), who pointed out that Heidegger’s philosophizing about human existence became more and more abstract over time, and Wittgenstein, on the contrary, sought to immerse himself in the practice of everyday life; Paul M. Livingston (2015), who tried to investigate the specifics of their reading of each other’s philosophy, taking into account, in particular, the concept of human existence. One can also mention the scientific research on certain anthropological issues in Wittgenstein or Heidegger – for instance, the recent works of Gunter Gebauer (2017) and Markus Weidler (2018), respectively. Despite the thoroughness of these studies, they leave open the question of a holistic comparative study of human nature in Wittgenstein and Heidegger, especially given the emergence of new publications (eg, the so-called "Black Notebooks" by Heidegger, or various critical works), which significantly complement the content of their anthropological conceptions.

Purpose

This paper aims to analyze from the comparative standpoint Wittgenstein’s and Heidegger’s philosophical arguments about the nature of human being.

Statement of basic materials

To achieve this aim, the presentation of the material will be as follows: first I will compare the views of both thinkers on the transcendental basis of human being, then compare their interpretations of the inner world and finally find out how they interpret human destiny in society in the technosphere.

Transcendental basis of human being. Analyzing human being, both thinkers emphasize the importance of language. In particular, Wittgenstein (1922) argued that "the limits of my language mean the limits of my world" (p. 149), and Heidegger (1998a) claimed that "language is the house of being" (p. 239). Both of them defined language as the basis that allows us to understand our being. However, in an effort to understand what is beyond being in language, they have obtained different results: Wittgenstein came to the concept of the unspeakable, and Heidegger came to the concept of Nothing. This difference can be explained by the difference in individual theoretico-methodological principles. In particular, for Wittgenstein, language reflects the world, and for Heidegger, on the contrary, the world reflects language. Therefore, the former intended to achieve the most accurate definitions of concepts that would reflect the actual state of affairs, and the latter each time constructed new word forms, which should correspond to something in the world.

Thus, Wittgenstein, in the process of constructing the structure of his ontology, made the transition from the world, which is a set of facts, to logical pictures of facts – thoughts. Proposition is a means of expression of the thought. It is the main element of language as a source of knowledge. However, this is not the limit of knowledge. It is more correct to say that the limit of language (the realm of logic) is the limit of discursive understanding of the world. The task is to go beyond it, that is, to go beyond one’s own microcosm (one’s own self). That is why in a letter to Ludwig von Ficker (September – October 1919) Wittgenstein (1979) explained his idea of writing the "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus": "… the point of the book is ethical … my work consists of two parts: the one which is here, and of everything which I have not written. And precisely this second part is the important one" (p. 94). In other words, human knowledge is much broader than that is expressed in language. All our information about the world is not reduced exclusively to logical knowledge. Human is constantly striving to go beyond the logic of language. Since the ethical and the logical are interconnected, at first human intends to find out the limits of logical knowledge in order to understand the limits of the transcendental ethical world, which is beyond objective facts.

Later, during a discussion with members of the Vienna Circle on December 29, 1929, Wittgenstein further developed his thoughts and even once mentioned Heidegger’s philosophical ideas. The Austrian thinker put it this way: "I can very well think what Heidegger meant about Being and Angst" ("Ich kann mir wohl denken, was Heidegger mit Sein und Angst meint") (McGuinness, 2001, p. 68). However, Angst should not be expressed, because it is a deep metaphysical fear of death – that which is not experienced, that "is not an event of life" (Wittgenstein, 1922, p. 185). Thus human as a transcendental subject (the limit of the world, not a part of it), expresses logical knowledge in language, and they must be silent about the ethical (unspeakable). It is important to understand that silence itself is not identical to the absence of sounds. Silence is full of meanings that we can mystically experience. It is with the help of a mystical sense of life that a person goes beyond their everyday life. So, this feeling is superior to language (Synytsia, 2019).

However, Heidegger (1998b) himself expresses a slightly different opinion: "Only language enables humans to be those living beings which they are as humans" (p. 138). That is, a human only in the process of speech becomes human. There is no question of silence. Humans and their essence are derived from being. And this process requires language. The person constantly speaks in some way. Each of us is a being who asks about being and its sense. Being is invisibly present in everyone. Only by correlating ourselves with being, we can understand our essence. This essence coincides with the existence of humans. Therefore, in "Being and Time" Heidegger (2001) preferred to talk about a special kind of existence – "Dasein" (there-being), which he defined as follows: "Dasein is an entity which is in each case I myself; its Being is in each case mine" (p. 150). Dasein has an advantage over any other being because it understands itself as an existence that has certain limits. The ontological basis of such existence is determined by temporality, and the ontic basis is established by Nothing, which is deeply present in Dasein. However, the person constantly runs away from it. This is how their consciousness is set up. The sciences completely reject any Nothing and analyze only being. However, being is revealed only in comparison with Nothing. The only phenomenon that forms Dasein as a whole and reveals Nothing to us is the Angst mentioned by Wittgenstein – the unintentional fear of Nothing. Heidegger (2018) claimed: "Nothing only becomes manifest in anxiety" (p. 741). Asking about it, one can only wonder, because they seek to go beyond being, seek, as Heidegger (2000) explained, to comprehend, "Why are there beings at all instead of nothing?" (p. 1). Wittgenstein (1922) reasoned in a similar way when he stated: "Not how the world is, is the mystical, but that it is" (p. 187). In this way (reflexively) human goes beyond individual things and finds themselves in the realm of metaphysics.

Studying the metaphysical preconditions of human existence, Wittgenstein and Heidegger differed on the status of values. Wittgenstein, in the context of the problem of the unspeakable, investigated values as transcendental entities, and Heidegger preferred to interpret any kind of ethical issues only as derived from ontological ones. In particular, Wittgenstein clearly understood that any attempt to express various kinds of ethical experience is futile – it is an attempt to think paradoxically (in Kierkegaard’s interpretation), its results are trivial (as pointed out by George Edward Moore), although the process of overcoming the limits of language indicates something (Augustine thought about it) (McGuinness, 2001, p. 68). The world of ethics is a world of values or entities that give sense to life. According to Wittgenstein (1922): "The sense of the world must lie outside the world" (p. 183). If values were part of our world, they would be accidental like the events that take place in it, but under certain conditions, they might not be. Similarly, the ethical subject is transcendental to the world. This subject can only experience the absolute and unconditional dimension of value, not construct it as a mental entity. The subject’s ideas about ethics, and aesthetics or religion in general, are formed from personal experiences of one’s self in the world and have intrinsic value. Some of these ideas have an absolute value that forms a person’s worldview. For example, the religio-ethical interpretation of the individual is based on amazement at the existence of the world, the experience of absolute safety, and guilt (Wittgenstein, 1965, p. 10). They have absolute value, although experienced individually, from a personal perspective.

It should be noted that ethical issues interested Wittgenstein throughout his career, but Heidegger often neglected them, focusing on issues of ontology. He explained this as follows: "Adding on value-predicates cannot tell us anything at all new about the Being of goods…" (Heidegger, 2001, p. 132). The fact is that the ontology as such already contains "existential conditions" for the formation of morality. Some of the existentials already indicate the need for value formation. In particular, the existential Mit-sein determines the coexistence of Dasein with others and thus indicates the need to communicate and build a certain system of value relations with each other. One of these relations is described by such an existential as Sorge. It signifies caring for another person, for oneself, or for being as such. This existential is so important that Heidegger (2001) even claimed: "The Being of Dasein is care" (p. 465). Care precedes any cognitive process and is manifested, among other things, in speech (Rede). Thus, Heidegger interpreted values not as transcendent to the world, but as immanent to it.

The inner world of human. Wittgenstein and Heidegger differently formulate their views on what the inner world of human is. The former was interested in the psychological aspect of human existence, the latter studied the ontological one, despite the fact that both emphasized the importance of language for understanding the nature of human. For this, Wittgenstein even over time in his writing made the transition from studying a formal language to studying the ordinary one and Heidegger replaced investigation of being and time with researching the issues of being and language. To find out the nature of human existence, the former gradually realized the importance of a detailed analysis of empirical facts, and the latter focused on the realm of poetry. As a result, Wittgenstein, in explaining human nature, appealed to the concept of the mental, and Heidegger applied the concept of self.

Thus, in general, Wittgenstein distinguished two levels of being: natural and spiritual. The former concerns the description of the state of affairs in the world, which is known to be a "set of facts", the latter concerns all that is connected with life. We express the being of facts with the help of propositions of natural science. They are fixed in the laws and can be expressed formally through language. In contrast to the objective natural level of being, our personal (subjective experience) cannot be expressed in words or reduced to information that can be reproduced on special devices. Personal experience is unique; any impersonal forms are not characteristic of it. Its essence consists of ethical, aesthetic, and religious experiences. For Wittgenstein, it is important that these experiences lead to peace of mind and harmony. If they acquire a negative connotation, it means inconsistency with the form of life, and indicates the need to change, to become appropriate to the form. That is, the condition for achieving mental harmony will be the intention to change yourself, not waiting for change. After all, spiritual experience is external to the facts. It is full of the meanings of human life and therefore has an axiological dimension that can only be experienced mystically. This dimension cannot be expressed in language, because values as such do not have a logical form. "The good is outside the space of facts", – as Wittgenstein (2006, p. 3e) summed up in "Culture and Value" (1929 recording).

At that time the Austrian thinker, according to Gunter Gebauer (2017), made "the turn to anthropology" (p. 75) and began to analyze the individual, making the transition from the study of linguistic means of expression of mental states to the philosophy of psychology. Among the basic mental characteristics that precede our speech, he singled out sensation, memory, and understanding. For example, when a person performs a certain activity or reacts to what is happening around, in their mind, there are certain "characteristic experiences" (Wittgenstein, 1968, p. 17). They arise when someone identifies form, perceives a certain color, feels the pain, and so on. We designate all these experiences by certain words. However, words only replace feelings but do not reproduce them. We cannot be sure that another person has the same feelings (qualia in the terminology of the philosophy of mind) as we do. In addition, by naming an object, we extract its meaning from memory. Thus, the meaning of words is not inherent in things, but in memory, which is characterized by physicochemical processes in the brain. For example, Wittgenstein (1968) pondered how someone retains the meaning of the terms "names of colours", "shape of a leaf" (p. 34). According to his assumption, there are probably some patterns (schemes) in our memory of what we are thinking about. A person only modifies these patterns in specific situations, taking into account a certain seeing aspect. They may forget a word, but keep in their memory the experience it evoked. When we say something, we first understand something, that is, at the mental level there is a certain process. The fact that a person understands something correctly, according to Wittgenstein’s, you can learn from their behavior. However, to my mind, this criterion is not universal, because the behavior itself is ambiguous. Sometimes it is full of manipulation and self-suggestion.

At the end of "Philosophical Investigations", Wittgenstein suggested another possibility of studying the mental. Actually, not because of the study of the grammar of words and human behavior, but because of "that in nature which is the basis of grammar" (Wittgenstein, 1968, p. 230). However, such a study should appeal to the facts of natural science, and Wittgenstein preferred to limit himself to linguistic analysis, namely, the interpretation of human behavior, the correlation of mind and language, meanings and experiences, words and actions, and so on. In "Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology" (1946-1949), one of his last works, he, studying the nature of the human soul, continued to draw attention to the correlation of perceptions and interpretations, features of verbal expression of feelings, in other words, the grammar of psychological concepts (Wittgenstein, 1998). Thus he continued to interpret human as a language-using creature; as a being that expresses themselves through language.

As we know, in Heidegger (1985), on the contrary, language speaks through human, "language speaks" ("die sprache spricht") (p. 11). It is the essence of being, and poetry is its essence. Language is full of the meanings that a human finds in it and communicates to others. Through communication, everyone shares their impressions of the world with others and forms a certain attitude towards them. Of course, understanding with others is achieved not only through words but also through silence, which is an integral attribute of communication. Through language, a human forms their attitude to being, which they are interconnected with, because: "There is no being without language… There is no language without being" (Heidegger, 2014b, p. 10). However, it should be noted that the conceptual structures of language are preceded by existential structures (i. e. existentials, such as care), which help a human to find the sense of life. Everyone, possessing Being-in-the-world, discovers being through language, whatever path they choose to the essence of things. It is even more correct to say, to the essence of oneself, because all that a human can find is themselves.

In general, Heidegger (2014b) identified four ways in which a human traditionally comes to realizing the essence of their self (ein Selbst): 1) through usual reflection; 2) by talking to You; 3) by reflecting on the situation; 4) through idolatry" (p. 6). This happens when a human’s attention is not focused on making a choice or being satisfied with a certain surrogate, which they replace their self with. Moreover, sometimes a human can confuse themselves with the image that is created for the public or by the public. Sometimes a human can confuse an autosuggestion image with the self. In addition, under certain conditions a person can fall under the power of depersonalization (das Man) and lose their authentic existence, i. e. reduce temporality (expressed in three modes of human existence) only to the present mode (to everyday life). Loss of connection with the past and inability to see the horizons of the future threaten the integrity of the human person. As a result of the depersonalization of the self, human ceases to ask about their own finitude, about the correlation between being and Nothing. The essence of Dasein becomes closed to them. Without understanding one’s own essence, a human will not realize their existence. Heidegger (2014a) reasoned as follows: "Knowing who we are is so necessary that without this knowledge we will never be able to decide whether we "are", or whether we just inventing ourselves in unbeing and revealing ourselves as a given, just as in cogito – sum!" (p. 279). It should be noted that such a reference to the work of Rene Descartes is not accidental. Heidegger was influenced by the ideas of his anthropology as one of the most significant for modern philosophy (Malivskyi, 2019). However, Heidegger did not think about sum (esse), but about human existence and understood that without realizing who a human is, we begin to live a false life, uncharacteristic of us. This is partly facilitated by the general leveling atmosphere in society, which is often hostile to the manifestations of human individuality and does not mind reducing their purpose to a simple functionality that neglects everything personal and unique in self.

Human’s comprehension of the authentic self is due to the awareness of the temporality of their existence. By understanding the inevitability of one’s own death (which becomes clear in connection with the death of the Other), the human gets the opportunity to constitute their self and to comprehend/rethink authentic life. In this way, we can most thoroughly comprehend our life in the dimensions of Dasein as being-a-whole and being-towards-death (Heidegger, 2001, p. 279). Thus human, according to Heidegger, knows their inner world (their own subjectivity) not by studying the realm of the mental (as it is in Wittgenstein), not by constructing a theory (as it is in science), but by realizing their own temporality and mortality as a necessary possibility of our existence.

The fate of human in the world in the technosphere. To better understand the nature of human existence, Wittgenstein and Heidegger in their later works reflected on the impact of technology on the human. It should be noted that their views on technology are quite similar: both are concerned about the danger to human posed by the development of science and technology, although they understand that such a process is inevitable and need to find ways to protect our forms of life and every self from negative consequences.

One of these ways, according to Wittgenstein, is not to absolutize the possibilities of science. Thus, in «Remarks on Frazer’s "Golden Bough"» (1931), Wittgenstein sharply criticized the scientific worldview. He saw the danger in the fact that science seeks to displace other types of worldview and analyze the original spiritual practices, which are based on completely different worldviews. Ontologically, the hypotheses of religion and science about the homogeneity of the phenomena of reality coincide. Therefore, it is inappropriate to say that mythology, religion, or any other cultural practice is worse than the scientific one. Even primitive magical cults are a form of life that organizes human activity. Socio-cultural practices capture human experience in a specific way and can easily function without scientific explanation or generalization that sometimes indicate their incorrectness or falseness. A proponent of scientism always risks presenting alternative views of human and their spiritual practices as erroneous. And this, according to Wittgenstein (1993), is unsatisfactory (p. 119), because any socio-cultural practices are forms of life (varieties of language-games), full of their own meanings and intentions. Their analysis from the standpoint of modern science and the realities of European civilization will be biased. In addition, the scientific worldview tends to change our perceptions of the true dimensions of socio-cultural space. And this can lead to a human’s loss of inner harmony with the world.

Heidegger, in contrast to Wittgenstein, singles out not only the negative impact of technology on the spiritual culture of the community but also other factors that affect the way of human life. In particular, in "The Question Concerning Technology" (1953) he wrote about how technology – the essence of which is nothing but "Enframing" (Ge-stell) – changes the nature around us and how it makes the environment only a means for its successful functioning, no more than part of itself. This state of affairs changes the way of human lives and forms a nihilistic basis for overestimating all spiritual values. The reality, which can lead to the process of excessive technicalization of social life, can threaten the human himself. As Heidegger (1977) explained: "The rule of Enframing threatens man with the possibility that it could be denied to him to enter into a more original revealing and hence to experience the call of a more primal truth" (p. 28). That is, the greatest threat from technology is the possibility of losing the human themselves, in other words, inevitably change their spiritual world, including the way of thinking.

Advances in technology lead to the fact that people stop wanting to think. Growing thoughtlessness today is destroying the inner world of human, who just does not have enough time to think. The human becomes capable of only superficial analysis, calculations, and planning. In his work "Discourse on Thinking" ("Gelassenheit") (1959) Heidegger (1966) called this type of thinking computational and characterized it as follows: "Calculative thinking is not meditative thinking, not thinking which contemplates the meaning which reigns in everything that is" (p. 46). In other words, it is human nature to think about fundamental things – to go beyond individual entities and comprehend the nature of being as a whole, and not calculating like a computer, that is, mechanically performing certain actions without understanding what is happening.

Wittgenstein argues similarly, disagreeing that human nature can be reduced to certain mechanical processes. He contrasted the human with an automaton. Writing about our attitude to the person of another, the thinker analyzed the meaning of the statement "I believe that he is not an automaton" and concluded that "My attitude towards him is an attitude towards a soul" (Wittgenstein, 1968, p. 178). This means that a human is able to experience (feel), understand, suffer, rejoice, and build a network of intersubjective relationships. However, Wittgenstein (1968) immediately clarified: "I am not of the opinion that he has a soul" (p. 178). It was important for him to demonstrate that he did not define the mental (consciousness) through the prism of religious concepts (soul). Concepts such as "soul", "understanding in heart" are convenient means to explain what is happening in the body (in the inner world). Of course, a human can sometimes be compared to a machine, but this will only be a metaphor. In order not to generate ambiguities and misunderstandings, philosophy must clarify the meaning of linguistic terms and phrases. And if the terminological apparatus of science agrees with the procedure of explanation, the philosopher should by no means neglect it in the search for ways to comprehend the truth.

Heidegger (1966) clearly understood this when he said: "We depend on technical devices they even challenge us to ever greater advances" (p. 53). Therefore, it is unwise to deny technological progress. Technology allows us to think again about who a human is and to explore more thoroughly the nature of things. Human still has to develop their attitude to technology, that is, to take both positions at once: to use technology, but also to keep a certain distance from it. This will allow people to avoid becoming addicted to technology. Heidegger (1966) defined such a situation (both "yes" and "no" to technological progress) as alienation (Gelassenheit) – "releasement toward things" (p. 54). Under such conditions, a person will be able to return to basics and still move forward. Going back to the beginning is an unequivocal choice in favor of the human. Such a choice is necessary in the case of an attempt through technical progress to impose inhumane forms of life that threaten the integrity of the human person. By preserving their own identity, particularly in the way of being rooted in tradition (as Heidegger argued), a human builds prospects for humanity and constitutes a secure environment for themselves and future generations.

Originality

The basic principles of anthropological concepts of Wittgenstein and Heidegger are reconstructed in the unity of the study of the transcendental basis of human being, understanding the essence of their inner world and studying the fate of human in the world in the technosphere. It is demonstrated that both thinkers differently defined the inner world of people and their transcendental premises, but at the same time pointed out the importance of language for understanding the essence of human existence and the need for reflection on the anthropological dimension of science and technology.

Conclusions

Thus, Ludwig Wittgenstein and Martin Heidegger in general developed original anthropological concepts, which differed from each other, although they had something in common. In particular, it was important for Wittgenstein to demonstrate how language reflects our inner world and how the human expresses themselves through language. Heidegger, by contrast, considered the world as a reflection of language and studied how it expresses itself through the human. Being on different theoretico-methodological positions (analytic and continental philosophy, respectively), the former, comprehending the being beyond language, came to the concept of the unspeakable, and the latter – to the concept of Nothing. Hence the difference in their view of the ontological status of values: in Wittgenstein, they have a transcendental nature in relation to the world, and in Heidegger, on the contrary, they are immanent to it. Comprehension of the essentially metaphysical foundations of human being is crucial for understanding the nature of human existence in their concepts. However, the Austrian philosopher studied the inner world of the human mainly in the linguo-psychological sphere through the concept of the mental, while for the German thinker the ontological sphere of the concept of self was decisive. In any case, both thinkers understood that the human is in a number of correlations with the world, and their being is increasingly influenced by science and technology. This state of affairs is both an advantage and a challenge for a human, and therefore they must constantly learn to form the right guidelines for life and to affirm moral values in the world.

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Wittgenstein, L. (1979). Letters to Ludwig von Ficker. B. Gillette, Trans. In C. G. Luckhardt (Ed.), Wittgenstein: Sources and Perspectives (pp. 82-98). Ithaca: Cornell University Press. (in English)

Wittgenstein, L. (1993). Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough. A. C. Miles, Trans. In J. Klagge & A. Nordmann (Eds.), Philosophical Occasions, 1912–1951 (pp. 118-155). Indianapolis: Hackett Pub Co Inc. (in German and English)

Wittgenstein, L. (1998). Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology (Vol. 1). Oxford: Basil Blackwell. (in English)

Wittgenstein, L. (2006). Culture and Value. P. Winch, Trans. Chicago: Chicago University Press. (in English)

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Wittgenstein L. Culture and Value / trans. by P. Winch. Chicago : Chicago University Press, 2006. 94 p.

А. С. СИНИЦЯ^1*

^1*Львівський національний університет імені Івана Франка
(Львів, Україна), ел. пошта andrii.synytsia.edu@gmail.com ,
ORCID 0000-0002-0983-7187

КОМПАРАТИВНИЙ АНАЛІЗ ПОГЛЯДІВ

ЛЮДВІҐА ВІТҐЕНШТАЙНА І МАРТІНА

ГАЙДЕҐҐЕРА НА ПРИРОДУ ЛЮДИНИ

Мета. Проаналізувати в компаративному ключі філософські концепції людини, які запропоновані Людвіґом Вітґенштайном і Мартіном Гайдеґґером як основними представниками відповідно аналітичної і континентальної традиції філософування у ХХ столітті. Теоретичний базис дослідження визначений творчим доробком Вітґенштайна у сфері логічного і лінгвістичного аналізу, а також екзистенційними, герменевтичними і феноменологічними ідеями Гайдеґґера. Наукова новизна. На підставі аналізу філософських праць Вітґенштайна і Гайдеґґера реконструйовано вихідні принципи їхніх антропологічних концепцій в єдності трансцендентальних передумов, сутнісних основ і кореляцій до світу за умов техносфери. Продемонстровано, що попри відмінність у трактуванні особливостей інтерпретації царини трансцендентального як позамовного і основних характеристик внутрішнього світу людини, обидва філософи наголошували на осмисленні людського буття через призму мови та на потребі антропологізації науки і техніки. Висновки. Вітґенштайн і Гайдеґґер висловили оригінальні міркування щодо природи людського буття, які цілковито відповідають базовим теоретико-методологічним принципам їхніх філософських концепцій. Перший з них акцентував увагу на тому, як мова віддзеркалює світ людини й слугує засобом вираження її знань та прагнень. Другий, навпаки, витлумачив світ як віддзеркалення мови, що виражає себе через людину. Як прихильник аналітичної методології й відповідно точності у формулюваннях, Вітґенштайн у процесі рефлексії щодо позамовного буття людини прийшов до концепту невимовного. А от в екзистенційному дискурсі Гайдеґґера, який сповнений метафор і неологізмів, буття людини обмежене концептом Ніщо. Як наслідок, зауважено, що онтологічний статус цінностей у Вітґенштайна є трансцендентальним щодо світу, а в Гайдеґґера – іманентним йому. Стверджено, що австрійський мислитель розвинув лінгво-психологічний підхід до вивчення людини через призму ментального, а німецький філософ осмислював людину в онтологічній площині через призму поняття самості. Продемонстровано, як обидва мислителі окреслювали виклики, що постають перед людиною у зв’язку з розвитком науки та техніки, й разом з тим наголошували на важливості обґрунтування їхніх антропологічних основ.

Ключові слова: людина; трансцендентальне; екзистенція; ментальне; самість; мова; техніка

А. С. СИНИЦа^1*

^1*Львовский национальный университет имени Ивана Франко
(Львов, Украина), эл. почта andrii.synytsia.edu@gmail.com,
ORCID 0000-0002-0983-7187

КОМПАРАТИВНЫЙ АНАЛИЗ ВЗГЛЯДОВ

ЛЮДВИГА ВИТГЕНШТЕЙНА И МАРТИНА

ХАЙДЕГГЕРА НА ПРИРОДУ ЧЕЛОВЕКА

Цель. Проанализировать в компаративном ключе философские концепции человека, предложенные Людвигом Витгенштейном и Мартином Хайдеггером как основными представителями соответственно аналитической и континентальной традиций философствования в ХХ веке. Теоретический базис исследования определен трудами Витгенштейна в сфере логического и лингвистического анализа, а также экзистенциальными, герменевтическими и феноменологическими идеями Хайдеггера. Научная новизна. На основании анализа философских трудов Витгенштейна и Хайдеггера реконструировано исходные принципы их антропологических концепций в единстве трансцендентальных предпосылок, сущностных оснований и корреляций к миру в условиях техносферы. Продемонстрировано, что несмотря на различие в трактовке особенностей интерпретации сферы трансцендентального (как внеязыкового) и основных характеристик внутреннего мира человека, оба философа подчеркивали важность осмысления человеческого бытия через призму языка и необходимость антропологизации науки и техники. Выводы. Витгенштейн и Хайдеггер высказали собственные оригинальные рассуждения о природе человеческого бытия, полностью соответствующие базовым теоретико-методологическим принципам их философских концепций. Первый из них акцентировал внимание на том, как язык отражает мир человека и служит средством выражения его знаний и стремлений. Второй, наоборот, истолковал мир как отражение языка, выражающего себя с помощью человека. Как сторонник аналитической методологии и соответственно точности в формулировках, Витгенштейн в процессе рефлексии относительно внеязыкового бытия человека пришел к концепту невыразимого. А вот в экзистенциальном дискурсе Хайдеггера, полном метафор и неологизмов, бытие человека ограничено концептом Ничто. Как следствие, отмечено, что онтологический статус ценностей у Витгенштейна является трансцендентальным миру, а у Хайдеггера – имманентным ему. Утверждается, что австрийский мыслитель развил лингво-психологический подход к изучению человека через призму ментального, а немецкий философ осмыслил природу человека в онтологической плоскости, используя понятие самости. Продемонстрировано, как оба мыслителя определяли вызовы, возникающие перед человеком в связи с развитием науки и техники, и вместе с тем отмечали важность обоснования их антропологических основ.

Ключевые слова: человек; трансцендентальное; экзистенция; ментальное; самость; язык; техника

Received: 19.02.2020

Accepted: 23.11.2020